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In countries where elections are not free or fair, and one political party consistently 
dominates elections, why do citizens bother to vote? If voting cannot substantively 
affect the balance of power, why do millions of citizens continue to vote in these 
elections? Until now, most answers to this question have used macro-level spending 
and demographic data to argue that people vote because they expect a material reward, 
such as patronage or a direct transfer via vote-buying. This dissertation argues, 
however, that autocratic regimes have social and political cleavages that give rise to 
variation in partisanship, which in turn create different non-economic motivations for 
voting behavior. Citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status have the 
resources to engage more actively in politics, and are thus more likely to associate 
with political parties, while citizens with lower levels of socioeconomic status are 
more likely to be nonpartisans. Partisans, however, are further split by their political 
proclivities; those that support the regime are more likely to be ruling party partisans, 
while partisans who mistrust the regime are more likely to support opposition parties. 
In turn, these three groups of citizens have different expressive and social reasons for 
voting. This dissertation argues that ruling party partisans vote out of a sense of civic 
duty, opposition parties vote to improve democracy, and nonpartisans vote when they 
are mobilized by their communities during elections. Overall, the dissertation shows 
that in Cameroon, expressive and social reasons are more important to explaining the 
voting act than economic motivations.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In countries where elections are not free or fair, and one political party 
consistently dominates politics, why do citizens bother to vote? If voting cannot 
substantively affect the balance of power, why do millions of citizens continue to turn 
out in these elections? In Algeria’s 2014 presidential elections, where President 
Bouteflika won his fourth term in office, a reported 11.3 million citizens voted, 
representing 49.4 percent of all registered voters.1 In Belarus, 6.1 million citizens went 
to the polls in 2015 to re-elect longstanding dictator Alexander Lukashenko to his fifth 
term in office.2 And in Cameroon, one of the most stable electoral autocracies in sub-
Saharan Africa, 4.2 million voters turned out in the most recent 2013 parliamentary 
and municipal elections, and 4.9 million voted in the 2011 presidential elections.3 Why 
do these citizens choose to vote when it is clear that elections will not bring change? 
 In Cameroon, one can easily find the expected frustration and apathy one 
would expect in a long-standing electoral autocracy. Across the country, many citizens 
have withdrawn from a political system that they feel does not change through 
elections. Seventy percent of Cameroonians believe that if an election were held 
tomorrow, the ruling party, the Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais 
                                                
1 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Voter Turnout Database; 
http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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(RDPC), would “definitely win a clear majority” of seats in the National Assembly.4 
Citizens from all different backgrounds profess their frustration with this status quo. 
When asked if she voted in the 2011 Presidential elections, a woman in the rural 
opposition heartland of Boyo in the Northwest, who is otherwise sympathetic to the 
opposition,5 claimed that, “I didn’t vote because my vote would not make a 
difference.”6 A young man from Kribi, a small beach town long-dominated by the 
ruling party, stated “I didn’t vote because I don’t believe in the system.”7 A woman 
from the Northwest city of Bamenda, headquarters of the largest opposition party, 
reported negative feelings about all aspects of the political system: “There is no need 
to vote because the outcome is already known beforehand. It’s a waste of time.”8  
Given the current state of affairs, it is not surprising that many Cameroonians feel 
alienated from the political system. 
 And yet millions of citizens choose to vote in elections. Amongst the 
pessimism and disillusionment, there are clear voices of hopefulness and inclusion. 
Many Cameroonians feel strongly that voting is a civic duty, and, regardless of their 
political views, are proud to cast their ballot. A 32 year-old Bamoun man in Foumban 
in the West Region proclaimed that, despite his very strong reservations about the 
                                                
4 Author’s survey: 70.4 percent say the RDPC would definitely win a majority; 7.4 said they probably 
would win a majority; 2.9 said it would be fifty-fifty; 2.4 said they probably wouldn’t win a majority; 
5.6 said they would definitely not win a majority of seats. 11.2 percent said they didn’t know. 
5 She reported that her feelings toward the RDPC were “very negative,” while her feelings toward the 
opposition SDF were “somewhat positive.”  
6Respondent Number 1168. Interviewed on January 25, 2015 in Fundong, Boyo by Brenda Masanga. 
7 Respondent Number 761. Interviewed on November 25, 2014 in Kribi, Océan by Brenda Masanga. 
8 Respondent Number 1024. Interviewed January 23, 2015 in Bamenda II, Mezam by Brenda Masanga. 
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political system,9 “I vote only because it’s obligatory as a citizen. It’s my duty. I am 
not a citizen if I don’t vote.”10 Others are generally satisfied with the political system, 
and vote to support the status quo. A 45 year-old woman in the West put it succinctly: 
“We eat, we sleep, there’s no war. I vote RDPC.”11 For others, despite issues at the 
national level, they are satisfied with local politics. An older woman in an isolated 
village in the East Region confided about her vote choice: “Our mayor started to do 
good things for our community. She planted trees and added a water pump. It’s the 
people that matter, not the party.”12 Others vote less out of a sense of duty or support 
for the status quo, but instead because they feel that voting can bring change to the 
system. As one 50 year-old opposition militant in Belo district expressed: “Even if 
elections are not fair, it's still good to vote because we can participate to expose the 
irregularity that happens. But if we just stay at home it means everything is just 
fine.”13 Clearly, Cameroonians possess a diverse set of political opinions, and perhaps 
surprisingly, a large number of them express genuine reasons for participating in 
elections, even if they know the elections will not result in short-term political change. 
 
Why Do People Vote in Autocratic Elections? 
How can one make sense of these diverse and oftentimes conflicting points of 
view? Why do different people choose to participate in autocratic elections, while 
                                                
9 On a scale from zero to ten, the respondent reported that the level of democracy in Cameroon today is 
a ‘zero.’ In addition, his feelings toward the RDPC are “very negative” and his feelings toward the 
opposition SDF are “somewhat negative.” 
10 Respondent Number 2212. Interviewed March 23, 2015 in Foumbon, Noun by the author. 
11 Respondent Number 2164. Interviewed March 22, 2015 in Foumbot, Noun by the author 
12 Respondent Number 2399. Interviewed April 25, 2015 in Angossas, Haut Nyong by the author 
13 Respondent Number 1275. Interviewed February 1, 2015 in Belo, Boyo by Evelyn Ngu. 
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others do not? From the citizen’s point of view, the existing literature on autocratic 
elections focuses almost exclusively on the importance of material inducements to 
voting, and therefore argues that citizens most susceptible to clientelistic relationships 
will be more likely to vote (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006; Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 
2015). Discussing elections in Jordan, Lust-Okar (2006) perfectly sums up the existing 
approach to political behavior in electoral autocracies:  
That elections are primarily an area of patronage distribution has a 
significant impact on voting behavior. Most obviously, voters tend to cast 
their ballots for candidates whom they think will afford them wasta 
[patronage], and not for reasons of ideology or policy preferences. They 
are also more likely to turn out to the polls when they believe that their 
candidates are close enough to the government to deliver state resources 
(460). 
 
 
Making almost identical assumptions, Shehata (2008) writes that, “In Egypt, as 
elsewhere in the Arab world, people do not vote primarily on the basis of party 
affiliation, electoral program, or ideology, but rather on the provision of services, 
including individual services provided to district residents” (95). While this 
assumption is the cornerstone of our understanding of political behavior in electoral 
autocracies, in fact, it has hardly been tested empirically, particularly from an 
individual-level perspective. Very few studies have actually asked citizens in these 
types of regimes why they choose to vote in elections. 
 While vote-buying and patronage are clearly important factors to 
understanding voting behavior in autocratic contexts, the central argument of this 
dissertation is that it is unlikely that these forms of inducements are the only, or even 
the most important, motivation for voting in autocratic elections. It is impossible for 
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any state to provide special gifts and services to the majority of its citizens during 
every election cycle. Further, when most communities lack basic infrastructure, such 
as piped water or electricity, after decades of multiparty elections, it seems unlikely 
that the majority of people vote because they think that high turnout will result in local 
investments. 
This is particularly true of economically under-developed autocratic regimes, 
where the reach of the state is notoriously weak. Arguably, one of the reasons that the 
literature has focused so substantially on economic incentives for voting is the heavy 
concentration of these studies in regions of the world that feature middle income 
autocracies, which are better positioned to promise and deliver these economic 
incentives to constituents. The literature on electoral autocracies has relied primarily 
on the cases of Mexico and Egypt (Blaydes 2011; Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006), and 
to a lesser extent Russia and Jordan (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014; Gandhi and 
Lust-Okar 2009; Lust 2009; Lust-Okar 2006, 2008); countries where the state is 
relatively strong and capable of running large-scale vote-buying campaigns and 
programs of electoral patronage. This is a critical point because the majority of 
electoral autocracies in the world are in much poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Table 1 presents a global list of contemporary electoral autocracies. For each 
case, the table lists a number of development indicators taken from the World Bank 
(2017): GDP per capita, health expenditure per capita, and percent of the population 
with access to electricity and an improved water source. Cases from sub-Saharan 
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Africa are highlighted, and the averages of sub-Saharan African cases and non-sub-
Saharan African14 cases are listed at the bottom of the table.  
 
Table 1: Cases of Electoral Autocracy and Contemporary Levels of Development 
Country 
GDP per capita 
(PPP,  
Constant 2011 
Dollars) 
Health Expenditure 
per capita (PPP,  
Constant 2011 
Dollars) 
Access to 
Electricity  
(% Pop.)  
Access to 
Improved  
Water Source  
(% Pop) 
Algeria 13,823 932 100 84 
Angola 6,938 239 37 49 
Azerbaijan 16,699 1,047 100 87 
Belarus 16,662 1,031 100 100 
Burundi 683 58 67 76 
Cameroon 2,926 122 54 76 
Chad 2,044 79 6 51 
D.R. Congo 737 32 16 52 
Ethiopia 1,530 73 27 57 
Jordan 10,240 798 100 97 
Kazakhstan 23,522 1,068 100 93 
Malaysia 25,312 1,040 100 98 
Mozambique 1,120 79 20 51 
Rep. Congo 5,993 323 42 77 
Russia 23,895 1,836 100 97 
Rwanda 1,655 125 18 76 
Singapore 80,192 4,047 100 100 
Sudan 4,121 282 33 56 
Tajikistan 2,661 185 100 74 
Tanzania 2,510 137 15 56 
Togo 1,372 76 32 63 
Uganda 1,738 133 18 79 
Zimbabwe 1,678 115 41 77 
Average for SSA 
countries 2,503 134 30 64 
Average for non-
SSA countries* 16,602 992 100 91 
All data from the World Bank Development Indicators Database 
*Excluding Singapore 
 
  
                                                
14 Excluding Singapore, which is a clear development outlier for autocracy. 
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The first thing to note is that of all the contemporary cases of electoral 
autocracy, African countries represent a majority. Of the 23 cases listed in Table 1, 
fourteen countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. However, despite the fact that most 
electoral autocracies are found in Africa, few of our studies of authoritarianism come 
from the region. Indeed, the two most foundational cases for our knowledge of 
electoral autocracy—Mexico and Egypt—are no longer electoral autocracies at all. 
 If electoral autocracy is a unique category of regime type, then does it matter 
where in particular our theories of autocracy are developed? In principle, given the 
similar institutional foundations of the regimes in these countries, the study of any one 
of these cases can shed light on the politics of the others. While, arguably, all cases of 
autocracy can help us to understand politics in other autocracies, it is clear from the 
data in Table 1 that African electoral autocracies are fundamentally different 
economically from electoral autocracies in other regions of the world. On average, 
even excluding Singapore, the GDP per capita of non-African electoral autocracies is 
6.6 times higher than the average electoral autocracy in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 This huge gap in develop would not necessarily matter, except that our existing 
theories rely heavily on economic explanations for political behavior. In nearly every 
study of political participation in electoral autocracies, almost all of which are based 
on studies of middle-income countries, the baseline assumption is that the state 
provides economic incentives to its people in order to maintain power (Blaydes 2011; 
Brownlee 2007; Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014; Gandhi 2008; Greene 2007; 
Magaloni 2006; Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 2015; Svolik 2012). But this assumption is 
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problematic if the state is not strong enough or developed enough to provide these 
resources.  
 As shown in Table 1, the per capita health expenditure of the average electoral 
autocracy outside of Africa is more than seven times as much as the average per capita 
health expenditure of African electoral autocracies. Outside of Africa, there is 100 
percent access to electricity in every single electoral autocracy. In Africa, the average 
coverage is a paltry 30 percent. In Chad, just six percent of the population has access 
to electricity. Similarly, in non-African electoral autocracies, the average country is 
able to provide 91 percent of its citizens with an improved source of water. In African 
electoral autocracies, this figure is just 64 percent. Further, the foundational cases of 
Mexico under the PRI and Egypt under the Mubarak regime were likewise middle-
income countries. For Mexico in 1990, GDP per capita was $12,547 and 96 percent of 
the population had access to electricity, while 82 percent had access to an improved 
water source. Similarly, for Egypt in 2010, GDP per capita was $10,102, 100 percent 
of the population had access to electricity, and 99 percent had access to an improved 
water source. 
 Theories that argue that the majority of citizens vote because they receive or 
expect to receive something from the state implicitly assume that the state is capable 
of providing the majority of its citizens economic rewards for participation. In terms 
of the average contemporary electoral autocracy, this simply may not be the case. In a 
country like Ethiopia, Mozambique, or Tanzania, where the average citizen has seen 
many elections come and go, but continues to lack access to electricity or an improved 
source of water, it seems unlikely that these citizens participate because they believe 
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the state will bring them water and electricity if only they vote again. Further, voter 
turnout in Africa is consistently higher in rural areas (Kuenzi and Lambright 2011), 
precisely where the state is conspicuously absent. For example, in Togo, only nine 
percent of the rural population has access to electricity, and only three percent of rural 
Chadians have electricity.  
 With the existing literature in mind, it is important to note that the argument I 
will present in this dissertation is not that citizens of African autocracies never vote 
because they expect an economic pay-off. Where the state is extremely under-
developed, even a small incentive, such as a sachet of laundry soap or a t-shirt might 
incentivize someone to vote for them, especially if voters see the gift as a symbol of 
more things to come (Kramon 2016). But in contrast to both middle-income countries 
as well as more competitive electoral systems, where the economic promises of the 
state are far more credible for a much larger percentage of the population, this 
dissertation will present evidence that the percentage of citizens in under-developed 
electoral autocracies who vote because of economic incentives is fundamentally 
smaller. Where economic incentives are not credible or prevalent, we must turn to 
non-economic explanations for political behavior. In contrast to the existing literature, 
this dissertation will argue that, apart from economic reasons for voting, citizens also 
participate in elections for expressive and social reasons (Abrams, Iversen, and 
Soskice 2011; Brennan and Hamlin 1998; Campbell 2006; Gerber et al. 2014; Riker 
and Ordeshook 1968).  
In order to understand the expressive and social reasons citizens have for 
voting, it is first necessary to understand the importance of existing socioeconomic 
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and political cleavages in autocracies. Nearly all of our theories of authoritarianism 
start from the perspective of the regime (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 2003; 
Svolik 2012), and, as a result, model political behavior based on the incentives 
provided by the state (Blaydes 2011, see Chapters 4 and 6; Magaloni 2006, see 
Chapter 4). In contrast, this dissertation starts theoretically from the perspective of the 
citizen. Given an individual’s political, social, and economic experiences as a citizen 
of an autocratic state, what reasons would one have for participating in politics? Given 
the political, social and economic differences between citizens, what are the different 
reasons different types of people have for voting? 
I propose that partisanship is a critical factor to answering these questions, and 
that different types of partisans have different reasons for participating in politics. 
First, similar to democratic regimes, partisans of all types—those who support the 
ruling party and those who support the opposition—should be more likely to possess 
higher levels of socioeconomic status (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba 1972, 
1995). Conversely, nonpartisans should have lower levels of socioeconomic status. 
Further, although partisans of all types look similar demographically, they should 
differ in their political beliefs about the state: while ruling party partisans support the 
regime and the status quo, opposition partisans are opposed to the regime, and seek a 
change in power.15 This typology of partisanship is depicted in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                
15 This pro-/anti-regime cleavage in autocracies has been most clearly articulated in theories developed 
by Schmitter and O’Donnell (1986), Bunce and Wolchik (2011), and Schedler (2013), but, to my 
knowledge, none has mapped the cleavage onto a theory of mass-based partisanship.  
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Table 2: Differences between Partisans 
 Pro-Regime Anti-Regime 
High Socioeconomic 
Status Ruling Party Partisans Opposition Partisans 
Low Socioeconomic Status Nonpartisans 
 
 
These basic yet fundamental differences amongst ruling party partisans, 
opposition partisans and nonpartisans can help to explain why different types of 
citizens choose to vote in elections. Because the existing literature has focused on 
economic incentives, variation in voting behavior is often assumed to exist between 
citizens with high or low levels of socioeconomic status (Blaydes 2011; Miguel, 
Jamal, and Tessler 2015). But if citizens have more complex voting motivations apart 
from economic inducements, then voting cannot be explained simply by the divide 
between the rich and the poor. The pro- and anti-regime divide between ruling party 
partisans and opposition partisans shapes their motivations when voting in elections. 
 This dissertation will argue that ruling party partisans, who support the status 
quo and are more likely to see the regime as generally democratic, should be more 
likely to vote when they feel that voting is a civic duty and an expression of patriotism 
or civic pride. In contrast, opposition partisans, who are fundamentally opposed to the 
regime, should be less likely to be motivated by appeals to patriotism and civic duty. 
Opposition partisans should be more likely to vote when they feel that participating in 
elections democratizes the political system as a whole. Opposition partisans who feel 
that voting legitimizes the autocratic state should not be motivated to vote. Finally, 
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nonpartisans, who possess few resources and little social standing, should be less 
influenced by these ideological debates. Instead, nonpartisans should be more likely to 
vote when they are mobilized by their communities. Nonpartisans who feel social 
pressure from their families, friends, communities, and local party elites should be 
more likely to go to the polls on election day. Nonpartisans who do not feel this 
pressure should be less likely to participate.  
 I provide evidence for this theory with original survey data collected in 
Cameroon. The public opinion survey was implemented in seven of Cameroon’s ten 
regions between September 2014 and April 2015. The survey reached 2,399 
respondents in 15 of Cameroon’s 83 electoral districts, and was designed to better 
understand why different types of citizens would vote for different economic, 
expressive, and social reasons. Notes were taken by hand during survey interviews 
when respondents provided explanations for their responses, and supplementary 
quotations are included to support the aggregate survey numbers. I also use interviews 
with elite-level actors from the largest political parties in Cameroon to extend the 
analysis of public opinion and mass political behavior. Finally, I use macro-level 
budgetary and electoral data collected from the archives in Cameroon in order to test 
the “null” hypothesis from the existing literature that government spending and 
patronage are the primary influence on voter turnout.  
 This dissertation offers several contributions to the existing literature on 
electoral behavior and authoritarianism. First, while research into democratic elections 
has explored the causes and consequences of turnout amongst different types of 
partisan groups, the existing work on autocratic elections has not yet explored this 
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cleavage in a systematic manner. This dissertation analytically explores the 
demographic and political cleavages between partisans who support the ruling party, 
partisans who support the opposition, and nonpartisans. Second, as noted already, the 
few existing studies of voter behavior in autocratic regimes rely almost exclusively on 
the assumption that voters receive material benefits in return for their vote. My theory 
proposes that not every citizen votes because she receives or expects to receive 
something, and instead provides a theoretical framework for explaining why different 
types of people may hold different reasons for voting.  
Third, to my knowledge, it is one of only a handful of studies to use micro-
level survey data to understand why people vote in autocratic elections. Further, it is 
the first original, quasi-nationally-representative study in an electoral autocracy 
designed to understand why ordinary people vote.16 Because the survey was 
implemented myself, it provides deeper insights into the thoughts and beliefs of these 
citizens. For example, another contribution of the theory is to propose that different 
types of citizens have different expressive and social reasons for participating, To my 
knowledge, studies of expressive and social voting have not hypothesized why some 
people would be motivated for these reasons more than other types of people. Finally, 
it is the first study to look at political behavior in Cameroon, a non-trivial country of 
22 million citizens. 
 Overall, the goal of this dissertation is to use the vantage point of the ordinary 
citizen to better understand why people participate in autocratic elections. By taking 
seriously the beliefs of citizens, I hope to shift the way in which we understand mass 
                                                
16 Frye, et al. (2014) conduct an original survey in Russia to understand why people vote, but it only 
samples employers and workers in firms. 
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politics in electoral autocracies. The overarching argument of this dissertation is that 
politics are critical to understanding public opinion and political behavior in 
autocracies. Citizens are not just economic actors responding to economic incentives. 
In order to understand why people participate, we must take seriously the role of 
socialization and political learning. This perspective has been dominant in our studies 
of democratic politics for decades (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba 1972), yet remains 
almost entirely ignored in our work on authoritarian politics.  
There are likely a number of reasons for this. First is the relative lack of data in 
autocratic regimes. Second, economic incentives, especially government spending, are 
in general easier to measure than expressive and social reasons for voting. Third, 
economic reasons for voting help to advance a normative argument about democracy 
and authoritarianism. If citizens of autocracies are uniformly repressed, and the 
autocratic regime is fundamentally illegitimate, it is difficult to explain why ordinary 
citizens would vote to legitimize the regime. Economic incentives help to explain 
away what appears to be mass commitment to autocracy. Without apologizing for 
authoritarianism, this dissertation argues that many citizens do not see their 
commitment to the regime as problematic. Even if they receive no material benefits 
from the regime, many people still see the government as legitimate and sometimes 
even democratic. 
Bringing politics into our theories of political behavior in authoritarian regimes 
introduces a wide range of potential implications. For example, while some of political 
science’s classic theories of democratization argue that citizens with low 
socioeconomic status as the backbone of autocratic support (Ansell and Samuels 2014; 
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Lipset 1959b, 1959a), others propose that they are the biggest threat to the regime 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). How does class affect commitment to 
democracy? This dissertation argues that we cannot understand the importance of class 
and socioeconomic status without embedding it within an understanding of political 
beliefs and partisanship in autocratic regimes. Citizens with high socioeconomic status 
are not uniformly for or against the regime. Instead, they possess diverse political 
beliefs based on a number of factors, such as their exposure to the opposition and their 
experiences with the state. Overall, this dissertation calls for renewed attention on the 
micro-level politics of autocracy. Before elaborating this theory of political behavior 
in Chapter Two, the following sections introduce the scope conditions and case 
selection of the dissertation.  
 
Scope Conditions and Electoral Autocracies 
The theory presented in this dissertation utilizes a broad definition of electoral 
autocracy, and includes any hegemonic-party autocratic regime that holds national-
level multiparty elections, which it never loses. Electoral autocracies of all stripes 
cohere around one major feature: the serious unlikeliness of the opposition to win 
elections due to structural disadvantages. Levitsky and Way (2010) famously define 
what they call ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’ as: “civilian regimes in which 
formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of 
gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant 
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advantage vis-à-vis their opponents” (5).17 Not without its detractors (Hyde and 
Marinov 2012), this definition has by-and-large become the default definition for 
many studies in the comparativists literature.  
While my definition generally coincides with that of Levitsky and Way, I am 
less concerned than they are with the ‘competitive’ aspect of their definition. The 
authors (2002) argue that, “It is essential…to distinguish regimes in which democratic 
institutions offer an important channel through which the opposition may seek power 
from those regimes in which democratic rules simply serve as to legitimate an existing 
autocratic leadership” (54). On the one hand, this is an ambiguous clause in their 
definition: if the opposition never wins, how are we to know whether or not elections 
are channels through which the opposition legitimately seeks power?18 For example, 
the authors (2010) note that for an electoral autocracy to be competitive, “Opposition 
parties can open offices, recruit candidates, and organize campaigns, and politicians 
are rarely exiled or imprisoned. In short, democratic procedures are sufficiently 
meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to 
contest power” (7). But Cameroon offers a good example of why this definitional 
clause remains ambiguous: Although the opposition in Cameroon is able to do all of 
these things, elections are simply not competitive or ‘meaningful channels for 
contesting power.’19 In sum, the authors’ insistence on the existence of ‘meaningful’ 
                                                
17 This definition is very similar to Schedler’s (2013), who defines an electoral autocracy as such: 
“Unlike other authoritarian regimes, electoral autocracies establish he entire set of formally 
representative institutions that characterize liberal democracy. Unlike electoral democracies, they 
subject these institutions to severe and systematic manipulation” (6). 
18 See a similar discussion in Morse (2012), pages 171-2. 
19 As noted earlier, 70 percent of Cameroonians expect the ruling party to win a clear majority of seats 
in legislative elections. In fact, most people who think the opposition could win are those who have 
bought the regime’s rhetoric about being democratic. 
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competition introduces a variable that is difficult to measure, and, further, requires an 
ex post facto judgment. As Hyde and Marinov (2012) write, “…if scholars are 
interested in studying the consequences of elections, they should not exclude elections 
based on whether they were consequential. Doing so excludes all cases of elections 
that could have been consequential but were not…” (191). As long as independent 
opposition forces are able to stand in elections, I consider the regime an electoral 
autocracy to which my theory could apply. 
On the other hand, for the purposes of the theory presented in this dissertation, 
the distinction between competitive and uncompetitive is not particularly relevant 
anyways. My theory relies on the existence of opposition and ruling party partisans, 
and so it is critical that an independent opposition exists. However, the likelihood of 
the opposition actually winning is less important. In fact, the theory would likely not 
hold as well in electoral autocracies where the elections are extremely competitive 
because many citizens of all partisan stripes would be more likely to vote for 
instrumental reasons. If citizens believe that the elections could actually result in a 
change in power, many may vote to influence the outcome of the election. So, for 
example, when the opposition in an autocratic regime wins by surprise, such as the 
color revolutions in Eurasia, retroactively, this theory would not pertain to such 
elections. 
Thus, the theory does not apply to closed autocracies, which I consider to be 
regimes that hold single-party elections only (such as the communist regimes in 
China, Vietnam or Laos). Nor should it apply to autocracies where the opposition is 
not fully independent from the state (such as Uzbekistan). In such cases, the 
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opposition is not strong enough to create a sustained group of partisan adherents; a key 
feature of the theory presented in this dissertation.  
In addition to closed autocracies, the theory also does not pertain to non-
autocratic hegemonic party systems. A handful of countries (for example, Botswana 
under the BDP, South Africa under the ANC, Namibia under SWAPO, or Japan for 
much of its history under the LDP) feature all of the hallmarks of democracy (such as 
personal freedoms and liberties, the absence of electoral fraud, a relatively even 
electoral playing field, and full voting rights) but never experience electoral turnover. 
In one sense, if no one believes the opposition can win, then the theory proposed in 
this dissertation may be able to explain voting behavior in hegemonic-party 
democracies. However, the pro-/anti-regime cleavage between partisans in democratic 
regimes is likely less severe than it is in autocratic regimes. In countries where 
individual rights are protected and the opposition is given complete freedom of 
expression and access to the media, opposition partisans should be considerably less 
motivated by their opposition to the state itself, and therefore fundamentally different 
from their cousins in hegemonic-party autocracies. I therefore restrict the scope 
conditions of the theory to electoral autocracies where the opposition is highly 
unlikely to win. 
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Table 3: Voter Turnout in Electoral Autocracies Across the World 
Country Year of Election Type of Election 
Number 
of Voters 
Voter 
Turnout* 
Algeria 2014 Presidential 11,307,478 49.42 
Angola 2012 Parliamentary 6,123,914 62.75 
Azerbaijan 2015 Parliamentary 5,211,765 55.54 
Belarus 2015 Presidential 6,113,013 87.22 
Burundi 2015 Presidential 2,826,072 73.44 
Cameroon 2013 Parliamentary 4,208,796 76.79 
Chad 2011 Presidential 2,765,765 55.71 
D.R. Congo 2011 Concurrent 18,911,572 59.05 
Ethiopia 2015 Parliamentary 34,351,444 93.22 
Jordan 2013 Parliamentary 1,282,550 56.45 
Kazakhstan 2015 Presidential 9,090920 95.21 
Malaysia 2013 Parliamentary 11,257,147 84.84 
Mozambique 2014 Concurrent 5,333,665 48.64 
Rep. Congo 2009 Presidential 1,380,651 66.42 
Russia 2012 Presidential 71,701,665 65.27 
Rwanda 2013 Parliamentary 5,881,874 98.8 
Singapore 2015 Parliamentary 2,304,331 93.56 
Sudan 2015 Concurrent 6,091,412 46.40 
Tajikistan 2015 Parliamentary 3,540,760 82.00 
Tanzania 2015 Concurrent 15,596,110 67.34 
Togo 2015 Presidential 2,138,438 60.94 
Uganda 2011 Concurrent 8,272,760 59.29 
Zimbabwe 2013 Presidential 3,480,047 54.38 
*Percent of all registered voters 
Source: http://www.idea.int/vt/ 
 
 
Table 3 presents a list of such electoral autocracies (the same list from Table 
1), and their reported levels of voter turnout in each one’s most recent national 
election. Examples of electoral autocracies include countries that feature a prominent 
dictator, such as Russia under President Vladimir Putin or Rwanda under President 
Paul Kagame. However the theory should also hold in hegemonic-party regimes with a 
rotating executive, such as Mozambique under FRELIMO or Tanzania under the 
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CCM. Though, perhaps, our archetypical image of an electoral autocracy features a 
strong party that shares power amongst a coterie of elites,20 most of the regimes listed 
in Table 3 actually feature a dictator. The presence or absence of such dictators is 
important for understanding a host of important regime dynamics. For example, much 
of everyday politics in these types of regimes (Cameroon included) revolves around 
rumors and whispers of succession plans and the health of the President. Nonetheless, 
the existence of an autocrat has little effect on the theory presented in this paper, as 
partisanship and voter turnout should not look fundamentally dissimilar in regimes 
with or without a strong executive. 
Relatedly, the theory should also pertain to both electoral autocracies that 
feature a deeply-embedded, mass-based ruling party as well as those with a weakly-
rooted elite-based ruling party. Again, in part because of the literature’s reliance on the 
foundational case of Mexico (Greene 2007; Lawson 2002; Magaloni 2006), the 
popular image of a hegemonic political party is one with strong levels of partisanship 
and mass-based membership. But this is not a necessary feature of an electoral 
autocracy. While countries such as Malaysia under UMNO or Singapore under the 
PAP have relied historically on the cultivation of partisanship amongst ordinary 
citizens, this is not a universal feature of autocratic ruling parties. For example, 
although the UNIR/RPT party has ruled in Togo since 1969, according to Round 5 
data from the Afrobarometer, only 24 percent of Togolese reported feeling close to the 
party (see Chapter Two). The primary implication of this distinction for my theory is 
                                                
20 This is likely the prominent view for two reasons. First is the foundational work of Geddes (2003) 
who makes a purposefully strong distinction between personal dictatorships and party autocracies. 
Second, much of our foundational empirical work on electoral authoritarianism comes out of Mexico 
during the PRI era (Greene 2007; Lawson 2002; Magaloni 2006), which featured a rotating executive. 
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that the ratio of ruling party partisans to opposition partisans to nonpartisans would 
vary depending on the nature of the ruling party. However, I argue that regardless of 
how much the ruling party attempts to cultivate partisans, the same socioeconomic and 
political cleavages should prevail, and this is what should matter for predicting 
political participation. 
Finally, as noted earlier, the theory should also apply to both economically 
developed autocracies such as Kazakhstan and Malaysia, as well as economically 
underdeveloped electoral autocracies like Chad and Uganda. Though the content of 
the theory was inspired by electoral autocracies with weak states and underdeveloped 
economies, it should nonetheless travel to developed autocracies as well. Where the 
state is incapable of delivering promises of patronage and vote-buying, expressive and 
social reasons for participating should be overwhelmingly dominant. However, even 
where such promises are credible, we should still expect to see different types of 
partisans participating for different social and expressive reasons. Even where the state 
is strong, it cannot possibly provide the majority of its citizens with gifts and 
investments during each election cycle. Thus, while perhaps a smaller percentage of 
the population may participate for expressive and social reasons (when compared to 
less developed electoral autocracies), there should still be a large number who do so.21  
In general, the dissertation is not overly concerned with the role that elections 
play in demarcating the line between democracy and authoritarianism, or the 
possibility that they will lead to democratization. Indeed, since the 1990s, many 
scholars have been interested in autocratic subtypes, and how the various 
                                                
21 What percentage exactly remains an empirical question left for future research. See the Conclusion 
for a discussion of future research agendas. 
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characteristics of elections affect the line between distinct categories of non-
democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2013). 
Others have focused on whether electoral autocracies are a shifting category inevitably 
moving toward democracy (Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006; Schedler 
2002b), or instead a static and distinct category separate from both democracy and 
authoritarianism (Carothers 2002; Hale 2011). Bunce and Wochik (2011) note the 
“…very different reading by scholars of what motivates authoritarian leaders to 
‘decorate’ their regimes with seemingly democratic institutions, and what these 
explanations imply in turn about the likelihood of more authentic democratic politics 
in the future” (10). On the one hand, scholars of democratization tend to focus on the 
weakness of autocratic leaders and how this weakness tends to translate into regime 
change. On the other hand, scholars of authoritarianism argue that autocrats adopt 
democratic features from a position of strength, and use them to consolidate their rule 
(ibid, 10-12). While these are all critical issues in considering autocratic elections, the 
theory presented here is agnostic about the political trajectory of electoral autocracies. 
While my theory might shed light on the nature of variation in autocratic elections and 
what this may mean for autocratic stability,22 it is not a question I answer in this 
dissertation. 
 
 
                                                
22 For example, in regimes with high levels of ruling party partisanship, high levels of voter turnout 
might indicate regime stability. Inversely, where partisanship is low, high turnout may be a sign of 
instability. In contrast, where partisanship is high and turnout low, we may expect regime legitimacy to 
be in question. However, for regimes with low levels of partisanship, demobilization is likely the 
desired outcome for the election.  
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Cameroon 
In order to test the theory presented in this dissertation, I use evidence from 
Cameroon, a stable autocratic regime in Central Africa that has held regular multiparty 
elections since 1992. The President of Cameroon, Paul Biya, came to power in 1982 
and is now one of the longest-ruling civilian presidents in the world. Before his 
succession, Cameroon held single-party elections regularly. However in 1992, under 
immense domestic and international pressure, Biya opened the electoral process to 
opposition parties, harshly cracking down on them in the early years of the transition. 
Today, overt repression and electoral fraud during elections is rare, and state-
sanctioned electoral violence is virtually nonexistent. Nonetheless, the opposition 
continues to face major structural impediments to gaining power, such as 
gerrymandering, unfair electoral laws, and grossly unequal access to state resources 
(Albaugh 2011, 2014, Chapter 6; Takougang 2003; Takougang and Krieger 1998). In 
the most recent elections held in 2013, the hegemonic political party, the 
Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais (RDPC), received 148 out of 
180 legislative seats, and in 2011 President Paul Biya received 78 percent of the 
popular vote. These results have not varied considerably since the founding multiparty 
elections, and there is little hope for this to change as long as Biya is President 
(Pigeaud 2011). See Chapter Three for a more in-depth discussion of politics in 
Cameroon. 
 Although few people in Cameroon expect the opposition to win elections (as 
noted earlier, 70 percent report that if an election were held tomorrow, the RDPC 
would win a majority of seats in the National Assembly and President Biya would win 
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re-election), national elections are still an important event in the country. Overall, 70.1 
percent of Cameroonians reported voting in the 2013 legislative and municipal 
elections (compared to the official figure of 76.8 percent of registered voters). Further, 
91.6 percent of Cameroonians reported that they felt somewhat or completely free to 
vote for whomever they wanted. When asked whether they were threatened during the 
previous election, less than 4 percent of respondents responded affirmatively.23  
Cameroon shares certain features with some electoral autocracies, but diverges 
from others. Crucially, the RDPC dominates politics because of an extremely 
advantageous playing field. Few people in Cameroon expect the opposition to come to 
power through elections while President Biya is alive. In general, most believe that if a 
regime transition were to occur, it will happen once Biya, who is now 84 years-old, 
leaves politics. In this sense, President Biya dominates politics, making Cameroon 
more similar to cases like Russia under Putin or Angola under President José Eduardo 
dos Santos than to electoral autocracies like Tanzania or Malaysia, where the power of 
the executive is checked by the party. Similarly, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, 
the RDPC is not a massed-based party like the CCM in Tanzania or FRELIMO in 
Mozambique. The party does not go out of its way to cultivate partisans, and instead is 
used primarily to coopt and control elites.  
Finally, as shown in Table 1, the state in Cameroon is notoriously weak and 
the economically underdeveloped. While not as poor as Burundi or the DRC, 
Cameroon’s economy is tiny in comparison to countries like Belarus or Kazakhstan. 
                                                
23 Figures from the author’s survey: 75.6 percent reported that they were completely free; 16.0 reported 
that they were somewhat free; 3.8 said they were not very free; 3.6 said they were not at all free; 1.0 
percent said they didn’t know. 
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This makes Cameroon an easy test of my theory, as expressive and social reasons for 
voting should be more prominent in countries where the state is weak. Overall, 
however, although electoral autocracies vary in numerous institutional and historical 
capacities, Cameroon shares important features with other electoral autocracies, most 
importantly, in the overwhelming dominance of the RDPC.  
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
The following chapter answers the question of why people vote in autocratic 
elections by presenting the central theory of the dissertation. The theory hinges on two 
arguments. First, partisanship captures important socioeconomic and political divides 
in electoral autocracies. Partisans of all types (those who support the ruling party and 
those who support the opposition) should be more likely to possess higher levels of 
socioeconomic status than nonpartisans. Citizens with more resources, higher levels of 
education, and denser professional networks should be more likely to actively support 
a political party (whether the ruling party or the opposition). I argue that this cleavage 
is important to understanding electoral behavior in autocracies. Second, the 
motivations behind voting vary according to degree and direction of partisanship, and 
these motivations are not solely economic. While the existing literature assumes that 
citizens vote in autocratic elections primarily in expectation of a gift or a reward, I 
propose that, similar to democratic regimes, citizens of autocracies may instead vote 
for expressive or social reasons. Together, the theory argues that different types of 
partisans have different reasons for voting. This chapter also introduces the survey 
used to provide evidence for the theory. 
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 Chapter Three seeks to better understand the nature of partisanship in 
Cameroon. It begins with a history of the major contemporary political parties in 
Cameroon (RDPC, SDF, UNDP, and UDC); the roles they played during the 1992 
transition; their geographic strengths and limitations; and how they have changed (and 
stayed the same) during the past 25 years. It then discusses the various ways in which 
Cameroonian political parties attempt to garner supporters, and how everyday citizens 
view the parties. Finally, this chapter provides evidence from the survey about the 
demographic characteristics of partisans and nonpartisans, showing that 
socioeconomic status explains much of the variation between them. It also discusses 
the different political beliefs that divide partisans of the ruling party from partisans of 
the opposition. 
 Chapter Four provides evidence for the core theory of the dissertation. It shows 
that there are many reasons for voting in autocratic elections, and that non-
instrumental reasons can be just as strong, or stronger, than instrumental ones. Further, 
it demonstrates that different types of citizens—partisans who support the ruling party, 
partisans who support the opposition, and nonpartisans—have different reasons for 
voting. 
 Using macro-level budgetary data and voter turnout figures, Chapter Five 
shows that there is no clear correlation between reported government spending and 
voting behavior. Using original data collected from the government ministries in 
Cameroon, this chapter attempts to find a correlation between spending and voter 
turnout. Looking at different types of elections (legislative and municipal versus 
presidential) and different directions of causality, the data reveals that there is not a 
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strong relationship between spending and turnout in Cameroon. Although the data 
cannot conclusively show that there is no relationship between patronage and voting in 
Cameroon, it suggests that the relationship is not universal, and that government 
spending is not solely dictated by mass political behavior. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of this finding, arguing that the Cameroonian government is more 
concerned with elite cooptation and management than it is with electoral mobilization. 
 Finally, the concluding chapter discusses the implications of the theory and 
empirical findings of this dissertation. Complicating the assumptions of voting 
behavior in autocratic elections is important for two reasons. First, by relaxing the 
assumption that most citizens vote because they expect a material reward, we can 
explain the longevity of some of the poorest and most under-performing electoral 
autocracies in the world, such as Cameroon. When states can develop legitimacy 
outside of clientelistic networks, they are able to endure decades of economic 
stagnation. Second, if we assume that a regime’s legitimacy is tied exclusively to 
economic pay-offs, then an electoral autocracy’s primary base of support is the 
beneficiaries of these rewards. However, if different groups of citizens have different 
reasons for participating in politics, and vote-buying is not prevalent, then 
understanding who supports the regime and why is critical to understanding regime 
legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A THEORY OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTOCRATIC REGIMES 
 
 
As Gandhi and Lust-Okar have noted (2009), the scholarship on elections in 
autocracies “has focused on exploring the relationships between elections and 
democratization…[and] these tendencies have kept political scientists from asking a 
wide range of questions about the micro-level dynamics of authoritarian elections…” 
(404). Indeed, the vast majority of the foundational studies on electoral autocracies 
have concentrated on the macro-level implications of holding elections, such as why 
dictators would hold elections in the first place (Brownlee 2011; Svolik 2012), how 
elections can stabilize autocratic regimes (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006; Wright 2008), or, on 
the other hand, lead to democratization, at least under certain conditions (Donno 2013; 
Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006; Schedler 2002b; Wolchik and Bunce 
2006). A few studies occupy a middle-level of analysis, looking at the candidates who 
stand in autocratic elections (Greene 2007; Lawson 2002; Lust-Okar 2006; Reuter and 
Gandhi 2011; Shehata 2008). 
 Though most studies of electoral autocracies focus on macro-level questions, 
the few studies that explore micro-level political behavior tend to treat citizens as 
having homogenous preferences. These theories argue that citizens in autocratic 
regimes participate in elections because they expect a material reward in exchange for 
their vote (Magaloni 2006; Blaydes 2011). Thus, where social cleavages exist in these 
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studies, they lie between the rich and the poor, depending on who is best positioned to 
receive such economic rewards. Due to the lack of alternative conceptualizations of 
voting behavior, these theories imply that citizens who are not embedded in 
clientelistic networks simply have no reason to vote in elections.24 Further, these 
arguments are largely tested using macro-level public spending figures and voter 
turnout data.  
 For example, Magaloni’s (2006) analysis of Mexico under the PRI shows that 
from 1989 to 1994 a poverty relief program (PRONASOL) spent more money in PRI-
controlled municipalities that were considered “swing districts” than it spent in 
heavily-controlled PRI districts or in opposition strongholds. She argues that the 
government used such spending to encourage people to vote for them in elections. 
Blaydes (2011) goes as far as to state that “the majority of voters in Egypt make their 
voting decision based on clientelistic considerations” (101). She shows that in Egypt 
under the Mubarak regime, electoral districts with higher vote shares for the 
opposition received fewer water and sewer improvement projects. She also argues that 
citizens were motivated to vote during elections due to vote-buying by showing 
through an ecological inference strategy that illiterate citizens were more likely to vote 
during parliamentary elections.  
 Although less concerned with mass political behavior per se, Pepinsky (2007) 
finds that Malaysian budgetary spending patterns cycle with the electoral calendar, 
suggesting that the Malaysian government spends more on public goods during 
elections in order to increase voter turnout. He argues that in electoral autocracies, 
                                                
24 Some authors have noted in passing that opposition voters may be motivated by ideological 
commitments, but have not investigated these claims empirically.  
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elections offer a focal point for patronage spending and are used to reward supporters 
and punish opponents. While the study does not make direct claims about voting 
motivations, the implication is that citizens are driven to support the regime during 
elections through incentives provided by government patronage networks.  
 Collectively, this body of work methodically and systematically demonstrates 
that these autocratic states are spending in a way that correlates with voting behavior 
and election cycles. However, due to the limitations of the macro-level data, they 
cannot show whether or not individuals are affected by this logic of spending. To my 
knowledge, only three studies have used individual-level data to analyze why people 
vote in authoritarian elections. Miguel, et al. (2015) look at Arabarometer pooled 
survey data and find several reasons for voting in autocratic elections in the Middle 
East and North Africa. First, although the authors find that citizens who use clientelist 
networks are more likely to vote, in contrast to Blaydes (2011) they also find that this 
relationship is strongest amongst high-income citizens. The authors argue that high-
income citizens are better networked than low-income citizens, and therefore better 
positioned to benefit from clientelism and the regime more generally. Second, the 
authors also argue that citizens of autocratic regimes engage in economic voting, 
rewarding the regime with their vote when the economic climate is favorable and 
abstaining altogether when the economy is bad. Further, they argue that this 
relationship between economic evaluation and voting is mediated by overall trust in 
the government.  
 Methodologically, Miguel, et al.’s foundational study is compelling: it is the 
first to use micro-level survey data to investigate why ordinary citizens participate in 
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autocratic elections. However, the analysis leaves several open questions. First, 
because it uses Arabarometer data, which is a general public opinion survey, it does 
not ask respondents directly why they participate in elections. Second, although the 
study begins to theorize voting behavior in terms of motivations outside of patronage 
networks, its reliance on economic motivations ignores a host of expressive and social 
reasons for participating in politics. Finally, although it takes trust in the regime 
seriously—a cleavage that I agree is fundamental to understanding voting behavior in 
autocracies—it does not systematically theorize which types of citizens trust the 
regime or why. This dissertation builds on Miguel, et al.’s work by using similar 
micro-level data, but pushes the literature forward by answering some of these open 
theoretical and methodological questions. 
 In addition, Croke, et al. (2016) find that in Zimbabwe, education is negatively 
related to voter turnout. The authors argue that citizens with more education have the 
resources to engage with politics, but have more democratic values and are also better 
equipped to criticize the regime in power, and therefore are less inclined to participate 
in autocratic elections. This is a fascinating finding because, in many ways, it 
contradicts Miguel, et al.’s conclusions, since they find that higher levels of 
socioeconomic status increase participation through clientelism. In addition, there is 
an inherent tension with many of the assumptions outlined in the literature on 
authoritarianism, which tends to assume that citizens with high levels of 
socioeconomic status will support the autocratic status quo because they benefit from 
it economically (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003). However, the analysis 
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focuses more on why people with high levels of education abstain from autocratic 
elections, without dwelling much on the reasons why some citizens do participate. 
 Finally, using a survey of the employees of firms in the regional capitals of 
Russia, Frye, et al. (2014) find that 25 percent of workers were mobilized to vote by 
their employers. The authors argue that economic coercion can be a significant cause 
of voter turnout in electoral autocracies. While this dissertation does not argue against 
the existence of such economic coercion, particularly in more economically developed 
electoral autocracies, according to the authors’ figures (p. 211), about 44 percent of 
their total sample was formally employed by private firms. If 25 percent of these 
employees were mobilized by their employers, this accounts for roughly 11 percent of 
Russian voters. While this is no doubt an important minority of voters to understand, 
the number of formally employed citizens in Cameroon, or any other under-developed 
electoral autocracy, is a fraction of this number. Therefore, the theory presented in this 
dissertation aims to better understand the voting behavior of citizens who lack 
economic ties to the state, which arguably constitutes the majority of voters in all 
electoral autocracies, and the vast majority of voters in poor autocracies such as 
Cameroon. 
 Notably, while some of the literature argues that citizens with low levels of 
socioeconomic status (SES) should be more inclined to vote in autocratic elections 
(Blaydes 2011; Croke et al. 2016), others contend that citizens with high levels of SES 
should be more likely to vote (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014; Miguel, Jamal, and 
Tessler 2015). Do citizens with more education and more resources benefit from the 
regime, and therefore support the status quo? Or do these resources and critical 
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thinking skills drive high SES citizens to disengage from politics altogether? I argue 
that socioeconomic status alone is not enough to understand political behavior in 
electoral autocracies. Instead, SES must be contextualized by political beliefs; citizens 
with high SES are more likely to be partisans, but sometimes they support the ruling 
party, and sometimes they support the opposition. This pro-/anti-regime divide may 
explain bifurcated theoretical expectations about their participation. High SES citizens 
who support the opposition may be more likely to disengage from politics, especially 
when they feel that their participation makes no difference to the system. On the other 
hand, high SES citizens who support the ruling party may be more likely to participate 
because they support the status quo and the regime in power. The following sections 
discuss the importance of partisanship in explaining voting behavior in electoral 
autocracies. 
 
Partisanship in Electoral Autocracies 
A whole host of micro-level dynamics has yet to be explored by scholars of 
electoral autocracies. For example, despite being heavily studied in democratic 
contexts, I argue that one of the most critical (yet overlooked) cleavages in autocratic 
regimes is between partisans and nonpartisans (Carlson 2015). Partisans are citizens 
who feel close to a political party, whether the ruling party or the opposition. 
Nonpartisans, on the other hand, do not feel close to any party. Just like in 
democracies (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), nonpartisans are critical to understanding 
voter turnout in electoral autocracies. In Cameroon, nonpartisans represent roughly 61 
percent of all citizens, and further, 60 percent of all nonpartisans reported voting in the 
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last election.25 Figure 1 below shows levels of partisanship in electoral autocracies 
surveyed by the Afrobarometer (Round 5). While Cameroon sits at the low end of 
partisanship, there is clearly wide variation in Africa, ranging from 37 percent in Togo 
to 86 percent in Tanzania. Understanding the voting behavior of nonpartisans is 
therefore just as important as focusing on the opinions and behaviors of partisans. 
   
Figure 1: Reported Levels of Partisanship in African Electoral Autocracies, 
Afrobarometer Round 5 
 
 
 
I contend that in electoral autocracies, similar to democratic regimes 
(Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995), partisans of all types should tend to come from higher socioeconomic groups. 
                                                
25 Data from author’s survey. 61.3 percent reported not feeling close to any party. 13.3 felt close, but 
not very close; 14.9 felt somewhat close; 10.3 felt extremely close; 0.16 didn’t know. 
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Just like in democracies, citizens who actively align themselves with a political 
party—whether the ruling party or the opposition—have the time and resources to 
participate in politics. They possess the capacity to engage locally within party 
structures, and importantly, are expected by their communities to participate in 
politics. In the context of Cameroon, as elsewhere, socioeconomic status includes such 
factors as wealth, education, gender, age, and to a certain extent, urban or rural locality 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). 
 First and foremost, wealth, education, gender, age, and locality, create social 
expectations for individuals from privileged groups to participate actively in local 
party politics. Particularly in developing countries, older men are considered to be the 
opinion leaders of their communities. For example, Bratton (1999) finds that in 
Zambia, gender—being male—predicts political participation better than any other 
single factor. The likelihood of older men dominating political networks is likely 
magnified in rural areas, where traditional gender roles are more deeply ingrained.  
Village elders—older men from rural areas—are often the default conduit between 
political parties and local populations. Whereas women, the youth, and citizens with 
lower levels of socioeconomic status are not expected to be politically active, older 
men with higher levels of socioeconomic status face much higher social expectations 
to engage with politics. Thus, these types of citizens should be much more likely to 
report feeling close to a political party (whether the ruling party or a local opposition 
party). 
 To a lesser extent—particularly in poorer autocracies—citizens with higher 
levels of education and income should also be more likely to be partisans because of 
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their professional or business networks (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, et al. 
1995). This dynamic is likely magnified for ruling party partisans in both developing 
countries, where an unusually large proportion of salaried jobs are created by the state 
(van de Walle 2001), as well as in electoral autocracies, where the state is synonymous 
with the ruling party. In many electoral autocracies, citizens who work for the 
government are more likely to support and vote for the ruling party (Widner 1992). 
Citizens whose livelihoods are dependent on the regime in power are likely to be 
much more supportive of it in general. Not only does this logic affect civil servants 
and bureaucrats, but also teachers, soldiers and employees of parastatal companies, 
who receive their salaries from the government. Thus in electoral autocracies, citizens 
from privileged socioeconomic groups should be more likely to have salaried jobs 
with the state, which in turn are deeply embedded in partisan networks, particularly for 
the ruling party (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014). However, although they may be an 
interesting minority of voters to understand, the total number of formal public sector 
employees in any given electoral autocracy is likely not a major proportion of 
partisans or voters. 
 In comparison to partisans, nonpartisans should be more likely to come from 
under-privileged groups in society who have fewer resources to devote to politics. 
Likewise, they are less likely to have salaried jobs, and are thus less likely to be 
embedded in the ruling party networks that have engulfed the public sector in many 
low- and middle-income electoral autocracies. As noted, women and young people 
from traditional societies are not expected to participate actively in politics, at least 
relative to older men. This is reflected in the existence across Africa of ‘youth’ and 
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‘women’s’ branches of political parties.26 These special organs are created to include 
women and young people because it is implied that the positions of leadership in the 
regular party hierarchy are reserved for older men. In general, the social expectations 
placed on both the youth and women are less likely to include political leadership, 
regardless of whether one is politically active with the ruling party or the opposition. 
As a result, if partisans from both sides of the political spectrum are demographically 
similar, then perhaps their true counterpoint is nonpartisans. In some ways 
nonpartisans, not opposition partisans, are the true underbelly of autocratic politics. 
 
Variation in Reasons for Voting 
Using this typology of partisanship, I propose that different groups of citizens 
should have different reasons for voting in autocratic elections, and that not all of 
these reasons revolve around economic issues. In building this argument, I suggest 
that the puzzle of voter turnout in autocratic regimes is not so different from the puzzle 
of voter turnout in democratic regimes. In democratic elections, theories of turnout 
have found that instrumental reasons for voting are not very good at explaining voting 
behavior (Fiorina 1976; Geys 2006). The infamous “D-term,” which captures non-
instrumental motivations, does much of the explanatory work in describing who votes 
in democracies.  
 People do not usually vote because they believe that they can personally affect 
the outcome of the election (Blais, et al. 2000). Instead, voter turnout is better 
predicted by expressive and social factors, such as one’s sense of civic duty (Riker and 
                                                
26 For example, in Cameroon, “L’Organisation des Femmes du RDPC” (OFRDPC) and “L’Organisation 
des Jeunes du RDPC” (OJRDPC).  
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Ordeshook 1968), a desire to ‘cheer’ for a particular political party (Brennan and 
Hamlin 1998), or, alternatively, because it is important to them that others know that 
they vote (Abrams, Iversen, and Soskice 2011; Campbell 2006; Gerber et al. 2014). 
Although the general concept of expressive and social voting can be brought into the 
framework of autocratic elections, the original theories do not account for why 
different types of people might hold different reasons for participating in politics. 
They implicitly presume that these expressive motivations are randomly distributed 
within the population, rather than associated with partisanship or socioeconomic 
status. I build on these theories by arguing that different types of citizens have 
different reasons for voting in autocratic elections, specifically by looking at partisans 
who support the ruling party, partisans who support the opposition, and nonpartisans.  
 
Ruling Party Partisans 
Partisans in autocratic regimes are fundamentally divided by their political 
beliefs about the state. The principal political cleavage in electoral autocracies is 
between supporting and opposing the regime itself. As Riedl (2014) argues for 
transitioning regimes in Africa, “The most salient cleavage [during democratization] is 
the anti-incumbent regime cleavage: the ruling party argues for democratic stability 
and peace to result from its continued leadership, whereas the opposition claims that it 
is the only true party of democracy” (174). The same logic holds true in electoral 
autocracies, where the ruling party and the opposition make identical arguments. 
Similarly, Schedler (2013) describes his ‘political institutionalist’ approach to 
authoritarianism, which “…focuses on the conflictive interaction between pro-regime 
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and anti-regime actors. The former defend the political status quo, the latter strive to 
transform it” (10). I argue that in electoral autocracies, this cleavage maps onto 
partisanship: While opposition supporters are committed to democratization and a 
turnover in power, ruling party supporters value the stability of the regime over 
democratic reform.  
 In electoral autocracies, opposition parties are uniquely situated to ‘own’ the 
issue of democratization (Bleck and van de Walle 2013; Letsa 2016a). Opposition 
parties, by definition, have little experience in government, and therefore have few 
concrete accomplishments to point to, particularly in regards to economic 
development and especially security. This is not to say that the issues of economic 
development or security are ignored by opposition parties; they most certainly use 
these issues to criticize the ruling party’s past incompetence or weaknesses. However, 
while opposition parties in electoral autocracies can use economic and security issues 
to criticize the ruling party, it is difficult for them to own these issues, having little 
past experience with which to point. 
 In contrast, opposition parties can and do own the issue of democratization. By 
and large, democracy is the bread-and-butter campaign issue of opposition parties in 
electoral autocracies. Not only are issues of democratization (such as the reform of 
electoral rules or the redrawing of electoral districts) critical to the fundamental 
survival of the opposition (Schedler 2002b), these issues are also nearly impossible for 
the ruling party to own. In electoral autocracies, the ruling party’s credibility as a 
symbol of democracy is tenuous at best. By definition, these parties have been ruling 
for decades, using their powers of incumbency to disadvantage the opposition and 
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manipulate the institutions of democracy to their personal advantage. Although they 
can and do deny accusations of abuse, democracy is hardly an issue that ruling parties 
can easily take ownership of. As a result, their platforms focus much more heavily on 
economic development and national security. Further, the narratives that they produce 
are predicated on the idea that the regime is already democratic, and that democratic 
consolidation is a secondary issue to more important concerns, such as the economy 
and the security of the state. Given the inexperience of the opposition in governing, 
the ruling party is better positioned to own issues of economic development and 
stability.  
 Because of this political divide, I argue that ruling party partisans who support 
the regime most strongly, and thus, due to the conflation between the ruling party and 
the state, feel a sense of civic duty towards the state, will be most likely to participate 
in elections. Tending to come from privileged groups in society, ruling party 
supporters may be the most likely to expect local investments or patronage in return 
for voting, but if vote-buying campaigns target the poor (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 
2006), ruling party supporters are probably not voting overwhelmingly because they 
have sold their votes. Instead, ruling party partisans are more likely to vote when they 
feel that voting is a civic duty.  
 There are a number of different mechanisms through which a sense of civic 
duty induces ruling party partisans to vote in elections. First and foremost, due to the 
conflation between the ruling party and the state in most electoral autocracies, voting 
for the ruling party is often seen as an act of patriotism. Thus, where ruling party 
supporters may feel pride to express this duty, opposition supporters and nonpartisans 
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who believe that voting is a civic duty may not feel any more inclined to vote than 
citizens who think of voting as a choice (as opposed to a duty), since they are less 
likely to feel a strong attachment to the state. 
 This inclination is likely nurtured by the state itself, which often teaches 
through public school curricula and voter registration campaigns that voting is a duty. 
However, such government messages are likely to affect ruling party partisans more 
than other types of citizens for two reasons. First, if partisans of all types come from 
backgrounds of relative privilege, then they are more likely to have received more 
education, and therefore received more messages equating voting as a civic duty 
(Zaller 1992). Thus, citizens with more education may be both more likely to support 
a political party as well as to believe that voting is a civic duty. Secondly, however, 
citizens who are inclined to support the ruling party are more likely to internalize this 
message than citizens who are inclined to support the opposition. Citizens who support 
the ruling party are more likely to find state messages credible.  
 Croke, et al.’s (2016) findings from Zimbabwe complicate the relationship 
between education, political participation, and support for the ruling party in autocratic 
regimes. On the one hand, education increases one’s resources, and therefore one’s 
capacity to participate in politics. In addition, it increases a citizen’s exposure to state 
communications, which might increase their proclivity to support the ruling party. 
However, as Croke, et al. argue, education can also increase one’s capacity to think 
critically, and therefore more education may lead to increased support for opposition 
parties. We may expect to find an inverted U-shaped relationship between education 
and partisanship, whereby the least and most educated citizens are the least likely to 
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join the ruling party. As Geddes and Zaller (1989) find in authoritarian-era Brazil, 
citizens with the strongest levels of support for the autocratic regime are those who 
receive messages from the state, but are not inclined to criticize or question these 
messages.  Thus although partisans of all types may be more likely to receive the 
message that voting is a civic duty, ruling party partisans are more likely to accept and 
internalize this message. Further, I propose that those ruling party partisans who have 
done so will be more likely to participate in elections.  
 
Opposition Partisans 
Opposition supporters, on the other hand, are politically committed to 
democratization over stability and regime continuity. Although opposition partisans 
might have diverse goals, such as to improve corruption or governance (Beissinger 
2013), democracy is the bedrock of the opposition’s platform, and partisans in 
particular (not just anti-regimes nonpartisans) should be most affected by the symbolic 
relationship between the act of voting and democratization. I hypothesize that 
opposition partisans should be less likely than ruling party partisans to believe that 
voting is a civic duty, and should be less motivated into action by this belief. 
Opposition partisans are more likely to criticize the status quo, and instead value the 
benefits of democratization. Though democracy is largely seen as a valence issue 
(Bleck and van de Walle 2013), I argue that opposition partisans should be less likely 
than other types of citizens to see the current system as democratic, and also more 
willing to vote when they see it as a means to democratization.   
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 This political orientation likely springs from two possible sources. First is 
through indoctrination by opposition parties. Opposition parties in electoral 
autocracies are oftentimes situated geographically; they may have historical roots in a 
particular region or strongholds in specific localities, and are sometimes tied to a 
distinct identity group (Letsa 2016b). For example, one of Tanzania’s strongest 
opposition parties, the Civic United Front, has historically received most of its 
electoral support from the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar. Similarly in Mexico 
under the hegemonic PRI, the opposition PAN party had historic strongholds in 
Guanajuato and Jalisco in the Center-West, and in Baja California and Chihuahua in 
the North. In Cameroon, the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) always 
receives the largest number of its Parliamentary seats from Anglophone districts in the 
Northwest Region. Socioeconomic elites that hail from such opposition strongholds 
are likely to join the party networks of the opposition instead of the ruling party. In 
these historic strongholds, the local government and associational networks are 
dominated by the opposition instead of the ruling party, and thus elites are more likely 
to join these networks and adhere to the opposition’s political stance of 
democratization. By geographic happenstance, these socioeconomic elites are more 
likely to be socialized into the ranks of the opposition instead of the ruling party. 
 The second path towards an oppositional political orientation can instead occur 
more independently of the opposition parties themselves, when individuals have had 
negative experiences with the ruling party. Citizens who have been spurned by the 
ruling party, perhaps by being denied contracts by the government, fired from public 
sector jobs, or harassed by security forces, may turn to the opposition seeking an 
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alternative ideology. This pathway may account for opposition partisans who live 
outside of opposition strongholds. Whether they come to the opposition independently 
or through social networks, I hypothesize that civic duty is less important for 
opposition partisans, who instead are motivated when they see voting as a chance to 
democratize the political system.  
 Though most citizens support democracy, not all of them think of the 
relationship between voting and democratization in the same way. Ruling party 
supporters should be more likely to think of their country as democratic anyways, and 
therefore less likely to think that voting is important for its ability to democratize the 
system. Opposition partisans in electoral autocracies should be less likely to believe 
that their country is democratic, so although opposition partisans may be less likely to 
think that voting will improve democracy, those that do believe in this logic should be 
more likely to vote. Opposition supporters who do not believe voting can improve 
democracy should see the act of voting as pointless, and opt out of elections entirely. 
 Although from a normative perspective this benevolent desire for democracy is 
seemingly altruistic, it may be just as instrumental as it is expressive. For citizens who 
live in opposition districts that may represent repressed or marginalized identity 
groups, or for citizens who have been scorned by the state, a desire for “democracy” 
may be tantamount to a “change in leadership.” These citizens would presumably be 
less wedded to democratic transition if one of their leaders were in charge instead.27 
Either way, however, these opposition partisans should be more likely to vote when 
they feel that the act can lead to an opening in the political status quo (even if only 
                                                
27 Not unlike ruling party partisans, who may certainly agree that democracy is important, but who are 
happy enough with the party in power, and therefore more likely to vote in support of the status quo.  
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symbolic), and this motivation should have little effect on ruling party partisans. 
Further, for many (if not most) opposition partisans, the connection between voting 
and democracy has an expressive element related to their aspirational hopes for regime 
change or democratization. 
 Conversely, we might believe that if citizens in general are ‘burned out’ on the 
belief that voting can lead to better patronage outcomes, then opposition supporters 
should be equally skeptical of the relationship between voting and democracy. On the 
one hand, the theory supports this point: on average, opposition partisans should be 
less likely than ruling party partisans to believe that voting can improve democracy. 
On the other hand, the comparison between voting and patronage and voting and 
democracy is not entirely parallel. Voting out of an expectation for patronage is a 
purely instrumental act based on an expected reciprocal exchange. While voting to 
improve democracy can potentially have instrumental motivations (the desire to ‘kick 
the bums out’), citizens who see voting in this way may indeed be more ‘burned out’ 
on the idea that voting is linked to democratization. Conversely, when voting to 
improve democracy is an expression of one’s identity as a democrat or opposition 
partisan, then the continued act of voting does not necessarily need to lead to concrete 
gains for democracy for one to continue voting. It is the expression of one’s identity 
that motivates someone to action, not the expected instrumental outcomes of that act. 
 
Nonpartisans 
Finally, because nonpartisans are less likely to possess the status or material 
resources to actively engage within the autocratic political space, I argue that they are 
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only likely to vote when they are susceptible to being mobilized. As Gerber and Green 
(2015) note, “In electoral systems where bribes and other material inducements are 
rare, incentives to vote are thought to be social in nature: voters are rewarded by the 
approbation of others, while nonvoters are criticized or shunned” (144). Even if 
“bribes” are present, it is unclear why such social pressures would be entirely absent. 
Even during autocratic electoral campaigns, political parties mobilize citizens to vote 
for them, and nonpartisans who feel this pressure should be more likely to vote. 
Nonpartisans who are not pressured by their families or communities to vote should be 
more likely to remain at home on election day.  
To my knowledge, this point has been most clearly articulated by Schaffer 
(1998), who argues that in new democracies, such as Senegal, citizens (particularly 
those with little education), see elections as “…an occasion to reinforce bonds of 
community solidarity” (96). Schaffer argues that citizens who strongly value their 
group or community membership (such as rural villagers) should feel the most 
pressure to vote in solidarity with these groups. In contrast, “Individuals who belong 
to several nonoverlapping groups, none of which is essential to their welfare, are likely 
to feel less pressure to conform their (electoral) behavior to the expectations of any 
one group” (ibid, 98). Urban citizens with higher levels of socioeconomic status are 
more likely to belong to such diversified networks, and therefore should be less likely 
to feel social pressure to participate in elections. 
 Previous theories proposed by Magaloni (2006) and Blaydes (2011) might 
argue that this mobilization is centered on material incentives provided by the ruling 
party. If nonpartisans tend to come from less-privileged societal groups, they may be 
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more likely to be targeted by vote-buying campaigns since their votes are relatively 
cheaper to “buy.” However, for many electoral autocracies, and particularly electoral 
autocracies in the developing world, the state simply does not possess the resources to 
provide private transfers to the majority of its citizens. Thus where vote-buying is 
common, it likely targets the poor, who are likely to be nonpartisans. But where the 
state cannot provide these transfers, I argue that it mobilizes citizens through old-
fashioned grass-roots campaigns, which have been found to be generally effective at 
boosting turnout in democratic contexts (Donald P. Green and Schwam-Baird 2015).  
 Since partisans require less persuasion to vote, such mobilization campaigns 
are more likely to target nonpartisans,28 and nonpartisans who are more susceptible to 
communal and familial pressures are more likely to be successfully mobilized. Indeed, 
Bratton, et al. (2004) have argued for emerging democracies in sub-Saharan Africa 
that “male party activists explicitly target women, especially less educated rural 
women, because they perceive them as ‘easier to organize’” (165). Just as citizens 
from privileged socioeconomic groups are likely to feel societal pressures to become 
partisan community leaders, so too do citizens from under-privileged socioeconomic 
groups feel social pressure to follow these community leaders during elections. 
 This form of mobilization in electoral autocracies can oftentimes be very local 
and very personal. Scholars of voting behavior in Africa have long noted that ethnic 
communities tend to vote together to support a particular candidate during elections. 
                                                
28 It is important to note that the Americanist literature has found that political parties work hardest to 
mobilize their own partisans and focus less on uncommitted nonpartisans who are both less likely to 
vote and also less likely to vote for the party doing the mobilizing (compared, at least, to the partisans 
of that party). In Cameroon, where partisanship is exceedingly low, and communal identities are 
extremely salient, it is likely that nonpartisans are most susceptible to mobilization, especially where 
voters only have one choice at the ballot box—the RDPC. 
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As Schaffer (1998) notes in his book about Senegal when it was dominated by the 
Parti socialiste du Sénégal (PS): 
 
“…an elderly farmer in the village of Kab Gaye offered [the following 
reasons] for voting for Abdou Diouf in 1993, even though he personally 
strongly supported Diouf’s main opponent, Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS: ‘I 
voted for Diouf because of my relatives and the people with whom I live in 
this village. Before the elections, everyone got together and decided to vote 
for Diouf. I voted for him out of respect for that decision.’ Motivated by 
deference to his family and neighbors, he implicitly acknowledges the 
powerful moral obligations imposed on him by the network of reciprocal 
social relations to which he belongs” (96).  	
Citizens such as this villager in Senegal vote because they feel significant pressure 
from their families and communities to turn out on election day. Partisans and local 
party leadership mobilize such citizens to vote, even though they might otherwise be 
disinclined to participate in politics.  
 Overall, I argue that there is considerable variation in voting behavior in 
autocratic regimes. While most studies have focused either on divides between the 
opposition and the ruling party or on who is most likely to sell their vote, these 
analyses have overlooked an important group of voters in autocratic elections—
nonpartisans—and have not yet systematically considered the non-economic reasons 
people have for voting in these regimes. 
 
The Relationship between Partisanship and the Voting Act 
 Taken together, I argue that in electoral autocracies socioeconomic status can 
help to predict partisanship, and that, in turn, political attitudes toward the regime 
determine partisan type: ruling party or opposition partisanship. Given this 
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trichotomous framework of partisanship, three different voting motivations can help 
predict voter turnout: a sense of civic duty, a belief that voting can improve 
democracy, and a feeling of social pressure to participate. Whereas a sense of civic 
duty should predict turnout amongst ruling party partisans, it should have little effect 
on opposition partisans and nonpartisans. Similarly, a belief that voting can improve 
democracy should predict voter turnout for opposition partisans, but should not predict 
turnout for ruling party partisans or nonpartisans. Finally, a feeling of social pressure 
should predict turnout amongst nonpartisans, but not ruling party or opposition 
partisans. This argument is summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Relationship between Partisanship and the Voting Act
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 Overall, this is not a deterministic argument. First, there are likely many 
citizens with low socioeconomic status that identify with a political party, and vice 
versa. I argue that socioeconomic status and political beliefs can help us better 
understand partisanship, but there are likely other factors that can explain this 
variation as well.29 Second, it is important to note that many nonpartisans likely hold 
political beliefs about the regime that may motivate them to vote, and, likewise, many 
partisans may be motivated for social reasons. On average, however, I argue that 
different types of partisans tend to vote for different reasons.  
 In addition, the theory presented here makes the assumption that partisanship is 
exogenous to voting motivations. This assumption is largely supported by the 
literature on American voter behavior, which has mostly found this to be the case 
(Whiteley 1988). In general, American partisanship is exceedingly stable over time 
(Green and Palmquist 1994). Although national level measures of partisanship 
fluctuate over time, it is unusual for partisans—especially strong partisans—to switch 
parties or identify as independents (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008, especially Section III). 
Because partisanship usually forms early in life, scholars have argued that attachment 
to a party predicts voting behavior, as opposed to the other way around (Campbell et 
al. 1960). 
 Similarly, I argue that socioeconomic status and political attitudes are causally 
prior to partisanship, and that, in turn, partisanship is causally prior to the voting act. 
First, it seems unlikely that partisanship would significantly alter one’s 
socioeconmomic status or political beliefs. Although on occasion one may benefit 
                                                
29 For example, political geography (Letsa 2016, 2017). 
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economically from one’s connection to the ruling party, it is unlikely that such 
benefits are systematic or far-reaching within the population as a whole. Further, 
feeling close to a political party is even less likely to change one’s level of education, 
age, gender, or rural or urban locality. In addition, while partisanship may deepen 
one’s political beliefs about the regime in power, it is unlikely to fundamentally alter 
these beliefs. For this to be true, we would have to find plausible the counterfactual, 
that someone with anti-regime beliefs would be just as likely to join the ruling party as 
they would the opposition, and vice-versa, and that only socialization into that party 
would alter their beliefs. Without panel data, this possibility cannot be ruled out, but it 
generally seems implausible. 
 Second, the theory assumes that these political beliefs and their impact on 
partisanship are causally prior to the voting act. In general, the act of voting should not 
cause partisanship (though it may deepen it), and it likewise should not strongly affect 
socioeconomic status or political beliefs. Instead, the decision to vote, and the 
motivations for doing so, should stem from one’s partisanship, and in turn, one’s 
socioeconomic status and prior political beliefs about the state. In all, I argue that 
based on one’s partisanship, different types of citizens have different social and 
expressive reasons for voting.  
 
Alternative Non-Economic Explanations 
In addition to these expressive and social reasons for voting in autocratic 
elections, there are two other potential non-economic reasons citizens might vote: 
ethnicity and electoral violence or intimidation. The literature on African politics 
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strongly suggests that people vote in elections in Africa as an expression of their 
ethnic identity. In addition, scholars have also written about the role that intimidation 
or violence plays in affecting electoral behavior. 
 
Ethnicity 
An enormous literature on political parties and electoral behavior in sub-
Saharan Africa has noted that “partisan” voting tends to cohere around ethnic 
cleavages more than ideological or political ones. On the one hand, African political 
parties organize their constituencies around convenient ethnic groupings in order to 
garner more votes (Posner 2005). On the other hand, voters see it in their best interest 
to support candidates of their ethnic group who will better represent them nationally 
(Wantchekon 2003). By and large, this behavior is seen as instrumental: ethnicity acts 
as an obvious organizational heuristic in societies where class and (therefore) 
ideological identities are weak. Citizens vote for their co-ethnics because they believe 
that a representative from their own ethnic group is more likely to deliver patronage or 
pork-barrel spending then representatives from other ethnic groups. While it is 
undeniable that, generally speaking, ethnicity plays a strong role in African elections, 
it is less relevant to the theory presented here for three reasons. 
 First, as an instrumental motivator for voters, ethnicity should be less salient in 
electoral autocracies. If elections are noncompetitive, then the high-stakes game for 
ethnic representation should be less important. Large-umbrella, catchall ruling parties 
in autocratic countries tend to be more inclusive ethnically, precisely because they do 
not need to use ethnic cleavages to compete for voters. Wahman (2015) has shown 
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across all types of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa that incumbent parties are much 
more likely to be ethnically inclusive than opposition parties. In electoral autocracies, 
where the incumbent party has dominated for decades, this high level of ethnic 
inclusion makes the need to organize around identity less important. 
 At the presidential level, presidents-for-life are likely to have a “core” 
constituency of co-ethnics; but unless their ethnic group represents a majority in the 
population, it is not in their best interest to appeal to this identity cleavage during 
elections. While legislative elections tend to be much more competitive locally in 
electoral autocracies (even if the party itself will never lose a majority in parliament), 
legislative elections are less likely to be ethnically-driven since candidates represent 
smaller, usually ethnically-homogenous, constituencies.30 Since legislative seats 
represent smaller constituencies, most of the time local candidates for the same seat 
will all hail from the same ethnic group, particularly for rural constituencies where 
ethnicity tends to be more salient anyways. For example, in autocratic Ethiopia, “Both 
electoral laws and party rules virtually guarantee that voters at the district level will 
choose between candidates from the same ethnic background” (Arriola 2003, 116). 
Therefore, electoral autocracies in general should feature less ethnic politicking than 
democracies, where the stakes for ethnic representation are much higher. 
 Second, if ethnic voting is seen as an “expressive” motivation, as opposed to 
an instrumental one, then this type of incentive can largely be subsumed by socially-
                                                
30 Of course, no constituency is completely homogenous ethnically. Most rural constituencies, however, 
are dominated by one autochthonous ethnic group and feature one or more minority migrant groups. A 
minority migrant group may have an important voice in local politics, but few rural communities 
feature large enough ethnic variation to support long-term ethnic cleavages during election cycles. 
Urban constituencies tend to be much more ethnically diverse, but also tend to feature less ethnic 
mobilization during elections because ethnic identity is less salient in urban settings. 
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motivated voting. If citizens vote with their ethnic group out of a sense of in-group 
attachment, then citizens most susceptible to social pressure will be more likely to 
vote. I argue that this expressive type of ethnically-motivated voting may sometimes 
be categorized under a more general form of community mobilization. Whether 
appeals to vote are motivated by familial ties, community custom, or ethnic influences 
from the local chief, they are socially-based stimuli. While it is difficult to disentangle 
the mechanism—whether one votes with their ethnic group to fulfill an expressive 
desire to vote with the group or out of an instrumental desire to obtain patronage—
according to the theory presented in this dissertation, nonpartisans should be more 
sensitive to these types of ethnic appeals.  
 Finally, for many of the reasons related to the features of electoral autocracies 
outlined above (as well as others), Cameroon simply does not feature strong ethnic 
parties. Ethnicity is critical to understanding elite-level politics, but, partially because 
the ruling party is not a mass-mobilizing party (see Chapter Three), it does not play 
heavily in electoral politics. Writing about Cameroon, van de Walle (1993) notes: 
“…clientelism does not have the political role that it has in countries with 
vibrant machine politics. Individuals in the state elite do not cultivate an 
autonomous power base by promoting a given region or ethnic group, or even 
a functional category like trade unionists or teachers. It may be important for 
the Ewondo people (or any other group) that there is an Ewondo minister in 
Biya’s cabinet—and certainly informal interviewing suggests it does—but it 
does not appear that the Ewondo minister feels obliged to do anything 
substantial for that ethnic group” (369). 
 
 
Politicians and elites do not win favor with the regime by their capacity to mobilize 
ethnic blocs or constituencies, and therefore elites do not tend to appeal to voters 
based on ethnic appeals. 
 67 
Historically, Cameroon is usually demarcated ethnically by three major 
political “identity” blocks: the Southerners, the Northerners, and the so-called 
‘Grassfielders’ or Anglophones and Bamiléké. Biya’s own ethnic group, the Beti, 
reside in the South of Cameroon as well as around the capital, Yaoundé in the Centre 
region, but are not a very large ethnic group. They are largely considered important 
politically because the President is Beti himself. The Fulani ethnic group of the North 
represents about ten percent of Cameroon’s population, but is a plurality in the 
Muslim north where their language acts as a lingua franca. Cameroon’s first President, 
Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon’s only president before Biya), hailed from the Fulani 
ethnic group, and thus the Fulani have been historically powerful in Cameroonian 
postcolonial history. Nonetheless, upon Biya’s peaceful succession, the Fulani found 
their role in politics increasingly diminished, leading to their fairly strong opposition 
of Biya, especially during the 1992 transition to multipartyism. The Northern (and 
markedly Fulani) political party, the UNDP, under the leadership of Maïgari Bello 
Bouba, won most of the opposition seats in Cameroon’s first (1992) elections when 
the SDF boycotted. In the following presidential election, Bouba came in third place, 
just after the SDF’s John Fru Ndi, with almost 20 percent of the popular vote. 
However, since the transition, the Fulani and the UNDP were successfully co-opted by 
the Biya regime and no longer represent the hotbed of opposition they once did during 
the transition. Bouba was invited into the Biya administration after the 1997 
presidential elections, and the UNDP officially backed Biya in the 2002 presidential 
elections.  
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 Hailing from the Northwest and West regions of Cameroon, the Grassfielders 
represent an amalgamation of many different fragmented ethnic groups. The largest of 
these, the Bamiléké, traditionally a hierarchical and strongly centralized ethnic group, 
are known for dominating business and trade across Cameroon (Arriola 2012, Chapter 
6), though they have a long history of political opposition to the regime (Joseph 1977; 
Konings 1996). Today, they represent a large minority in the commercial capital of 
Douala, as well as most regions of Cameroon.  
However, the Bamiléké are largely Francophones, and therefore linguistically 
and culturally divided from their cousins across the border in the Anglophone 
Northwest. While the Bamiléké and the broader Anglophone Grassfielders ethnic 
union (under the SDF) coalesced into a fearful opposition to the Biya regime during 
the transition, complicated linguistic, ethnic and ideological divisions have fractured 
the SDF in the past twenty-five years. During the transition, the Anglophone 
Northwest and Southwest stood united linguistically, but ethnic and political divisions 
have driven the Southwest away from the SDF. Inversely, the relative ethnic unity 
between the Northwest Grassfielders and the Western Bamiléké was ultimately riven 
by linguistic divides over the Anglophone question. The regime has done everything 
in its power to nurture the seeds of these divisions, particularly through co-opting 
prominent Bamiléké business interests as well as Southwesterners (Arriola 2012, 
Chapter 6; Nyamnjoh 1999, 108). 
 The reality is that Cameroon is one of the most ethnically fragmented countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. There are upwards of 250 distinct ethnic groups within 
Cameroon’s borders, and the only group that constitutes a large enough plurality to 
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represent a political threat, the so-called ‘Grassfielders’, is really an amalgamation of 
dozens of ethnically distinct communities. As Cameroon scholar Neville Rubin 
describes it: “Cameroun presents an ethnic pattern of almost unrivaled complexity, a 
good deal of which is still shrouded in uncertainty. Attempts to classify the different 
ethnic or tribal groups have rested on linguistic or cultural characteristics, but have 
produced major disagreements among ethnographers” (Rubin 1972, 9). Further, the 
Anglophone-Francophone and North-South divides have dominated identity politics in 
Cameroon, further muddying the potential for ethnicity as an organizing political 
factor. In general, ethnic-balancing in Cameroon has historically been an elite game 
(van de Walle 1993), and while it is possible that ethnicity plays a stronger role in 
political behavior for other electoral autocracies, it is difficult to view it as 
systematically critical for understanding voter turnout in Cameroon. 
 
Electoral Violence and Intimidation 
While electoral violence seems like a bread-and-butter issue of electoral 
autocracies, it has not actually been systematically studied within the context of these 
types of regimes.31 Stable, long-term electoral autocracies, such as Malaysia, 
Tanzania, or Cameroon actually tend to feature relatively little electoral violence, at 
least after they have transitioned from closed autocracies. Electoral violence appears 
to be more common in unstable or transitioning regimes, such as Côte d’Ivoire, 
Nigeria, or Kenya (Goldsmith 2015). However, there are important exceptions, such as 
Zimbabwe or Ethiopia. Further, low-level intimidation during elections—shy of 
                                                
31 For example, Gandhi and Lust-Okar’s (2009) review of autocratic elections barely touches on the 
topic of electoral violence. 
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outright violence itself—is likely to be much more common in autocratic elections 
than is electoral violence. 
 Although the dissertation considers electoral violence and intimidation 
throughout the empirical analysis, these factors are not a feature of the theory. 
Violence is not a major attribute of Cameroonian elections, and is therefore dismissed 
outright as a key motive for voting. Nonetheless, where violence is prevalent in 
autocratic elections, such as in Zimbabwe or Ethiopia, it is likely the most important 
factor to understanding electoral behavior. General intimidation, on the other hand, is 
a much more prevalent factor in electoral autocracies around the world. In Cameroon, 
however, it does not account for a significant amount of variation in voter behavior. 
Overall, when asked if they were threatened in any way during the previous election, 
only 3.5 percent of respondents reported intimidation. Further, 75.6 percent of 
respondents reported feeling “completely free” (and a further 16.0 percent felt 
somewhat free) during elections to vote for whomever they wanted.32 Because 
intimidation does not appear to be a widespread consideration for Cameroonian voters, 
it does not feature prominently in the theory presented in this dissertation. However, I 
do include these measures in the empirical analysis in order to probe their plausibility 
as a systematic predictor of voting behavior. 
 
Survey Design 
The following two chapters test the plausibility of this theory of partisanship 
and voting behavior by looking at data from an original 85-question public opinion 
                                                
32 Data from the author’s survey. 
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survey conducted in Cameroon from September 2014 through April 2015. Seventeen 
of the questions are common to the Afrobarometer Round 5 and Round 6 instruments 
(not including demographic questions). Appendix 1 presents the comparative results of 
these common questions, revealing the relatively strong replicability of the survey. An 
original survey was conducted because existing surveys in electoral autocracies, 
notably the Afrobarometer, do not ask direct questions about social and expressive 
reasons for voting. In order to better understand these expressive motivations, it was 
necessary to design a novel instrument incorporating questions about civic duty, the 
relationship between voting and democracy, and the role that community expectations 
play during elections. 
 
Sampling 
The survey was designed to be nationally representative, but it was only 
implemented in seven of Cameroon’s ten regions because the three northern regions 
were inaccessible due to the activity of Boko Haram. Therefore, all results are only 
representative to the seven southern regions of Cameroon. Within the seven regions 
the survey included, 15 electoral departments sampled on two significant 
characteristics: 1) whether the department was urban or rural (with a fifty-fifty 
distribution), and 2) whether the department was an opposition area, an RDPC area, or 
an area that “swings” between the two. The 15 sampled electoral departments are 
presented in Table 4. Table 5 lists all of the sites visited within the seven regions. 
Appendix 2 presents a map of all the sampled districts in relation to this sampling 
design of opposition stronghold, RDPC strongholds, and swing districts. 
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Table 4: Sampling Design 
 Opposition Area Swing Area RDPC Area 
Urban 
Mezam Centre 
Noun 
Mémé 
Wouri East 
Wouri Centre 
Mifi 
Mfoundi 
Océan 
Rural 
Boyo 
Momo East 
Nyong et Kelle 
Mezam South 
Haut Nyong 
Mvila 
Manyu 
 
 
 Post-stratification weights were created to compensate for over-sampling in 
opposition and swing areas as well as to readjust urban/rural sampling within these 
district types to match the national distribution. The post-stratification weights range 
in value from 0.196 to 2.300. Opposition and swing regions were over-sampled in 
order to provide enough within-sample variation for sub-group analysis. Within each 
enumeration area, the survey was administered by myself and four research assistants 
on a random walk to willing and informed respondents aged 23 years or older, and 
reached a total of 2,399 respondents. Twenty-three years was chosen because the 
voting age in Cameroon is 20, and I wanted to interview only citizens who would have 
been eligible to vote in the 2013 parliamentary and legislative elections. 
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Table 5: Sampled Areas 
Region Département Arrondissement 
Centre 
Mfoundi Yaoundé I, Yaoundé II 
Nyong et Kellé Matomb, Bot Makak, Ngog-Mapubi 
East Haut Nyong Abong-Mbang, Angossas, Doumé 
Littoral Wouri Est Douala III, Douala V Wouri Centre Douala I 
Northwest 
Boyo Belo, Fundong 
Mezam Centre Bamenda II, Bamenda III 
Mezam South Santa 
Momo East Batibo 
South Mvila Ebolowa, Ngoulemakong Océan Kribi 
Southwest Mémé (Kumba Centre) 
Kumba I, Kumba II, 
Kumba III 
Manyu Mamfé 
West Mifi 
Bafoussam I, Bafoussam 
II, Bafoussam III 
Noun Centre Foumban, Foumbot 
 
 
Characteristics of the Sample 
Within the weighted sample, 48.8 percent of respondents were male, and 51.2 
percent were female. The age distribution of respondents is presented below in Figure 
3, in comparison to the distribution of age in the general population.33  The majority of 
respondents were 40 years old or younger. Education was normally distributed around 
a mean of ‘some secondary schooling.’ The weighted percentages for level of 
education within the sample are reported in Table 6 below. As noted earlier, the 
survey does not cover the three northern regions of Cameroon. Therefore Christians 
are overrepresented in the sample (32.4 percent Catholic, 26.59 percent Protestant, 8.5 
                                                
33Cameroon census data projected to 2015. 
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percent Pentecostalist, and 20.5 percent non-denominational Christian). Muslims 
represent 7.7 percent of the sample (compared to 13.8 found by the Afrobarometer, 
Round 6), and a handful of others were also interviewed, including two Bahai 
respondents, a Mormon, and a dozen Jehovah’s Witnesses. In addition there are more 
than 125 self-reported ethnic groups represented in the sample.  
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Respondents' Ages 
 
 
 
 Socioeconomic status was a little more difficult to measure within the survey 
framework. A series of questions, mostly borrowed from the Afrobarometer, were 
included to assess the level of income of each respondent’s household. Respondents 
were asked whether they owned various household items, including a radio, a 
television, a car, a motorcycle, a mobile phone, or a computer. The average number of 
items owned is three items, with a normal distribution around this average.  The most 
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common combination across the sample was for a respondent to own a television, a 
radio, and a mobile phone.  
 
Table 6: Level of Education in the Sample 
Level of Education 
Weighted Proportion 
of Respondents 
No formal education 2.86 
Informal education only 2.58 
Some primary schooling 7.71 
Primary school completed 17.72 
Some secondary schooling 31.73 
Secondary school completed 15.68 
Post-secondary school technical diploma 5.66 
Some university 6.42 
University completed 5.89 
Post-graduate degree 3.75 
 
 
 In addition, about 22 percent of the sample had running water inside of their 
house, 35 percent only had a well or tap within their household’s compound, and 43 
percent had to fetch water outside of their compound (either at a community source or 
at a nearby river, stream, or lake). Similarly, 28 percent of the sample had a toilet 
within their house, while 62 percent had a latrine within their compound instead. Ten 
percent had no toilet or latrine within the compound. Finally, the plurality of 
respondents was self-employed (43.8 percent), for example as a farmer or market 
trader. Twenty-one percent of the sample was unemployed and looking for work and 
17 percent were formally employed full time. Eleven percent was not looking for 
work; this included students, housewives, and retired persons.     
 
 76 
 The following chapter uses this survey data to better understand the 
demographic and political differences between ruling party partisans, opposition 
partisans, and nonpartisans in Cameroon. Chapter Four uses the data to uncover the 
different reasons citizens have for participating in elections in Cameroon. Overall, the 
survey data indicate that non-economic motivations for voting—expressive and social 
motivations—are much better at explaining variation in self-reported voter turnout 
than economic reasons for voting. Further, different non-economic reasons for voting 
have stronger relationships amongst the different groups of partisans. While ruling 
party partisans are much more likely to vote when they believe voting is a civic duty, 
opposition partisans are more likely to vote when they believe it is a democratizing 
act, and nonpartisans are most likely to vote when they are mobilized to do so by their 
families and communities. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF 
PARTISANSHIP 
 
 
In order to better understand the meaning of partisanship in Cameroon, this 
chapter begins with a discussion of Cameroon’s postcolonial political party history. 
Though the same party has essentially been in power since independence, it has 
survived multiple permutations as the politics of Cameroon have changed over time. 
The chapter also discusses the introduction of opposition parties in the 1990s, and the 
role the most important opposition parties have played in reshaping the meaning of 
partisanship. It is impossible to understand the meaning or content of partisanship in 
electoral autocracies without a theoretical contextualization of both opposition parties 
as well as ruling parties. The second half of the chapter uses survey data in order to 
explore the demographic and political determinants of partisanship in Cameroon 
today. 
 Cameroon’s political experience is not unusual in regards to the electoral 
autocracies of sub-Saharan Africa.34 Although Cameroon lacked much of the 
instability that other African countries faced during the 1970s and 1980s—such as in 
Togo, Burkina Faso, or Sudan—it is the poster child for “big man rule” in Africa. 
Since the turn to multipartyism in the 1990s, the ruling party has relied on a number of 
                                                
34These include Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
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common tactics to remain in power, such as altering the constitution in order to 
concentrate power in the hands of the executive branch, relying on gerrymandering to 
win artificially high numbers of legislative seats, and using various tactics to 
delegitimize and split the opposition (Albaugh 2011, 2014, Chapter 6; Schedler 
2002a). On the whole, Cameroon looks similar to many electoral autocracies in Africa 
that feature a powerful incumbent party surrounded by many smaller, weaker parties, 
situated within a presidential system that magnifies the powers of the executive (van 
de Walle 2003). As the following section will show, with only a handful of setbacks, 
the ruling party’s dominance in politics has been gradually cemented over the 60 years 
of its rule. 
 
Nationalism, Independence, and the First Parties of Cameroon 
Cameroon has a long history of party politics, predating the transition to 
multipartyism in the 1990s and stretching back to the post-World War II era under 
colonialism. Like many African nations, Cameroon had a troubled independence 
process, and although Francophone Cameroon emerged successfully from French 
colonization in 1960 under President Ahmadou Ahidjo and his Union Camerounaise 
(UC), this independence was hard-fought and left Cameroon politically fragile. After 
World War II, African nationalism planted deep roots in Cameroon. As France began 
experimenting with limited self-governance, promoting a handful of pro-France 
political parties in Cameroon, the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), 
founded in 1948 and led by Ruben Um Nyobé, quickly turned from a group of trade 
unionists to a “radical” nationalist party by the early 1950s (Joseph 1977). Demanding 
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independence from France within ten years and reunification with the Anglophone 
regions of the former German Kamerun (then a United Nations Trust Territory under 
the management of British-controlled Nigeria),35 the French outlawed the UPC in 1955 
as its leadership went underground and began the process of turning the UPC from a 
political party into an insurgent movement (Gardinier 1963, 66–71). 
 Although the French brutally crushed the UPC rebellion, assassinating Um 
Nyobé in 1958 and taking a “scorched earth” policy to the UPC’s strongholds in the 
West (LeVine 1964, 160–61), independence was ultimately granted to French-
controlled Cameroon in 1960. With the UPC driven underground, the French backed 
Ahmadou Ahidjo, a northerner, to lead Cameroon into independence; less due to his 
popularity, and more because of his compliance with the French policies of 
independence accompanied by continued French political and economic influence.  
 Meanwhile, in 1961, immediately after Francophone Cameroon’s 
independence, two of the four British Cameroonian territories voted to become a part 
of Francophone Cameroon (the two northern territories voted to join Nigeria). This 
decision to join Cameroon as a linguistic minority region has dominated political 
considerations in Western Cameroon for decades, and continues to strongly influence 
national politics today (Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997). Anglophone Cameroon agreed 
to join Francophone Cameroon under a federalist system, with an Anglophone prime 
                                                
35 Similar to Togo, the German colony of Kamerun was split between the French and the British after 
the German loss of World War I. Though the areas were technically League of Nations Mandates and 
then United Nations Trust Territories, the French and the British more or less administered their 
respective Cameroonian territories as they did their other colonies (Gardinier 1963; LeVine 1964; 
Rubin 1972). The smaller, but more densely populated British Cameroons were integrated politically 
and economically into Nigeria. The much larger French Cameroon was administered as its own 
territorial unit. 
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minister, John Ngu Foncha, who held considerable authority over politics in the 
Anglophone region during the reunification era (Gardinier 1963, Chapter 9).  
 During the independence and reunification process, Ahidjo adopted a policy of 
cooptation and inclusion,36 side-lining his northern base in the short-term and 
including members of ethnically diverse political parties in his early cabinets (Bayart 
1979). By building a diverse coalition of support, specifically based on a North-South 
axis, Ahidjo was slowly able to consolidate power within the UC, officially turning 
Cameroon into a one-party “democracy” in 1966, as he dissolved several Western and 
Eastern-based political parties, establishing the new Union nationale Camerounais 
(UNC). The UNC would continue to dominate Cameroonian politics until Biya’s 
ascension to the presidency in 1982. Elections for both the National Assembly and the 
President were held (non-concurrently) every five years from 1970-1988. In 1970, 
1975, and 1980, Ahidjo was re-elected president with 100 percent of the vote.  
 As Ahidjo consolidated power within the UNC, he simultaneously worked 
tirelessly to coopt and sideline the Anglophone Westerners and break apart the 
federalist constitution. In 1969, Ahidjo amended the constitution to give himself sole 
power to appoint the prime ministers of each federated state. With this new power, 
Ahidjo nominated the sympathetic Solomon Muna to replace Foncha in the 
Anglophone West. Further, between 1961 and 1972, Ahidjo slowly eroded the powers 
of state governments by transferring authority over the police, civil service, prisons, 
                                                
36 Ahidjo is famous for his masterfully-executed strategy of ethnic balancing, which many cite as the 
basis for his long and stable rule. For his part, Biya has attempted to replicate this strategy, though 
many criticize his favoritism of southerners. Nonetheless, since the turn to mulitpartyism, the four most 
prestigious national offices—the Presidency, the Prime Minister, the President of the National 
Assembly, and the President of the Senate—are always evenly divided between the four major ethnic 
groups (Beti/southerners, Sawa/Douala, Fulani/northerners, and Grassfielders/Anglophones). 
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education, and import and export tariffs from the state governments to the federal 
government (Takougang and Krieger 1998, 49). Finally, in a 1972 referendum, 99.99 
percent of Cameroonians approved of a new unitary constitution in which political 
power was heavily consolidated in the executive branch, and Anglophone Cameroon 
lost its autonomy. 
 
Political Parties in Postcolonial Cameroon 
Although the UNC was the only political party in Cameroon for twenty years 
of Ahidjo’s ascendancy, it could only briefly, during the culmination of the heady 
decolonization period, be considered a mass-based party (Bienen 1978, 40; Schachter 
1961). As Bayart noted in 1979, by the early 1970s, Ahidjo had successfully 
personalized all political power in Cameroon; the party, the administration and the 
regime were all directly controlled by the President. As a result. “The head of state 
drew his legitimacy from the exercise of power itself:  de facto legitimacy justified by 
his success was only later transmuted into a secondary legitimacy, democratic and de 
jure” (Bayart 1979, 143).37 Ahidjo fully controlled the political machine, and the party 
was a tool of co-optation for elites. The masses were mobilized to vote during 
elections, but otherwise not expected to actively participate in party politics, or politics 
of any sort for that matter (Bayart 1978). 
In the 1960s and 70s in Africa, the exclusion of the masses from the single 
party was not unique to Cameroon.38 Kasfir (1976) notes this growing trend of 
                                                
37 Author’s translation. 
38 The one partial exception to this trend would be Tanzania, where a general effort was made to make 
CCM partisans out of ordinary citizens based on a Marxist-inspired ideology of African socialism. 
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political demobilization across Africa in the post-independence period. Despite 
relatively high levels of inclusion and participation during decolonization, Kasfir 
points to the common attraction for leaders across the continent to strengthen their 
control of the political arena by excluding the number of participants. In particular, he 
highlights the role of policies designed to strengthen the central administration at the 
expense of participatory institutions, such as local governments, opposition parties, 
and legislatures (229-30). After sidelining alternative sources of popular participation, 
leaders eventually gutted their own ruling parties by rendering them useless. As power 
became increasingly centralized and competitive elections were abolished, the purpose 
and functions of the ruling party withered, eroding popular participation with it (244-
45).  
As Bienen (1978) writes of Africa during this period, "The problem is that, 
insofar as 'single mass-party authoritarian regime' implied a monolithic party whose 
control extended out into all areas of the countryside enabling it to mobilize political 
and economic resources from a central core, such regimes did not exist" (64). Bienen 
likens the African single-party regime during the postcolonial period to the American 
party machine, where ideological or programmatic issues are minimized, and popular 
mobilization is limited to clientelistic or patronage-based relationships between 
periphery and center. Cameroon would arguably be a textbook case of such party 
organization. 
 Nonetheless, the political environment in Cameroon pivoted unexpectedly with 
the transition to the Biya presidency in 1982. An (apparently temporarily) ailing 
Ahidjo retired abruptly on November 4, resigning most of his political authority to a 
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relative political unknown: Paul Biya. Although in many ways (and for many reasons) 
history has largely remembered Ahidjo as a founding father and unifier of 
Cameroonians who presided over a period of sustained economic growth, by the late 
1970s, many Cameroonians viewed Ahidjo and his personalistic state as brutally 
autocratic. Biya was thus seen in 1982 as a symbol of change, political liberalization, 
and hope. Indeed, Biya came to power with a message of “a new society where there 
would be a greater degree of tolerance, individual liberty, and freer exchange of ideas” 
(Takougang and Krieger 1998, 63; Biya 1987, 36–37). The troubled transition, 
however, dashed many of these hopes.  
 Although at first Ahidjo strongly backed Biya, lending Biya much of his 
political authority during the months following his resignation, Ahidjo remained chair 
of the UNC, attempting to maintain at least partial control of the political environment. 
Further, the longer Ahidjo remained out of office, the more it appeared he wished to 
regain the presidency. In an interview with the Cameroon Tribune in late January 
1983, Ahidjo indicated that the UNC (which he still controlled) was responsible for 
determining policy; the government itself had only the power of implementation 
(Takougang and Krieger 1998, 68). Further, as time progressed, Ahidjo began to use 
his power within the UNC to actively undermine Biya’s authority (ibid, 69-70). This 
rift came to a head in April 1984, when a coup attempt by several northern officers 
was successfully thwarted. Although Ahidjo denied any involvement in the coup plot, 
he was tried in absentia (while in exile in France) and found guilty. The coup attempt 
drastically altered Biya’s approach toward governing, as he tightened his control over 
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the military, his cabinet, the party, and the institutions of the state in general 
(Takougang and Krieger 1998).  
 In an attempt to establish undisputed control over the ruling party, Biya 
undertook an initiative to rebrand the UNC. At the 1985 UNC congress in Bamenda, 
Biya officially changed the name of the party to the Rassemblement démocratique du 
peuple camerounais (RDPC). He also attempted to deliver on some of his messages of 
liberalization, though the effects were largely cosmetic. He expanded the number of 
members of the party’s Central Committee, allowed for multiple candidates to stand in 
legislative and municipal elections, re-introduced electoral constituencies (as opposed 
to one national electoral district), and included more “progressives” in leadership 
positions within the party (largely in order to displace the Ahidjo-era leadership) 
(Takougang and Krieger 1998). In practice, the new RDPC did not look fundamentally 
different from the UNC, as the Central Committee still held veto power over the 
candidate lists, and Biya largely controlled the decisions of the Central Committee. 
Although the changes brought new blood into the party, it hardly changed the 
autocratic nature of the state or the ruling party: “Biya’s New Deal political changes, 
intended to portray him as a reformer, operated in such a way that they did not 
jeopardize his control of the institutions of power and authority” (ibid, 84). 
 
The RDPC 
Since the British Southern Cameroons voted to reunify with French Cameroun 
in 1961 (Ardener 1962; LeVine 1964), Cameroon’s political history has revolved 
around a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of elite-level ethnic balancing, developed by 
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Ahidjo and perfected by Biya (Nyamnjoh 1999). Through the ‘ethnicization’ of elite 
networks (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998) and the funneling of resources through 
regional linkages (Bayart 1979), the party has become the central hub for political 
ascendancy. Elites who wish to accumulate political power must do so through loyalty 
to the party. During the Ahidjo era, the party was largely believed to favor his northern 
constituency39 while under Biya, the Southerners—and particularly the Beti—have 
found themselves in the position of dominance. But the need for ethno-regional 
balancing has curbed tendencies towards extreme favoritism. For the most part, this 
ethno-regional calculus has remained an elite-centered game, and poverty and political 
exclusion remains the status quo for ordinary citizens across every ethnic group and 
region.  
In terms of the technical structure and operations of the RDPC, not much has 
changed since 1985; Biya retains tight control over the party apparatus. Although the 
organization of the party has devolved, featuring an effort to attract and mobilize more 
members (or as they are called in Cameroon, militants), especially at the grassroots 
level, this pyramidal organization is not intended to cede real power to the masses. 
The transition to multiparty elections in 1992 forced the party to take electoral 
mobilization seriously. While symbolically it was always tangentially important for 
the ruling party to promote voter turnout, Biya’s 1992 near loss to John Fru Ndi forced 
the party to build genuine grassroots mobilization structures. Today, nearly every 
village and neighborhood in Cameroon has an RDPC “party cell” headed by a low-
level elite elected by local party “militants.” Party cells are grouped into “base 
                                                
39 And more specifically Ahidjo’s Fulani ethnic group—to the anger of other Northern minority ethnic 
groups. 
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committees,” again with an elected head; base committees are clustered into “sub-
sections,” usually within a voting district; and finally sub-sections are amalgamated 
into “section committees,” which represent arrondissements. Section committees are 
elected by members of the outgoing section committee, members of the sub-section 
committees, and the presidents of each base committee.40  
  This hierarchy of local titles is intended to, on the one hand, penetrate into 
Cameroonian towns and villages and involve ordinary Cameroonians in the party 
structures and, on the other hand, cede some local control over municipal affairs. 
Overarching these two goals is the clear delimitation of relinquishing any true power 
outside of the national Central Committee. Unlike more repressive autocratic regimes, 
the party cells do not appear to have (or ever have had) a “monitoring” function. No 
one I encountered ever expressed any fear of these cells or base committees, or felt 
that they were active in observing, censoring, or reporting to the party in regards to the 
opinions or activities of ordinary citizens. By most accounts, low level militants and 
cell presidents are only active during elections when they are expected to help 
facilitate rallies, canvassing activities, and electoral mobilization for the RDPC. 
 The real power within the party is held by the national Central Committee and, 
more narrowly, the Political Bureau. The RDPC Congress, consisting of the Central 
Committee, the presidents of arrondissement sections, a set number of party members 
elected by local sections, and party notables (such as MPs, ministers, etc.), meets 
every five years in order to elect the president of the party (Biya) and 150 of the 250 
                                                
40 This structure was described to me by Jacque Fame Ndongo, Secretary of Communications for the 
RDPC and Minister of Higher Education, in an interview on May 4, 2015 at the Ministry of Higher 
Education in Yaoundé. 
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members of the Central Committee (the other 100 of whom are directly appointed by 
Biya), as well as to discuss general issues within the party. Two parallel organs, 
l’Organisation des femmes du RDPC (OFRDPC) and l’Organisation des jeunes du 
RDPC (OJRDPC), in theory ensure the participation of women and youth within the 
party. In practice, it sidelines their participation; as one online commentator noted, 
tongue-in-cheek, “The principal role [of the OFRDPC] is to sing, dance, and applaud” 
(camer.be, 2016). In general, the quinquennial meetings of the RDPC Congress are 
largely ceremonial affairs, reported on in the news, but usually resulting in little 
change. 
 The official role of the 23 members of the Political Bureau, an elite subset of 
the Central Committee, is to “assist the President in affairs of the party.” In practice, 
most members of the Political Bureau are also members of the President’s governing 
cabinet. They direct all nominations within the party, and guide its national campaigns 
and electoral strategies. The current Secretary of Communication for the RDPC, 
Jacques Fame Ndongo, is also currently the Minister of Higher Education 
(MINESUP), but has been in government since Biya came to power. Ndongo has 
stood at the heart of Biya’s propaganda machine since the 1980s, holding positions 
such as the Director of the Advanced School of Mass Communications and editor-in-
chief of the state newspaper, The Cameroon Tribune. In an interview with Ndongo, he 
noted repeatedly that decisions within the party (such as the holding of elections and 
the planning of electoral strategy) occur at the “pleasure of the president.”41 Overall, 
despite massive political transformations within Cameroon between 1985 and today, 
                                                
41 Interviewed on May 4, 2015 at the Ministry of Higher Education in Yaoundé. 
 
 88 
very little has changed within the ruling party. While a genuine effort has been made 
to mobilize ordinary Cameroonians into the party structure, the formal organization of 
the party itself cedes very little power to the masses. Paul Biya remains the sole veto 
point for politics in the RDPC. 
 
The Opposition, 1990 – 1997 
  As the UNC was being restructured and renamed to the RDPC in 1985, clearer 
voices began to arise calling for an opening of the system to opposition parties. Biya’s 
unfulfilled promise of liberalization, a declining economic climate, and renewed 
ethnic tensions as Biya shifted his cabinet to favor his Southern constituency at the 
expense of the North (and others),42 all contributed to a growing demand for the 
legalization of opposition parties. Eventually, as international events unfolded with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the evolution of Benin’s National Conference, demands for 
multiparty democracy in Cameroon reached a boiling point. The scandalous arrest in 
February 1990 of the “Douala ten,” a group of lawyers led by Yondo Mandengue 
Black (former president of the Cameroon Bar Association) who founded a pro-
multipartyism civil society group, the National Coordination for Democracy and a 
Multi-party System, set off the beginning of the democratization era in Cameroon. 
 The closely followed show trial of Black and his associates spurred 
Anglophone populist John Fru Ndi to officially register his newly formed Social 
Democratic Front (SDF) with the Ministry of the Interior (MINATD) as an official 
                                                
42 It is unclear how extreme this favoritism was. While the northerners certainly lost out during the 
transition (especially after the attempted coup), and Biya has been dogged by accusations of southern 
favoritism, the RDPC remains an ethnically inclusive party, with every major identity constituency 
represented in both the President’s cabinet as well as the Political Bureau of the RDPC. 
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political party. The government actively tried to dissuade Fru Ndi and refused to grant 
recognition of the SDF. In response, Fru Ndi rallied around 20,000 peaceful protesters 
in Bamenda on May 26, 1990, which was met brutally by the police, who shot and 
killed six protestors (Krieger 1994). The killing of the “Bamenda six” catalyzed 
opposition forces into action. Within a month, Maïgari Bello Bouba, a Northerner in 
exile in Nigeria for his alleged involvement in the 1983 attempted coup, launched his 
own political party, the Union nationale pour la démocratie et le progrès (UNDP). 
Protests spread across the country, gaining increasing support from a number of 
important groups, such as the Catholic Church and university students (Takougang 
and Krieger 1998). 
 Seeking to appease this opposition, Biya released the “Douala ten” from 
prison, further expanded the RDPC’s Central Committee, and “on December 5 [1990], 
the National Assembly approved a series of bills introduced by the president, who 
signed and proclaimed them ‘Liberty Laws’ on December 19” (ibid, 109). The liberty 
laws expanded press freedoms and, finally, outlined provisions for the establishment 
of opposition parties. Within months, the independent press had expanded 
exponentially, and calls began for a National Conference following the successful 
model of Benin (and soon after, many other Francophone West African nations). Biya 
refused to concede on this point, hoping to personally manage the (now inevitable) 
democratization process. In response, protests escalated, culminating in the “ville 
mortes” or “ghost town” campaigns in which entire cities—most famously Douala, 
Bamenda, and Bafoussam, but also many regional towns throughout the Littoral, 
Northwest, Southwest, and West Regions—shut down for weeks, and brought tens of 
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thousands of protestors to the streets week after week for months (van de Walle 1993, 
381).  
 During this period, four primary opposition parties rose to the forefront of the 
protests: the SDF, UNDP, UDC, and UPC. John Fru Ndi’s Social Democratic Front 
(SDF) was clearly the most prominent organizational force behind the villes mortes 
campaign. Based in Bamenda, its natural constituency was the Anglophone regions, 
particularly the Northwest. But during these early days, Fru Ndi made significant 
inroads bringing in elites and organizers from the Francophone West and Littoral 
regions. Fru Ndi was a charismatic leader with strong populist appeal; his speeches 
rallied tens of thousands of protestors across Western Cameroon, and Bamenda 
became the unofficial capital of the larger opposition (Takougang and Krieger 1998). 
 The UNDP arose to represent the (by now politically relegated) interests of the 
“greater north” encompassing the Adamawa, North, and Far North regions. Its primary 
leaders, Bello Bouba, Samuel Eboua, Hamadou Mustapha, and Issa Tchiroma, hoped 
to revive and transform Ahidjo’s legacy into a mass opposition movement in the north. 
Meanwhile, Adamou Ndam Njoya arose as a strong opposition figure in the heart of 
the Bamoun Kingdom in the Noun département in the West Region. His Union 
démocratique du Cameroun (UDC) was an early ally of the SDF. At the time, Ndam 
Njoya was a long-standing intellectual of the RDPC and member of the Bamoun royal 
family. Appointed Minister of Education under Ahidjo, he spent most of the Biya 
years of the 1980s as a career diplomat abroad. Njoya broke sharply with his royal 
family in opposing the RDPC (today, his brother the Sultan, Ibrahim Mbombo Njoya, 
is a staunch supporter of Biya and member of the RDPC Political Bureau), and his 
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intellectual and independent standing have remained nearly unblemished over the 
decades. Finally, the reestablished UPC undertook a revival during this period, 
garnering some support in Douala and northwards into its historic home in Bassa and 
Bamiléké country. Though unlike the other opposition parties, its leadership never 
really coalesced around one figure, and after 1992 the party fractured. 
 Eventually Biya conceded to the protests, scheduling multiparty legislative 
elections for March 1, 1992. The SDF and UDC boycotted the elections, but the 
UNDP and a faction of the UPC led by Frédéric Kodock stood against the RDPC. 
Because of the SDF/UDC boycott, the UNDP won 68 seats out of 180 across the Far 
North, North, Adamawa, West, Southwest, and even made inroads into the East. The 
UPC won 18 seats mostly in the Littoral, though also a handful of constituencies in the 
Center, West and Southwest. From a historical perspective, most opposition leaders 
regret the SDF/UDC decision to boycott the election. The RDPC swept the SDF and 
UDC constituencies on extremely low voter turnout (for example, 23 percent of 
registered voters in Mezam (Bamenda) and 16 percent in Noun), giving the ruling 
party a majority of seats it most certainly would not have won if the SDF and UDC 
had fielded candidates.  
 Learning from their mistakes in the legislative elections, the opposition 
attempted to unify for the presidential elections later that year. Unfortunately, 
however, early calls for a unified opposition candidate quickly evaporated into 
squabbles amongst the party leaders. Fru Ndi was challenged within his party by the 
Douala Ten’s defense lawyer, Bernard Muna, fracturing the party and signaling the 
start of many future defections from the SDF. More fatally, Fru Ndi and Ndam Njoya 
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had a major falling out, as each one saw himself as the legitimate leader of the 
opposition. With support splintering around Fru Ndi, Bello Bouba, empowered by his 
showing in the legislative elections, decided to run under the UNDP banner. Against 
the fractured opposition, Biya won the presidential election with 40 percent of the vote 
(an outcome still intensely disputed by all opposition leaders, and many independent 
observers). Officially, Fru Ndi won 36 percent of the vote, Bello Bouba won 19 
percent, and Ndam Njoya won just under 4 percent.  
 
The Opposition, 1997 – Present 
The 1992 presidential elections marked the last time the opposition threatened 
the Biya regime. In the 1997 legislative elections, the SDF entered the National 
Assembly with 43 seats, but the RDPC added 21 seats to their majority, primarily 
gaining ground from the nearly defunct UPC, as well as establishing its primacy in the 
East. The opposition successfully boycotted the presidential election several months 
later, allowing Biya to win with 93 percent of the vote. The RDPC made even stronger 
inroads in the 2002 legislative elections, now gaining majorities in nine of ten regions 
of the country; the sole exception being the Northwest where the SDF won the largest 
number of opposition seats (Takougang 2003). In 2004, Biya won 71 percent of the 
vote nationally, cementing his unrivaled station. He then revised the constitution, 
abolishing term limits and winning re-election in 2011 with 78 percent of the vote.  
 Today, in terms of vote totals, the SDF remains the strongest opposition party 
in Cameroon, followed by the UNDP and then the UDC. Various factions of the UPC 
continue to run for office (sometimes successfully), and other smaller parties, such as 
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Maurice Kamto’s Mouvement pour la renaissance du Cameroun (MRC) contest seats 
in a handful of constituencies. However, most everyone agrees that today the 
opposition is deeply demoralized. In 2013, the RDPC ran uncontested in 13 electoral 
districts (out of 83 total). The most popular explanation in Cameroon for this outcome 
is the RDPC’s ability to coopt the opposition. Arriola (2012) pinpoints the key 
moment of cooptation in the mid-1990s, when Biya successfully brought in key 
Bamiléké business interests, depriving the opposition of its primary source of funding 
(Chapter 7). Even where opposition leaders have (by their own accounts) remained 
independent, most are dogged by rumors that they have accepted bribes and favors 
from the RDPC leadership in order to remain a “loyal” opposition; independent 
enough to give Cameroon the appearance of democratic competition without actually 
posing a threat to the regime. Whether these accusations are founded or not, many 
Cameroonians believe them to be true.  
 Further, the regime has deeply disadvantaged the opposition through various 
legal and extralegal channels (van de Walle 1993, 379–82). Access to the media 
(especially television broadcast) remains dominated by the state; the conflation 
between the ruling party and the state gives the RDPC unparalleled access to resources 
and campaign funding; gerrymandering continues to make winning structurally more 
difficult for the opposition; and although outright electoral fraud has become 
increasingly rare, it certainly played a decisive role in keeping Biya in power 
throughout the turbulent 1990s (Albaugh 2011). Finally, the opposition itself has 
become increasingly unlikable. Opposition leaders who came to power criticizing the 
autocratic state now appear, 25 years later, as little dictators within their own parties. 
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The lack of leadership turnover has resulted in a general stagnation within these 
parties, and many constituents complain that repeated and unvarying attacks on the 
regime fail to inspire hope or inspiration for erstwhile supporters. Further, infighting 
within the parties has eroded not just the political bases of the opposition, but also 
their credibility. 
 Repeated defections within the SDF lost Fru Ndi almost all of his original 
support outside of the Northwest (Konings 2004). Today, apart from a handful of seats 
in the capitals of the Littoral, Southwest, and West regions, all of the SDF’s 
parliamentary seats are in the Northwest region. Further, 7 of the Northwest’s 20 
parliamentary seats are held by the RDPC (see Appendix 2). Nonetheless, Fru Ndi 
remains a steadfast symbol of the opposition. Despite popular accusations, he 
maintains that the SDF is fundamentally independent from the RDPC. In his own 
words, “The CPDM [RDPC] does not reach out to us; they think they know 
everything. The CPDM believes that money can change everyone’s minds. Our 
relationship has not changed much. When you go to talk to them with an open heart, 
they look to cheat you. It is worse today than ever before”.43 Regardless of their 
relationship with the RDPC, the electoral messages of the SDF have not changed 
much in 25 years. When I asked Vanigassen Mochiggle, a member of the SDF’s 
National Executive Committee, about the SDF’s general electoral strategy and which 
types of voters they target during elections, he replied that, “We don’t have a specific 
campaign strategy. There are no groups we target specifically. Instead we have a broad 
                                                
43 Interviewed by the author on March 30, 2015 at his compound in Ntarinkon, Bamenda. 
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message, mostly on the economic failings caused by the politics of the CPDM 
government”.44  
 The structural organization of the SDF mirrors the RDPC. In order to mobilize 
voters, they organize their militants into village “wards,” which are aggregated up into 
subdivision (arrondissement) groups, which cluster further into divisional 
(département) groups, and finally regional groups. Local level campaign messages are 
often filtered up through this hierarchy from the ward level, and the decentralization of 
this campaign strategy compliments the lack of a unified or professionalized electoral 
strategy. Not unlike the RDPC Congress, the SDF holds a convention for its members 
every four years to elect party representatives, though primary power lies with Fru Ndi 
and his National Executive Committee. 
 The UDC is similarly structured, though through discussions with Ndam 
Njoya, now mayor of Foumban, and separately with his wife, Patricia Tomaino Ndam 
Njoya, senior Deputy for the UDC, the party seems much more focused on local 
issues. Although the UDC entertains ambitions of national status, the fact that it has 
only held seats in one electoral district since 1992 firmly defines it is a regional party 
of Noun in the West. Because it has just one constituency, it is logical that it would 
have a more grassroots approach towards governing. As Ndam Njoya noted in an 
interview, “Bamouns are open people and so we have always been open with the 
UDC. The organization of the party has always been focused on the human being”.45 
Both Ndam Njoya and his wife spoke at length about the importance of engaging 
directly with their constituents. The mayor frequently cited independent development 
                                                
44 Interviewed by the author on March 30, 2015 at his compound in Ntarinkon, Bamenda. 
45 Interviewed by the author on March 21, 2015 at his house in Foumban. 
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projects and initiatives he was starting in Noun outside of government channels. The 
senior MP noted that:  
Election campaigns are not really important to us. The time we spend 
educating people—sensitizing them—has been since day one and is 
everyday, not just during elections… We campaign, but what is important 
to us is to educate our militants to keep a political ethics in their everyday 
lives… We want militants who are moral and disciplined and who want 
good representatives and good governance.46 
 
 
The UDC’s focus on local politics and development has clearly contributed to its 
success in Noun. Despite the Bamoun Sultan’s strong support for the RDPC, the UDC 
continues to be re-elected in both legislative and municipal elections in that district. 
 Ironically, the distrust Fru Ndi and Ndam Njoya express towards Biya is 
dwarfed by their distrust of one another. Both spoke far more passionately and angrily 
of one another than they did of President Biya (whom they barely even mentioned). 
Ndam Njoya, an otherwise erudite and soft-spoken statesman, lashed out at the SDF, 
accusing them of being coopted by the RDPC: “They are greedy and don’t see the 
long game”.47  Fru Ndi, a garrulous and pugnacious populist, who in nature and 
disposition could not be more different from Ndam Njoya, nevertheless had similar 
accusations. In the middle of an unprovoked rant against “these smaller parties” who 
are “jealous of us,” Fru Ndi accused Njoya of single-handedly destroying their 
opposition unification pact in 1992.48  These seemingly insurmountable challenges to 
                                                
46 Interviewed by the author on May 8, 2015 at her house in Essos, Yaoundé. 
47 Interviewed by the author on March 21, 2015 at his house in Foumban. 
48 Interviewed by the author on March 30, 2015 at his compound in Ntarinkon, Bamenda. 
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opposition unity do not present a clear path forward for the two remaining viable 
opposition parties. 
 Finally, the UNDP, which currently holds 5 seats in the National Assembly, 
has come fully under the umbrella of the RDPC. After the 1992 elections, two of the 
founders of the UNDP, Hamadou Mustapha and Issa Tchiroma, were invited into the 
Biya government as ministers. They accepted, and Bella Bouba denounced them, but 
did not expel them from the party (Takougang and Krieger 1998, 161). The co-
optation nonetheless worked to begin discrediting the unity and independence of the 
UNDP. In 1997, after losing 55 seats in the elections for the National Assembly 
(largely because of the entrance of the SDF after its 1992 boycott), Bello Bouba also 
accepted a cabinet position from Biya, first as Minister of Industrial and Commercial 
Development (now the Ministry of Trade (MINT)), and bouncing around different 
ministries until landing in 2011 as Minister of Tourism and Leisure, a position he 
enjoys today. Though the UNDP continues to run in municipal and legislative 
election, it does not run in presidential elections, and its MPs vote in conjunction with 
the RDPC. 
 
Demographic Divides between Partisans and Nonpartisans 
Given the current state of the political environment, what does contemporary 
partisanship look like today in Cameroon? To what extent do citizens identify with 
these political parties, and how does the meaning of partisanship differ for citizens 
who identify with the RDPC versus partisans who support an opposition party? 
Perhaps because the opposition in Cameroon today is so deflated, there is very little 
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scholarly discussion of partisanship or mass political behavior in Cameroon (or 
electoral autocracies more broadly). Generally, the assumption most elites and 
scholars make in assessing the state of public opinion in Cameroon is that the average 
Cameroonian is cynical about politics and disconnected from the political system as a 
whole. The general belief is that the Biya regime is deeply unpopular and lacks any 
kind of popular support. As one commentator noted, “Even if the general spirit is one 
of demobilization, pockets of resistance still exist within Cameroonian society” 
(Pigeaud 2011, 215).49  
 However, the almost complete vacuum on public opinion in Cameroon means 
that these conjectures are largely derived from elite interviews and speculation. This 
dissertation attempts to fill this gap in our knowledge by directly analyzing 
Cameroonian public opinion. Although analysts and commentators are correct to argue 
that citizens are generally demobilized, they are incorrect to believe that partisanship 
is meaningless or that the existing regime is deeply illegitimate. If pockets of 
resistance exist, so do many pockets of support. Most studies of authoritarianism have 
very little to say about mass publics, except as a potential threat to the regime 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012). In most 
cases, the public is assumed to be adversarial to the ruling regime, and partisanship is 
thought to be exceedingly weak. Although this dissertation does not argue that the 
Biya regime or the RDPC is overwhelmingly popular, it seeks to explore the variation 
in support for and against the regime and the parties. In order to better understand 
partisanship in Cameroon, I first investigate the types of citizens who choose to 
                                                
49 The author’s translation. 
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associate with political parties, whether the ruling party or the opposition. As outlined 
in Chapter Two, I argue that, similar to democratic regimes, partisans in general 
should feature higher levels of socioeconomic status than nonpartisans. Opposition 
partisans and ruling party partisans are instead divided by their beliefs about politics 
and the legitimacy of the state. 
 Today in Cameroon, partisanship is low, particularly for the opposition. 
Overall, 38.5 percent of respondents reported feeling close to a particular political 
party. Of this group of partisans, 75.7 percent reported feeling close to the RDPC. 
Almost 15 percent were close to the largest opposition party, the SDF, and eleven 
other parties were mentioned, including the northern-based UNDP and the UDC, all of 
which represented fewer than five percent of partisans. As shown in Table 7, this 
roughly matches national vote totals for these parties. This means that only 9.2 percent 
of all respondents are opposition partisans (reporting that they feel close to an 
opposition party). 
 
Table 7: Self-Reported Partisanship and Official Vote Totals 
Political Party 
Proportion of 
Reported 
Partisans* 
Percent Vote in 
2011 Presidential 
Election 
Rassemblement démocratique du Peuple 
Camerounais (RDPC) 75.7 % 78.0 % 
Social Democratic Front (SDF) 14.6 10.7 
Union nationale pour la démocratie et le 
progress (UNDP) 2.7 -- 
Mouvement pour la renaissance du 
Cameroun (MRC) 2.0 -- 
Union démocratique du Cameroun (UDC) 1.6 1.7 
Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) 1.1 -- 
*Author’s survey 
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 Overall, I argue that partisans of all types—both those who support the ruling 
party as well as those who support the various opposition parties—should possess 
higher levels of socioeconomic status than nonpartisans. Socioeconomic status 
incorporates various different indicators; most classically this includes income and 
education (Lipset 1959b; Verba and Nie 1972). Citizens with higher levels of income 
possess the economic resources to more fully participate in political life. They have 
the time and means to engage with candidates and parties in ways that poorer citizens 
(who are pre-occupied with making ends meet at home) do not. Relatedly, citizens 
with higher levels of education have the cognitive resources to more fully participate 
in politics. Citizens with very low levels of education are less likely to fully 
understand the political system or engage with it directly.  
 Apart from endowing citizens with the resources to engage with political 
parties, socioeconomic status also provides citizens with social expectations to 
participate. For example, wealthier and more educated citizens are often expected to 
join parties through their personal and professional networks. In addition, older 
citizens, and particularly men, are far more likely to be expected to participate in 
politics than younger citizens and women, especially in traditional societies. Rural 
areas are also more likely to enable partisanship, as close-knit networks of reciprocal 
participation are stronger than urban networks, especially amongst networks of older 
men. The following section presents the descriptive statistics of the survey, looking at 
the basic relationships between demographic factors and partisanship. The next section 
estimates the comparative relationships between income, education, age, gender and 
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locality with partisanship using regression analysis. The final section turns to the 
political divides between ruling party partisans and opposition partisans. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Demographic Determinants of Partisanship 
In Cameroon, the clearest indicators of partisanship are age, gender, and 
locality. Far and away, partisans are more likely to older men from rural areas. 
Looking first at age, Figure 4 shows the density of nonpartisans, RDPC partisans, and 
opposition partisans at all ages between 23 and 100 (the range of ages in the survey). 
While the age distribution of RDPC partisans and opposition partisans is nearly 
identical, nonpartisans clearly skew younger than partisans as a whole. While the 
average survey respondent was 37 years old, the average nonpartisan is 35 and the 
average partisan is 40. On average, opposition partisans are about one year older than 
RDPC partisans.  
 In addition, partisans are also much more likely to be men from rural areas. 
Figure 5 presents the percent of nonpartisans, RDPC partisans, and opposition 
partisans that are men or women and were interviewed in rural or urban locations. 
Fifty-seven percent of nonpartisans are women, compared to 50 percent of RDPC 
partisans and only 34 percent of opposition partisans.  Of all the women interviewed, 
70.7 percent were nonpartisans, 23.7 percent reported feeling close to the RDPC, and 
only 6.6 percent reported feeling close to an opposition party. In contrast, 57.2 percent 
of men were nonpartisans, while 30.2 percent felt close to the RDPC and 12.5 percent 
felt close to an opposition party. Clearly men are much more likely to report feelings 
of partisanship when compared to women. 
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Figure 4: Kernel Density Plot of the Relationship between Age and Partisanship 
 
  
  
Similarly, rural respondents were also much more likely to be partisans. For 
both RDPC and opposition partisans, roughly half were interviewed in urban areas and 
half were interviewed in rural areas. However, only 40 percent of nonpartisans were 
interviewed in rural areas; 60 percent were urban. For subgroups of partisans, it 
appears that opposition partisans tend to be even more rural than RDPC partisans. 
While RDPC partisans were almost perfectly split between urban and rural 
enumeration areas, 54.3 percent of opposition partisans were rural compared to 45.7 
percent urban. 
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Figure 5: Gender and Locality across Partisan Groups 
 
  
 
 While the relationship between partisanship and age, gender, and locality is 
quite striking, there appears to be a weaker or more nuanced connection between 
income and education and partisanship. First, in terms of income, it does appear that, 
on average, partisans of all types appear to be slightly wealthier than their nonpartisan 
counterparts. Because few Cameroonians know their annual incomes, the survey 
attempts to approximate a measure of income in more tangible ways. These are 
captured in Table 8. First is a combined measure of items owned by the respondent: a 
radio, television, car, motorcycle, mobile phone, computer, piped or well water, and an 
indoor or outdoor toilet within the compound. This scale ranges from 0-10, where 
someone who owns all items, as well as piped water in their house and a toilet in their 
house receives a perfect 10, and someone who owns none of those items nor any water 
or a toilet/latrine within their compound receives a zero. While the average score of a 
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nonpartisan is 4.85, the average score of a partisan is slightly higher: 5.18. Ruling 
party partisans tend to be slightly “wealthier” (5.27) than opposition partisans (5.04). 
 
Table 8: Income Measure of Partisans and Nonpartisans 
 
All 
Respondents 
Non-
Partisans 
All 
Partisans 
RDPC 
Partisans 
Opposition 
Partisans 
Average  
No. Items 
Owned  
(0-10) 
4.98 4.85 5.18 5.27 5.04 
Average 
Full-Time 
Employment 
Rate 
16.1 % 15.7 % 16.8 % 17.2 % 16.1 % 
Average 
Lack of 
Basic Needs 
(0-12) 
4.6 4.8 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Total 
Number 2,399 1,461 931 590 341 
 
 
 
 The second measure of income is employment. The survey offered five 
categories of employment: unemployed not looking, unemployed looking, self-
employed, formally employed part-time, and formally employed full-time. The 
plurality of respondents (45.6 percent) was self-employed, usually as farmers, market 
traders, or informal service providers, such as hairdressers or tailors. Roughly 16 
percent of the entire sample was formally employed full-time, but this figure was 
slightly higher for partisans (16.8 percent) than it was for nonpartisans (15.7 percent). 
Formal employment was highest for RDPC partisans (17.2 percent).  
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 Finally, a series of abstract questions probed the respondent’s level of “lived 
poverty” (Bratton 2005). Borrowed from the Afrobarometer, these three questions 
asked the respondent how often during the past year their family had gone without 1) 
enough food to eat, 2) medicine, or 3) a cash income. For each question, options 
included, “never,” “just once or twice,” “several times,” “many times,” or “always.” 
The average respondent went without food or medicine once or twice a year, and went 
without a cash income several times. For each response, “never” was coded as zero, 
while “always” was recorded as 4; thus the “wealthiest” respondents, who never went 
without food, medicine, or an income, had the lowest scores, while the poorest 
respondents had the highest scores. Combined, the scale ranged from zero (152 
respondents) to twelve (17 respondents), with an average of 4.6. Although the 
differences are slight, nonpartisans scored slightly higher on this scale (4.8) than 
partisans (4.3), indicating that by this measure as well, nonpartisans are poorer than 
partisans. 
 Taken together, I believe that the first measure of income (items owned) is the 
best approximation of income because it is most precise. While full-time formal 
employment is most certainly a strong measure of wealth, the sub-categories contain 
many different income groups. In particular, self-employment is too broad a category 
to convey information: small plot rural farmers are lumped together with successful 
market traders, who may themselves employ dozens of full-time employees. Further, 
the three questions of lived poverty are overly subjective, and respondents often used 
the question to emphasize how upset they were with their personal circumstances, 
regardless of how well the response category correlated with reality. A number of 
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respondents who were clearly well-off professed to me that they “always” went 
without food, medicine, or income as a way to tell me that Cameroon was under-
developed or mismanaged.50 In contrast, the measures of items owned are more 
objective, and therefore respondents answered the questions more earnestly. Thus, 
throughout the rest of the dissertation, I use the first measure of “items owned” in 
order to capture overall wealth. This measure is also not ideal, particularly because 
while it captures extreme poverty, it does not capture gradients of wealth (which likely 
deflates the differences between partisans). Nonetheless, it is more precise than the 
other two measures. 
 Even more than income, the relationship between education and partisanship 
appears to be ambiguous. Within the sample, education ranges on a nine-point scale 
from no formal education (3.7 percent of the sample), to post-graduate degree (3.2 
percent of the sample). Overall, the modal Cameroonian possesses “some secondary 
schooling.” As shown in Figure 6, the direct comparison of education levels amongst 
different partisans groups doesn’t reveal much variation, although opposition partisans 
do appear to possess slightly higher levels of education than nonpartisans or ruling 
party partisans. The average education score for an opposition partisan is 4.4, 
compared to 4.2 for both nonpartisans and RDPC partisans (where a 4 represents 
“some secondary schooling”). This is likely complicated by the nature of autocratic 
politics.  
 
                                                
50 As a result, I recommend that researchers refrain from using this series of questions to measure 
income when analyzing the Afrobarometer data.  
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Figure 6: Kernal Density Plot of Education and Partisanship 
 
  
 
As Croke, et al. (2016) have noted in Zimbabwe, citizens with high levels of 
education may be less likely to participate in autocratic politics because their cognitive 
skills make them less likely to buy into the political system as a whole, and therefore 
less likely to participate in general. This logic does not appear to dominate the 
relationship between education and partisanship in Cameroon, though a competing 
logic may be at work. On the one hand, citizens with high levels of education may be 
more likely to participate in politics than citizens with low levels of education because 
education endows them the basic resources to do so. On the other hand, having more 
education may make some citizens more likely to bow out of politics altogether. 
 The basic descriptive statistics present a mixed message about partisanship. 
While clearly partisans of all types tend to be older men from rural areas, they only 
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appear to have slightly more wealth than nonpartisans.51 Inversely, education appears 
to be unrelated to partisanship. However, given the overlapping and inter-related 
nature of these demographic features, it is unclear from the descriptive statistics 
whether or not the different aspects of socioeconomic status uniformly predict 
partisanship. After discussing the relationship between ethnicity and partisanship, the 
following section uses multinomial logit regressions in order to better understand the 
predictive relationship between partisanship on the one hand, and these different 
characteristics of socioeconomic status (income, education, age, gender, and locality) 
on the other. 
 
Ethnicity 
As noted in Chapter Two, a voluminous literature has argued that ethnicity is 
central to understanding partisanship and political behavior in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Therefore, it is worth looking at ethnicity as an additional demographic factor that 
might determine partisanship. In order to measure ethnicity, the survey asked an open-
ended question: “To which ethnic group do you belong?” I received more than 200 
different responses to the question, and so I therefore include only the top ten ethnic 
groups represented in the survey: all groups that had 50 or more respondents, plus a 
category for ‘other.’ Taken together, the top ten ethnic groups account for 66.5 percent 
of the sample. Table 9 reveals the percentage of nonpartisans, all partisans, ruling 
party partisans and SDF partisans for each sampled ethnic group. 
 
                                                
51 Though arguably the measure of income is less precise than the other demographic measures. 
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Table 9: Partisanship and Ethnicity 
Ethnic Group Nonpartisans 
All  
Partisans 
RDPC 
Partisans 
SDF 
Partisans 
Beti 58.2 % 41.8 % 39.7 % 1.0 % 
Douala 71.2 28.8 23.2 1.5 
Makas 52.8 47.2 42.7 1.9 
Bamiléké 68.2 31.8 24.0 3.6 
Bamoun 54.0 46.0 33.3 1.4 
Bassa 61.9 38.1 25.4 1.1 
Bayangi 51.9 48.2 38.2 6.6 
Kom 61.1 38.9 12.0 23.4 
Mamfe 61.0 39.0 30.0 7.5 
Moghamo 53.3 46.7 17.8 27.4 
Other 60.1 39.9 23.7 13.6 
Total 60.1 39.9 26.3 9.5 
 
 
 Overall, there is clearly variation in partisanship amongst the largest ethnic 
groups. Total partisanship varies between a high of 47.2 percent (the Makas, an 
acephelous group that straddles a wide swathe of the East region, spilling into Gabon 
and Equatorial Guinea) and a low of 28.8 percent (the Douala). Similarly, there is 
clear variation in type of partisanship as well. Although we might expect the Beti (the 
President’s ethnic group) to be the most hardcore RDPC partisans, in fact, it is again 
the Makas who have the highest percentage of ruling party partisans (at 42.7 percent 
of all Makas respondents). This is considerably higher than the national average of 
26.3 percent. Further, the Bayangi—an acephelous ethnic group from the Anglophone 
Southwest region—possess similar levels of ruling party partisanship as the Beti (38.2 
versus 39.7 percent); a perhaps surprising finding given the stylized fact that all 
Anglophones are SDF partisans. Less surprisingly, the largest numbers of SDF 
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partisans identify as Moghamo (27.4 percent) and Kom (23.4 percent), ethnic groups 
from the Northwest departments of Batibo and Boyo, respectively. While ethnicity can 
give us some clues to understand partisanship, it is unclear how much ethnic identity 
overlaps with confounding factors such as urban/rural locality, education and wealth. 
Thus, the following section arbitrates between these different demographic factors in 
order to arbitrate between their relative predictive powers. 
 
Statistical Analysis of the Demographic Determinants of Partisanship 
The first multivariate analysis looks at the overall divide between all partisans 
and all nonpartisans, where a partisan is anyone who reported feeling close to a 
political party. All models control for the demographic characteristics discussed above 
(including ethnicity), and also include region fixed effects as well as post-stratification 
weights designed to re-balance over-sampling in opposition areas. Table 10 reports the 
results of the regression.52  
Overall, it is clear that demographically, partisans are different from 
nonpartisans. The logit results indicate that holding all other indicators equal, partisans 
as a whole tend to possess more personal items, be older men from rural areas, and 
have middling levels of education. Ostensibly, one of these factors is not driving the 
relationship between socioeconomic status; instead all of them describe the 
socioeconomic differences between partisans and nonpartisans. Further, it is important 
to note that all of these factors help to explain partisanship even controlling for 
                                                
52 Coefficients for region fixed effects are not included because of space constraints. 
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ethnicity. However, in comparison to the Beti (the baseline group), the Bassa, Kom, 
and Mamfe are all less likely to be partisans. 
 
Table 10: Characteristics of All Partisans and Nonpartisans 
Reported Feeling Close 
to a Political Party 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
Personal Wealth 
 
 
 
0.091*** 
(0.033) 
Rural 
 
 
1.054*** 
(0.201) 
Female 
 
-0.405*** 
(0.118) 
Age 
 
0.037*** 
(0.005) 
 
Education 
 
0.398*** 
(0.112) 
 
Education  
Squared 
-0.042*** 
(0.011) 
 
Beti -- 
Douala -0.317 
Makas 0.211 
Bamiléké -0.257 
Bamoun 0.087 
Bassa -0.704** 
Bayangi -0.537 
Kom -0.755** 
Mamfe -1.157*** 
Moghamo -0.505 
Other -0.122 
Constant -3.187*** 
Pseudo R-Squared                 0.086 
Model includes region fixed effects (Centre, East, Littoral, Northwest, West, Southwest, and South).  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 ; n = 2,325 
 
 
 In order to better understand the more nuanced divide between ruling party 
partisans, opposition partisans, and nonpartisans, the second statistical analysis uses a 
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multinomial logit model to evaluate which types of respondents report feeling close to 
either the ruling party or an opposition party, or feeling close to no party at all. The 
multinomial logistic approach calculates the odds that a particular type of citizen (for 
example, a 30 year-old woman with a high school diploma) is a nonpartisan relative to 
the odds of being an RDPC partisan or SDF partisan. The marginal effects of the 
multinomial logit regression are presented in Table 11. The marginal effects can be 
interpreted as the odds of being an RDPC partisan, an SDF partisan, or a nonpartisan, 
given a one-unit increase in the independent variable. 
 
Table 11: Characteristics of Partisanship:  
Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 Nonpartisans 
Members of the 
Ruling RDPC 
Members of the 
Opposition SDF 
Personal 
Wealth 
 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Rural 
 
 
-0.212*** 
(0.041) 
0.239*** 
(0.040) 
-0.027 
(0.018) 
Female 
 
 
0.071*** 
(0.025) 
-0.042* 
(0.024) 
-0.030*** 
(0.010) 
Age 
 
 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Education 
 
 
-0.083*** 
(0.024) 
0.071*** 
(0.025) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Education 
Squared 
 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Multinomial logit. Marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Model includes region fixed effects (Centre, East, Littoral, Northwest, West, 
Southwest, and South) and ethnicity dummies. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 ; n = 2,176 
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 Across all socioeconomic indicators, the starkest contrast lies between RDPC 
partisans and nonpartisans. The odds of being close to the ruling party increases for 
men and rural citizens, and as personal wealth and age increase. These odds 
simultaneously decrease the likelihood of being a nonpartisan. Education appears to 
have a more nuanced relationship with partisanship, as the squared term indicates that 
citizens with the highest and lowest levels of education have the strongest odds of 
being a nonpartisan. The odds of partisanship increase at middling levels of education. 
In general, it appears that SDF partisans are more heterogeneous than RDPC partisans. 
Apart from locality, the signs of the marginal effects for SDF partisans and RDPC 
partisans are identical, however only gender and the education-squared term are 
statistically significant from zero for SDF partisans. Similar to RDPC partisans, SDF 
partisans are more likely to be men with middling levels of education.  
 Thus although opposition SDF partisans are more likely to come from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds, it is clear that nonpartisans are far more likely to hail 
from lower socioeconomic categories when compared to partisans of all types. 
Nonpartisans are more likely to be younger, poorer, urban women. In general, these 
results show that partisans and nonpartisans are distinct categories of citizens, at least 
demographically. Whilst the wealthiest citizens have about a 50-50 chance of being a 
partisan (of any party), the poorest respondents only have a 26 percent chance of 
belonging to a party. The predicted probability of being close to the RDPC doubles for 
the wealthiest citizens (compared to the poorest ones). Further, nonpartisans are 
heavily represented by the youth whilst older citizens are much more likely to feel 
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close to a political party. Whereas a 25 year-old Cameroonian has a 73 percent 
likelihood of being a nonpartisan, an 85 year-old has only a 23 percent likelihood. 
 
 Again, these findings hold even controlling for ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, the 
Kom and the Moghamo (both traditionally from districts in the Northwest SDF 
heartland) are more likely to be SDF partisans. In comparison to the Beti, they are also 
less likely to the RDPC partisans, along with the Mamfe (from the Southwest region) 
and the Bassa (the group central to the UDC rebellion). Thus, overall, the statistical 
analysis supports the contention that partisans tend to possess higher levels of 
socioeconomic status than nonpartisans. Though this relationship appears to be 
stronger for ruling party partisans than it is for opposition partisans. 
 
Political Divides between Opposition and RDPC Partisans 
Although there is a deeper demographic divide between partisans and 
nonpartisans than there is between different types of partisans, this does not mean that 
opposition partisans and ruling party partisans are identical. Indeed, despite their 
similar levels of socioeconomic status, they are deeply divided in their views of 
politics. While opposition parties are mistrustful of the regime and skeptical of the 
level of democracy in Cameroon, ruling party partisans are far more trusting and 
optimistic. 
 As predicted, in terms of general approval of the regime, ruling party partisans 
are far more likely to express trust in all of the ruling institutions. Figure 7 shows the 
average scores for trust by partisanship. The survey asked each respondent how much 
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they trusted the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission (ELECAM), the 
RDPC, the opposition parties, and the president.  
 
Figure 7: Trust in the Regime by Partisanship Type 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the only one of these institutions opposition partisans trust 
more than RDPC partisans is the opposition itself. Apart from the opposition parties, 
however, trust in the institutions of government clearly bundles together. Although 
ruling party partisans trust the president more than any other institution, their average 
level of trust for all institutions of government (apart from the opposition) hovers 
around “somewhat.” Similarly, for opposition partisans, apart from their higher 
approval of opposition parties, their level of average trust in the National Assembly, 
ELECAM, and President all hover just under “a little.” Though they do appear to hold 
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a special disdain for the RDPC. Similarly, when asked whether or not they believed 
the work of their deputy (MP) makes a difference in their life, 33.5 percent of 
opposition party partisans replied in the affirmative compared to 41.5 percent of ruling 
party partisans. 
 For trust in each of these different institutions, nonpartisans float somewhere in 
between ruling party partisans and opposition partisans.  For example, the average 
score for a nonpartisan for trust in the National Assembly is 0.89, falling in between 
the average score of an opposition partisan (0.73) and a ruling party partisan (1.61). 
Average trust scores for nonpartisans fall somewhere in between average for ruling 
party partisans and opposition partisans for every institution of government, including 
the political parties. For nonpartisans, the average trust score for the RDPC is 0.86; 
certainly higher than the average opposition partisan score (0.38), but likewise lower 
than the average RDPC partisan score (1.97). For trust in the opposition parties, the 
average score for a nonpartisan is 0.73, compared to 1.87 for opposition partisans and 
0.61 for RDPC partisans. As we might expect, nonpartisans appear to be less 
ideologically committed than partisans in general. 
 Striking at the heart of this political cleavage, different types of partisans have 
profoundly different explanations for the historical dominance of the RDPC. The 
survey asked respondents to choose one of three different explanations for why the 
RDPC always wins elections: 1) “because it is genuinely popular,” 2) “not because it 
is popular, but because there is no credible opposition,” or 3) “because the elections 
are rigged.” As presented in Figure 8, the majority of ruling party partisans (61.5 
percent) believes that the RDPC wins elections because it is popular. Inversely, very 
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few opposition partisans agree with this explanation (11.6 percent). Instead, the vast 
majority of opposition supporters (72.5 percent) believe that the RDPC only wins 
elections because the electoral system is rigged. A similar number reported believing 
that the RDPC wins because there is no credible opposition (23.9 percent of RDPC 
partisans versus 15.9 percent of opposition partisans).53  
 
Figure 8: Explanation for Why the RDPC Always Wins 
 
 
 
 Just as these different groups of partisans have inverse views of the 
government, they also have different understandings about democracy in Cameroon. 
                                                
53 Again, on average, nonpartisans fall in the middle of the two partisan groups. They are far more 
evenly split in their responses to this question. 31.2 percent say the RDPC is genuinely popular, 27.8 
percent say that there is no credible opposition, and 41.0 percent say that the elections are rigged. As a 
group, when compared to ruling party partisans and opposition partisans, nonpartisans are slightly more 
likely to think that there is no credible opposition. However, the percentage of nonpartisans who 
believes that the RDPC is genuinely popular or that the elections are rigged falls in between the 
correlating percent of RDPC partisans and opposition partisans. 
 118 
In general, RDPC partisans are much more likely than opposition partisans to believe 
that the system is democratic. A series of questions asked respondents to rate the level 
of democracy in Cameroon on a scale from zero to ten, where zero represents not 
democratic at all, and ten represents completely democratic. For each question, RDPC 
partisans on average rated the level of democracy in Cameroon higher than did 
opposition partisans on average. For legislative elections, the average score provided 
by RDPC partisans was 6.4, compared to 3.9 for opposition supporters. The gulf is 
even wider for presidential elections: 6.5 compared to 3.2. For the country “today,” the 
averages diverge by 2.3 points, for the country in 1992, there is a 1.2-point difference, 
and for the country in 1982, there is a 0.8-point divide.54 The distributions of responses 
by partisanship type are depicted in Figure 9. Of all the different ratings, ruling party 
partisans, on average, gave the highest democracy scores to presidential elections, 
which was second-to-last for opposition partisans.  
When asked whether or not elections should be abolished, neither group of 
partisans was particularly anti-democratic (2.9 percent of RDPC partisans and 3.8 
percent of opposition partisans said it would be good to abolish elections). However, 
opposition partisans were generally more cynical about the general worth of elections; 
16.8 percent of opposition partisans said it wouldn’t make a difference either way if 
elections were abolished or not (compared to only 6.3 percent of RDPC partisans who 
held this view). 
 
                                                
54 The average score for nonpartisans falls in between the average score for RDPC partisans and 
opposition partisans for each question. Taken with the similar findings for the questions about trust and 
the question about why the RDPC wins elections, these results for nonpartisans indicate that, on 
average, nonpartisans appear to be less ideologically committed than either group of partisans. 
 119 
Figure 9: Assessments of Level of Democracy by Partisanship Type 
 
 
   
 These figures reveal a very clear political cleavage between ruling party 
partisans and opposition partisans. Although they both hail from relatively higher 
socioeconomic groups, they hold vastly different levels of trust in the government and 
beliefs about the level of democracy in Cameroon. While ruling party partisans have 
relatively high levels of trust in the government and give higher-than-average marks to 
the level of democracy in Cameroon, opposition party partisans hold very little trust in 
what they view as undemocratic institutions of government. In contrast, as a group, 
nonpartisans appear less ideologically committed than either set of partisans. 
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 Taken together, this chapter has shown that although the ruling party was not 
primarily designed as a “mobilizing” party meant to indoctrinate or control mass 
participation, the party—in one form or another—has now been at the heart of 
Cameroonian politics for nearly 60 years. Over the decades, it has developed a core 
group of partisan supporters, who on average tend to possess higher levels of 
socioeconomic status. Opposition parties have likewise relied on a core group of high 
SES partisans to support them during elections, but have appealed to a completely 
different set of political beliefs about the state. Whereas the ruling party paints a 
picture of stability, peace, and long-term economic growth, the opposition campaigns 
on a narrative of economic stagnation, corruption, and the illegitimacy of the 
autocratic government. These different party narratives have been cultivated and used 
over the past 25 years to mobilize partisans to vote during elections. The next chapter 
assesses the ways in which this framework of partisanship can help to explain the 
different reasons Cameroonians have for voting in elections.  
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CHAPTER 4 
WHO VOTES AND WHY? 
 
 
The previous chapter showed that partisans in Cameroon, not unlike partisans 
in developed democracies, tend to come from groups with higher levels of 
socioeconomic status. Citizens who align themselves with a political party are more 
likely to possess the resources and social standing that enable them to engage directly 
with politics. However, although partisans tend to look similar demographically, at 
least when compared to nonpartisans, they also display clear political divides. In 
electoral autocracies, the primary division between ruling party partisans and 
opposition partisans revolves around support for or opposition to the state itself. 
Different types of partisans have fundamentally different understandings of national 
politics. Whereas ruling party partisans, on average, trust the various institutions of the 
state and see the country as relatively democratic, opposition partisans are deeply 
distrustful of all the institutions of government, and far less likely to view the state and 
its institutions as democratic.  
 This dissertation argues that these cleavages, both demographic and political, 
can help us to better understand why people vote in rigged elections in autocratic 
regimes. The theory presented in Chapter Two proposed that partisans in electoral 
autocracies are motivated to vote by political considerations. Ruling party partisans, 
who are more likely to support the government, should be more likely to vote out of a 
sense of civic duty. Opposition party partisans, on the other hand, will be more likely 
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to vote when they feel that their participation will democratize the political system, 
even if only symbolically. Nonpartisans, however, should be less likely to be 
motivated by these political concerns. Instead, nonpartisans should be more likely to 
vote when they feel social pressure from their families and communities to participate 
in elections. Overall, I argue that these considerations should be more important to 
understanding voting behavior in Cameroon than material incentives for voting, such 
as vote-buying or patronage.  
 The theory argues that in many autocratic contexts, instrumental inducements 
for voting are relatively rare, and therefore people may have reasons for voting that are 
not directly related to economic considerations. I propose that partisanship can offer a 
strong framework for understanding this type of non-instrumental political behavior.  
The survey data used to explore this framework of voting is advantageous because it 
can get closer to the mechanisms of voting that have largely been ignored by the 
existing literature on mass political behavior in autocratic regimes.  
 The first section of this chapter discusses the survey evidence for economic 
voting in Cameroon. The second section looks at the evidence for non-economic 
reasons and compares the data for both sets of theories. The final section shows how 
partisanship helps to explain why different types of citizens choose to participate in 
autocratic elections. 
 
Economic Reasons for Voting 
By and large, the existing literature contends that people vote in autocratic 
elections for economic reasons, and in some ways the descriptive data from Cameroon 
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supports this theory. Overall, 10.9 percent of all respondents reported receiving a “gift 
or favor” during the last election. People who reported that they received something 
included citizens engaged in the traditional relationship of vote-buying, where the 
citizen receives cash in exchange for their vote. However, this group also includes 
more indirect exchanges, such as those who received a small gift (for example, rice, 
soap, or cloth) at a political rally. These extremely common offerings during electoral 
campaigns are largely seen as benevolent gestures from the party, and not as 
reciprocal or monitored exchanges (Kramon 2016). For example, it is common for 
citizens to attend both RDPC as well as opposition rallies to receive the gifts of both 
parties. Although most citizens would not feel obligated to vote for the party after 
receiving such a gift, it is possible that some do feel such an obligation, at least 
subconsciously. Thus, although the vague wording of the question measures activities 
that are broader than the traditional reciprocal exchanges of cash for a vote, it offers a 
conservative measure of the null hypothesis of the study by including anyone who 
may feel obliged to vote because of a direct, personal material reward.  
Because of the sensitive nature of vote-buying, I also created a list experiment 
for the instrument that was designed to measure the prevalence of vote-buying without 
introducing social sensitivity bias. However, my experience implementing the list 
experiment has led me to conclude that the results are unreliable. Miscomprehension 
and satisficing were so prevalent that it is impossible to say what percentage of 
respondents understood the question and provided an accurate response. Further, the 
introduction of bias from satisficing may be leading researchers to over-estimate the 
prevalence of vote-buying and other socially sensitive activities in general (Gonzalez-
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Ocantos et al. 2012). Appendix 3 outlines these issues and how they may be inflating 
our estimates of vote-buying in autocratic or semi-democratic elections. 
 Vote-buying, however, is only one aspect of economic voting. In autocratic 
(and also democratic) elections, it has been argued that the promise of local 
government spending is the largest motivating force for citizens to vote (Blaydes 
2011, Chapter 4; Magaloni 2006). Where national elections are not competitive, the 
idea is that constituencies that support for the ruling party with high levels of pro-
regime turnout will be rewarded with higher levels of local government spending. This 
logic of patronage is certainly not lost on ordinary Cameroonians. In order to measure 
this motivation, I designed a question for the survey that asked, “Do you think that if 
voter turnout is high in your district, the government will reward the district with 
resources like schools, health clinics or paved roads?” To my knowledge, this is the 
first time a survey has asked a direct question about the logic of electoral patronage. A 
majority of Cameroonians—51.6 percent of respondents—somewhat or completely 
agreed with the statement (41.7 percent disagreed and 6.7 percent reported that they 
did not know). 
 Further, in an experimental setting, responses implied that a candidate’s ability 
to deliver local spending is the most important factor in vote choice. An experiment 
embedded within the survey proposed a hypothetical parliamentary candidate who 
possessed four defining characteristics. These characteristics included, 1) the 
candidate’s party, 2) the candidate’s potential ability to deliver local spending, 3) the 
degree of support the candidate has for the government, and 4) the candidate’s 
popularity within the community. The description is presented below: 
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First, imagine that this new candidate is // is not a member of the political 
party you find appealing. Second, although nobody knows for sure, some 
people on the street have been saying that this candidate will // will 
not be able to bring things like schools, clinics and paved roads to your 
community. In addition, he is known as a candidate intent 
on improving democracy // maintaining the current political regime in 
Cameroon. Finally, it is clear that this candidate is // is not popular in your 
[village/neighborhood].  
 
The four characteristics of the candidate were randomly assigned to be missing or 
present, such that there were sixteen different versions of the candidate. After hearing 
the description of the candidate, each respondent was asked whether or not they would 
vote for the candidate. By controlling the information each respondent received about 
the hypothetical candidate, it is possible to discern which piece of information most 
affects a person’s decision to vote (or not). 
 Table 12 presents the “vote totals” for five of the sixteen candidates. The 
baseline category, Candidate A, presented in the first row, possessed none of the four 
characteristics—he was not from an appealing party, he likely would not bring 
development projects, he supported the ruling regime, and he was not popular. 
Columns 2 - 5 represent the four characteristics, and an ‘X’ in that column indicates 
that the candidate possessed that particular characteristic. Thus, Candidate B was 
identical to the baseline category (Candidate A), except that he was from an appealing 
political party. The last two columns represent the percentage of respondents in each 
group who reported that they would or would not vote for that candidate. 
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Table 12: "Vote Totals" of Hypothetical Candidates 
ID Partisan Patronage Democratic Popular 
No. of 
Resp. 
(No 
Don’t 
knows) 
Percent 
Don’t 
Know/ 
Refused 
Percent 
Vote 
Percent 
Would 
Not Vote 
A     136 3.55 19.86 76.60 
B X    144 0.69 13.10 86.21 
C  X   143 2.72 59.18 38.10 
D   X  139 2.80 37.06 60.14 
E    X 149 1.32 17.88 80.79 
 
 
 Of respondents who received the baseline candidate (who possessed none of 
the potential positive characteristics), only 19.9 percent said they would vote for him. 
Of the four “treatment candidates,” the candidate who can deliver patronage is far and 
away the most popular candidate: 59.2 percent of treatment group C respondents 
reported that they would vote for him. Surprisingly, Candidate B (a co-partisan) 
 and Candidate E (who is locally popular) received less support than the baseline 
candidate. The only other candidate who did better than the baseline candidate was 
Candidate D, who ran a pro-democracy campaign.  
 The substance of these descriptive statistics is reflected in the t-tests presented 
in Table 13. Each row of Table 13 shows the mean response value (“Would you vote 
for this candidate?”) of each candidate from Table 12, along with the difference in 
means between each treatment group and the control group (Candidate A). Treatments 
B (partisanship) and E (popularity) appear not to be statistically different from the 
control group. Treatments C (patronage) and D (democracy) are statistically distinct 
from the control group mean, indicating that in this hypothetical scenario, respondents 
are more likely to vote for a candidate who is able to deliver patronage or willing to 
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campaign on a pro-democracy platform. Further, the huge difference in means 
between treatment C and the control (and the smaller difference between treatment D 
and the control) suggests that the ability to deliver patronage is the most important 
characteristic of a parliamentary candidate, while the desire to democratize is, perhaps, 
a secondary concern. 
 
Table 13: Difference in Means between Treatment Groups 
ID 
Baseline 
Mean 
(Control 
Group (A)) 
Treatment  
Mean 
Difference in 
Means P Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
B 0.203 0.141 0.062 0.162 290 
C 0.203 0.603 -0.400 0.000 287 
D 0.203 0.386 -0.183 0.001 286 
E 0.203 0.180 0.023 0.621 291 
 
 
  The results of this survey experiment indicate that Cameroonians care very 
much about the ability of a politician to deliver development projects to their home 
constituency. In this hypothetical scenario, the delivery of development trumps 
everything else, including partisanship, popularity, and even support for democracy. 
All in all, the evidence from this hypothetical survey question supports the existing 
literature; citizens vote for candidates who can deliver local development. This should 
not surprise us: When asked to name the biggest problem in Cameroon, the top two 
choices were unemployment (23.7 percent) and poverty (11.5 percent). Only two 
percent of Cameroonians feel that the present economic condition of Cameroon is 
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“very good.”55 Ordinary Cameroonians are sincerely troubled by the poor level of 
economic development in Cameroon, both locally as well as nationally.  
 At the same time, however, the hypothetical scenario presented in the survey 
experiment does not reflect the political reality in Cameroon. While Cameroonians 
deeply desire local spending and development, it is not entirely clear that they believe 
that this spending will come because of their actions during elections. Overall, 76.1 
percent of Cameroonians feel that the deputy that represents them in the National 
Assembly makes absolutely no difference in their life. In addition, 64.7 percent of 
respondents trust the National Assembly only ‘just a little’ or ‘not at all.’ The theory in 
this dissertation does not oppose the claim that citizens of autocratic regimes are 
deeply affected by their desire for economic equality, development, and opportunity. 
Nor does it deny that economic issues such as employment and infrastructure are the 
most important issues in Cameroon today. Instead, this dissertation proposes that after 
decades of one-party rule and economic stagnation, most Cameroonians no longer 
expect economic development to come from the choices they make at the ballot box. 
As a result, beliefs about patronage may not be the strongest predictor of voting 
behavior. 
 
Non-Economic Reasons for Voting 
If citizens no longer trust their representatives to deliver economic 
investments, then why do so many people continue to vote in these autocratic 
                                                
55 Author’s survey data: 2.2 percent said the present economic condition of Cameroon was very good, 
14.7 reported that it was fairly good, 26.5 said it was neither good nor bad, 21.8 said it was fairly bad, 
and the plurality, 34.8 percent, reported that that it was very bad. 
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elections? I argue that political and social considerations play the most important role 
in motivating citizens to vote. Before delving into sub-group analysis of partisanship, 
it is important to first establish that these non-economic motivations are even 
plausible. Economic and ethnic reasons for voting have dominated the discourse on 
voting in Africa and autocratic regimes for so long, it may seem unlikely that in a 
context like Cameroon, citizens would consider voting a civic duty, or believe that 
their vote might democratize the political space. 
 Descriptively, however, these considerations appear to be very important to 
Cameroonians. The three questions designed to capture these motivations are 
presented in Table 14. In order to avoid acquiescence bias, the question about civic 
duty provides the respondent with two compelling logics for voting being either a 
choice or a duty (Blais and Achen, n.d.). It then asks with which one they agree. 
Roughly 69 percent of respondents believe that voting is a duty. Similarly, the next 
question offers respondents two options regarding the democratic aspects of voting, 
asking whether the best way to improve democracy is to abstain from an unfair 
process as a form of boycott, or to vote to increase representative participation. Nearly 
80 percent of respondents believe that voting is the best way to improve democracy. 
Finally, the survey asks whether or not the respondent takes into account the 
expectations of their family and community when deciding to vote. Respondents were 
split on this question: 57 percent said that these expectations were “very important” or 
“a little important,” while 42 said that they were “not very” or “not at all” important. 
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Table 14: Question Wording and Responses 
Question 
Response  
Option #1 
Response  
Option #2 
Response  
Option #3 
Response  
Option #4 
Don’t 
Know 
In general, different people feel 
differently about voting. For some, 
voting is a duty. Regardless of what 
they think about the candidates and 
parties, they feel they should vote in 
every election no matter what. For 
others, voting is a choice. In each 
election they choose whether to 
vote or not depending on how they 
feel about the candidates and 
parties. For you personally, is 
voting first and foremost a duty or a 
choice? 
 
I feel 
strongly 
that voting 
is a duty 
 
 
62.7 % 
 
I feel that 
voting is a 
duty, but 
not very 
strongly 
 
 6.6 % 
 
Voting is 
a choice 
 
 
 
 
30.3 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.4 % 
People have different opinions 
about how to improve democracy in 
Cameroon. Some people think that 
voting will improve democracy. 
Other people think that it is better to 
boycott elections that are not free 
and fair. To improve democracy in 
Cameroon, do you believe it is 
better to vote in or to boycott 
elections? 
 
I feel 
strongly 
that we 
should 
vote 
 
76.6 % 
 
I feel we 
should 
vote, but 
not very 
strongly 
 
10.2 % 
 
I feel we 
should 
boycott, 
but not 
very 
strongly 
3.8 % 
 
I feel 
strongly 
that we 
should 
boycott 
 
7.1% 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 % 
When deciding whether or not to 
vote, do you take into account the 
expectations of your family and 
community? 
 
Their 
expectatio
ns are 
very 
important 
43.9 % 
 
 
Their 
expectatio
ns are a 
little 
important 
14.3 % 
 
Their 
expectatio
ns are not 
very 
important 
5.5 % 
 
Their 
expectatio
ns are not 
at all 
important 
34.9 % 
 
 
 
1.4 % 
  
 
The raw response figures indicate that, in general, Cameroonians are familiar 
with these different logics of voting. For example, although, a priori, it may seem 
doubtful that Cameroonians think of voting as a duty (“un devoir”), it is clear that a 
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robust majority believe that it is. Further, Cameroonians who did not believe voting 
was a duty still understood the concept: only 0.4 percent of all respondents reported 
that they did not know if voting was a duty or a choice.56 It is also important to note 
that while the majority of respondents agree with these expressive and social reasons 
for voting, there is only modest correlation between the three questions. The two 
expressive reasons for voting—civic duty and democracy—correlate most strongly at 
0.23. But voting with the community only correlates with civic duty at 0.05 and with 
voting for democracy at 0.08. Thus, the measures do not appear to be tapping into 
some broader latent measurement of expression, citizenship, or participation in 
general. 
While there is broad support for these three general ideas, the basic figures do 
not give us a sense of whether these beliefs motivate action, or whether one is more 
important than the other, or that any one of them is more important than economic 
reasons for voting. Therefore, the following regression analyses simultaneously 
measure the relationship between all of these potential voting motivations and self-
reported voting behavior.  The dependent variable of this analysis is a dichotomous 
measure of whether or not the respondent reported voting in the most recent 2013 
legislative and municipal elections. Although it has been shown that people over-
report voting behavior in surveys (Tittle and Hill 1967), there is unfortunately no way 
around this issue given the available data. 
Further, certain steps were taken to improve the reliability of response rates 
and measurement given issues of social sensitivity across the instrument. First, 
                                                
56 Note, for example, that 6.7 percent of respondents responded that they “did not know” when asked 
about the existence of electoral patronage.  
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Cameroon was specifically chosen as the site of fieldwork because political repression 
is rare amongst ordinary citizens, and therefore relative to some autocratic contexts, 
the fear of retribution for participation in the survey was low. Second, a 100-
respondent pre-test of the instrument was conducted in Yaoundé prior to full 
implementation. A number of questions and question orderings were altered to 
improve comprehension and minimize response bias.57 Third, measurement of the key 
dependent and independent variables were carefully designed to minimize social 
sensitivity bias. For example, it has been shown that people over-report voting 
behavior in surveys, and so the survey took steps to minimize this bias by providing 
respondents a list of options regarding the previous election.58 Further, as an 
alternative measure of the potentially sensitive question of patronage voting, the 
regression analysis includes direct measures of local government investments. 
Even given the inevitability of social sensitivity bias, I argue that these micro-
level measures of voting behavior are an improvement over existing analyses. Overall, 
studies that use macro-level measures of voting behavior commit ecological fallacy if 
they try to extrapolate individual behavior from macro-level indicators (Blaydes 2011; 
Magaloni 2006). At best, we can say that turnout correlates with state spending; but 
we cannot say whether or not citizens are actually affected by this spending as they 
decide whether or not to vote. In particular, Blaydes’ methodological strategy for 
                                                
57 Two list experiments were included in attempt to measure vote-buying and intimidation, but despite 
repeated re-writing of the questions, I found it exceedingly difficult for participants to follow the 
directions of the experiment, and therefore do not find the responses accurate or credible. See Appendix 
3 for more information. 
58 These options included “You were not registered to vote,” “You were registered, but chose not to 
vote,” “You were registered and tried to vote, but were turned away at the polling station,” and “You 
did vote.” 
 133 
measuring vote-buying is especially dubious. She measures vote-buying by regressing 
district-level voter turnout on district-level illiteracy rates using Gary King’s 
ecological inference statistical package (King, Tanner, and Rosen 2004). On the one 
hand, this decision is methodologically problematic as a number of scholars have 
found the ecological inference strategy problematic if a number of highly-restrictive 
assumptions are not met (Cho and Gaines 2004; Cho 1998). On the other hand, even if 
we accept the methodological assumptions made by her modeling choices, at best all 
we can say is that illiterate citizens are more likely to vote than literate citizens. This 
gives us no purchase on the question of vote-buying, unless we make the heroic 
assumption that the only reason illiterate citizens would vote is because they sold their 
vote. 
Apart from these macro-level methodological approaches, I also argue that the 
measures are an improvement over existing micro-level measures of voting 
motivations, which either rely on pre-packaged survey data that was not designed to 
measure voting motivations (Miguel, Jamal, and Tessler 2015), or only samples small 
subsets of the population (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014). Despite the drawbacks of 
social sensitivity bias (which I have taken steps to minimize), I contend that the 
precision of the questions and their micro-level measurement make them superior to 
our existing measures. 
 With this in mind, the regression features six primary independent variables: 
three economic reasons for voting and three non-economic reasons. The first two 
economic motivations were the survey questions discussed in the earlier section 
concerning vote-buying in the previous election (“Did you receive a gift or favor?”) 
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and the logic of patronage (“Do you think that if voter turnout is high in your district, 
the government will reward the district with resources like schools, health clinics or 
paved roads?”). The third economic independent variable is a direct measure of 
government spending. This measure was constructed from government investment 
budgets, which have been produced by Cameroon’s Ministry of Economy, Planning, 
and Regional Development (MINEPAT) for 2008-2015. The coding details of this 
measure are discussed in Chapter Five.  The three non-economic motivations are the 
three questions detailed in Table 14 (voting as a civic duty, as a way to improve 
democracy, and whether or not the respondent takes into account the expectations of 
their family or their community). All regressions include region fixed effects and post-
stratification survey weights. 
 
Results: Different Motivations for Voting 
 Model 1 in Table 15 presents the results of a logistic regression of just these 
six independent variables. Model 2 includes a set of control variables, which might 
account for potential confounding relationships between the six independent variables 
and the likelihood of voting. The first set of control variables are the demographic 
measures from Chapter Three: items owned, urban/rural locality, gender, age and 
education. In addition, following Miguel, et al. (2015), I include a question that 
measures the respondent’s assessment of the national economy. I also include self-
reported news consumption to try to account for the respondent’s exposure to political 
communications from the government. Finally, I measure the ruling party’s vote share 
in the respondent’s arrondisement for the previous election to account for the effects 
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of living in a ruling party region of the country versus an opposition region, or a 
region that ‘swings’ between the two.  
Table 15: Primary Motivations for Voting, Full Sample 
Reported Voting in the 
2013 Elections Model 1 Model 2 
Received a Gift Or 
Favor 
 
0.030 
(0.219) 
-0.018 
(0.221) 
Expects  
Patronage 
 
0.061 
(0.054) 
0.029 
(0.058) 
Per Capita  
Budgetary Spending 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
 
Civic Duty 
 
 
0.298*** 
(0.078) 
 
 
0.245*** 
(0.083) 
Improve  
Democracy 
 
0.373*** 
(0.077) 
0.388*** 
(0.084) 
Votes with the 
Community 
0.280*** 
(0.054) 
0.310*** 
(0.058) 
Items Owned 
 
-- 0.004 
(0.044) 
Rural 
 
-- 0.561 
(0.361) 
Female 
 
-- -0.237 
(0.150) 
Age 
 
-- 0.063*** 
(0.010) 
Education 
 
-- 0.002 
(0.043) 
Evaluation of Economic 
Performance 
-- 0.125* 
(0.070) 
News Consumption 
 
-- -0.003 
(0.008) 
RDPC vote share 
(Arrondissement) 
-- -0.004 
(0.015) 
Constant -1.448*** (0.291) 
-3.118** 
(1.212) 
N 2,126 2,043 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.109 0.177 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses. All models contain region 
fixed effects and ethnicity dummies. 
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The results of both Model 1 and Model 2 indicate that, for the entire sample of 
respondents, even controlling for ethnicity and other demographic factors, non-
economic reasons for voting have a stronger relationship with self-reported voter 
turnout than economic reasons. While all three non-economic independent variables 
(civic duty, improving democracy, and expectations of the community) have a positive 
and significant relationship with self-reported voter turnout, government spending in 
the less restrictive model is the only statistically significant economic variable. 
Respondents who reported selling their votes in the last election or expecting a 
government reward do not appear to be more or less likely to vote than their peers who 
responded negatively to these survey questions. Further, local government spending 
does not appear to have a strong relationship with self-reported voter turnout, 
especially when controlling for demographic and geographic factors. The results 
reveal that the logic of electoral patronage does not dominate the reasons people hold 
for voting.59 
 The coefficients from Model 1 are displayed graphically in Figure 10. 
Although all six measures have positive relationships with voter turnout, only the non-
economic measures are statistically distinguishable from zero at a 95 percent 
confidence interval. The measure of vote-buying has very wide confidence intervals 
because relatively few respondents actually reported receiving a gift or favor during 
                                                
59 The results from Model 2 also provide support for findings in the existing literature that older citizens 
and citizens from rural areas are more likely to vote (Kuenzi and Lambright 2011). In addition, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the respondent’s assessment of the national economy 
also supports the findings from Miguel, et al. (2015), who argue that in autocratic elections in the 
Middle East and North Africa, citizens reward the regime with their vote when the economic 
environment is favorable. However, the data do not support the contention that education or 
socioeconomic status are strong predictors of political behavior in Cameroon. 
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the previous election. Though vote buying is surely influential on the likelihood of 
voting when it happens, it is not a very common occurrence in Cameroon today, and 
therefore cannot explain the voting behavior of the majority of voters.  
 
Figure 10: Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals, Model 1 
 
 
 
While the confidence intervals on patronage and government spending are 
much smaller in comparison, both of these measures have coefficients very close to 
zero, indicating that they do not have a very strong correlation with self-reported 
voting behavior, at least when controlling for other motivations for voting. Although a 
majority of Cameroonians believes in the logic of electoral patronage, this belief 
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apparently does not translate strongly into self-reported voting behavior. Citizens who 
believe voting can bring increased spending are not any more or less likely to vote 
than citizens who do not believe spending correlates with vote shares. 
 Non-economic reasons for voting, on the other hand, all correlate positively 
and significantly with self-reported voting behavior. For the entire sample of survey 
respondents, all else held equal, a respondent who feels that voting is a civic duty is 
about 10 percent more likely to vote than one who feels that voting is a choice. A 
respondent who believes that voting can improve democracy in Cameroon is nearly 23 
percent more likely to vote than someone who thinks that boycotting is the best 
strategy. Finally, a citizen who thinks the expectations of their family and community 
are very important is about 14 percent more likely to vote than someone who does not 
take their expectations into account, all else held equal. Although the coefficients are 
not reported in the table, it is important to note that ethnicity plays very little role in 
explain voter turnout. At a p-value of 0.05 or less, no ethnic group is any more or less 
likely to vote than another. Overall, these findings suggest that non-economic reasons 
for voting are important for understanding voting behavior in autocratic elections, and 
that they are seemingly even more important than economic reasons for voting. The 
following section further investigates how these different motivations affect different 
types of partisans. 
 
Results: Partisanship and Voting 
The core theory of this dissertation, presented in Chapter Two, proposes not 
just that citizens vote in autocratic elections for non-economic reasons, but that 
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partisanship can help us to understand the different reasons why people choose to vote. 
Given their unique set of political beliefs, I argue that ruling party partisans will be 
most affected by their sense of civic duty, whereas opposition partisans will be most 
influenced by their beliefs about the relationship between voting and democratization. 
Nonpartisans, on the other hand, should be more strongly motivated by the social 
expectations and pressures of their families and communities.  The models in Table 16 
disaggregate respondents into partisans who support the opposition SDF, nonpartisans, 
and partisans who support the RDPC.60 In order to contextualize and better interpret 
these results, Table 17 reports the predicted probability of voting for the lowest and 
highest values of each non-economic motivation for each group. Figures 11 through 
13 plot these marginal effects. 
 
 
  
                                                
60 Models are identical to Model 2 in Table 13, except that they are run on only groups of partisans. In 
addition, the models do not include ethnicity dummies because the models are under-powered. 
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Table 16: Explaining Which Partisans Vote for Which Reasons 
Reported Voting in the 
2013 Elections 
Members of the 
Opposition SDF Nonpartisans 
Members of the 
Ruling RDPC 
Received a Gift 
Or Favor 
2.276 
(1.620) 
-0.154 
(0.271) 
-1.022* 
(0.560) 
Expects Patronage 
 
-0.087 
(0.287) 
-0.050 
(0.069) 
0.070 
(0.164) 
Per Capita Budgetary 
Spending 
0.074 
(0.056) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
Civic Duty 
 
0.266 
(0.392) 
0.178* 
(0.095) 
0.567** 
(0.240) 
Improve Democracy 
 
0.938** 
(0.473) 
0.384*** 
(0.093) 
0.370 
(0.239) 
Votes with the 
Community 
 
-0.429 
(0.308) 
0.316*** 
(0.069) 
0.204 
(0.146) 
Items Owned -0.100 
(0.181) 
-0.021 
(0.053) 
-0.100 
(0.106) 
Rural 
 
-1.877 
(1.689) 
-0.049 
(0.378) 
2.388*** 
(0.794) 
Female 
 
-0.296 
(0.692) 
0.008 
(0.174) 
-0.282 
(0.403) 
Age 
 
0.108 
(0.077) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.137*** 
(0.034) 
Education 
 
-0.019 
(0.204) 
-0.010 
(0.050) 
0.079 
(0.124) 
Evaluation of Economic 
Performance 
-0.480 
(0.357) 
0.104 
(0.083) 
-0.127 
(0.174) 
News  
Consumption 
0.105 
(0.113) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
0.162** 
(0.065) 
RDPC vote share 
(Arrondissement) 
0.066 
(0.044) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
-0.048 
(0.040) 
Constant -10.072* (4.313) 
-4.368* 
(1.287) 
-3.136 
(3.276) 
N 187 1206 526 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.366 0.134 0.310 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
All models contain region fixed effects. 
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Table 17: Predicted Probabilities of Non-Economic Voting Motivations 
Reported Voting in the 2013 
Elections 
Members of 
the 
Opposition 
SDF Nonpartisans 
Members of 
the Ruling 
RDPC Motivation Belief 
Civic Duty 
Voting is a civic 
duty 
 
0.869 
(0.034) 
0.650 
(0.022) 
0.919 
(0.034) 
Voting is a 
choice 
0.825 
(0.046) 
0.579 
(0.029) 
0.831 
(0.016) 
Community 
Community is 
very important 
0.801 
(0.041) 
0.714 
(0.024) 
0.915 
(0.018) 
Community is 
not very 
important 
0.898 
(0.036) 
0.520 
(0.030) 
0.871 
(0.025) 
Democracy 
Voting improves 
democracy 
0.877 
(0.025) 
0.665 
(0.019) 
0.903 
(0.015) 
Boycotting 
improves 
democracy 
0.589 
(0.121) 
0.425 
(0.051) 
0.807 
(0.069) 
 
  
 
 First, the results indicate that RDPC partisans are more likely to report having 
voted when they believe that voting is a civic duty. RDPC partisans who feel strongly 
that voting is a duty are about nine percent more likely to vote than RDPC partisans 
who see voting as a choice. As revealed in Table 17 and Figure 11, believing that 
voting is a civic duty is positively correlated with voting behavior amongst all 
subgroups: opposition partisans who believe voting is a duty are about four percent 
more likely to vote, and nonpartisans who believe this are seven percent more likely to 
vote. Controlling for other motivations, however, these relationships are not 
 142 
statistically significant for these other groups. The correlation is clearest and strongest 
amongst ruling party partisans.  
 
Figure 11: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Amongst Different Partisans,  
Civic Duty 
 
 
  
Second, opposition partisans are instead more likely to vote when they feel that 
it can improve the level of democracy in Cameroon. Again, although this measure has 
a positive coefficient for all groups, it is the only statistically significant predictor of 
voting for members of the opposition. As shown in Table 17 and Figure 12, an SDF 
partisan who feels strongly that boycotting elections is the best strategy to improve 
democracy is nearly 30 percent less likely to vote than an SDF partisan who feels 
strongly that voting will improve democracy. The magnitude of this measure is quite 
large and it also has an influence on other types of citizens, particularly nonpartisans. 
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While RDPC partisans are about ten percent more likely to vote when they believe it 
will improve democracy, nonpartisans who believe this are almost 25 percent more 
likely to vote. However, for RDPC partisans, this is not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. Nonetheless, for opposition partisans, a belief in improving democracy 
appears to be the only statistically significant correlate of reported voting behavior.  
 
Figure 12: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Amongst Different Partisans,  
Improve Democracy 
 
 
 
 Finally, nonpartisans are the only subgroup of citizens who have a statistically 
significant relationship between feeling pressure from their community and reported 
voting behavior. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 13, opposition partisans are the only 
group with a negative coefficient on the community measure, meaning that they are 
potentially more likely to vote when they feel that the expectations of their family and 
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community are not important to their voting decision. This perhaps reflects the 
opposition’s value of independence and individualism. But for opposition partisans 
this measure is not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 13: Predicted Probabilities of Voting Amongst Different Partisans, 
Community and Family Expectations 
 
 
 
Unlike opposition partisans, nonpartisans are more likely to vote when they 
feel like their family and community expect them to do so. Citizens who feel the most 
pressure from their families and communities are nearly 20 percent more likely to vote 
than citizens who feel the least amount of pressure. RDPC partisans who feel 
influenced by their families and communities are only about 4 percent more likely to 
report having voted, and SDF partisans are almost ten percent less likely to have 
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reported voting. However, this relationship is only statistically significant for 
nonpartisans. Nonpartisans who feel that voting can improve democracy and who take 
into account the expectations of their families and communities when voting are more 
likely to vote than nonpartisans who think boycotting is best and who do not take into 
account the expectations of their communities. 
 In addition to the different motivations for voting, several of the control 
variables also appear to affect voter turnout. As we might expect, older respondents 
are more likely to report having voted in the most recent election (Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2011), at least amongst nonpartisans and ruling party partisans.61 In 
addition, it is interesting to note that for RDPC partisans, rural citizens and citizens 
who consume more news are also more likely to vote, but these relationships are not 
statistically significant for nonpartisans or opposition partisans. Koter (2013) has 
argued that rural African citizens are more likely to vote for incumbent political 
parties, and Kuenzi and Lambright (2011) have shown that rural Africans in general 
are more likely to vote in elections. Taken together with the findings from Chapter 
Three, showing that partisans tend to come from rural areas, it is interesting to note 
that only ruling party partisans are more likely to vote when they hail from rural 
constituencies. It is also perhaps unsurprising that RDPC partisans who consume more 
news are more likely to vote in elections. Given that the media in Cameroon is 
dominated by the state and the ruling party, news consumption is a proximate measure 
for receiving messages from the state, and state media generally encourages citizens to 
                                                
61 The relatively smaller sample size of opposition partisans decreases the precision of estimates for the 
subgroup. Notably, the only measure that is significantly correlated with voting is whether or not the 
(opposition) respondent believes voting can improve democracy. 
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vote during elections. Because nonpartisans and opposition partisans who receive 
more of these messages are not any more likely to vote, we may be able to infer that 
such citizens find these messages less credible, and are thus less likely to internalize 
them (Geddes and Zaller 1989). 
 These results provide evidence for the theory that different groups of partisans 
in electoral autocracies have different reasons for participating in politics. They also 
bring into question existing theories that argue that citizens vote in autocratic elections 
primarily for economic reasons, adding complexity to some of the traditional 
assumptions of electoral behavior in autocratic regimes. As one nonpartisan in 
Bafoussam (a swing city in the West Region) put it, “Only RDPC Members of 
Parliament can bring development. The opposition isn't favored by the government. 
But really it doesn't even make a difference because nobody ever brings anything 
anyways.”62 The logic of patronage certainly exists in Cameroon, but after 20 years of 
multiparty elections and continued economic stagnation and underdevelopment, many 
citizens doubt the connection between electoral returns and the provision of public 
goods.  
 Instead, citizens may hold more ideational or social reasons for voting. For 
example, ruling party supporters in autocratic countries may possess a high level of 
patriotism, and feel pride in fulfilling their civic duty come election day. As one 
female RDPC supporter told me in Foumban, “I vote the RDPC because it's the ruling 
party. I grew up with it. My mother was a member since I was a child.”63 Opposition 
supporters, on the other hand, are more confident in alternatives to the ruling party, 
                                                
62 Respondent Number 1951. Interviewed on March 17, 2015 in Bafoussam I, Mifi by the author. 
63 Respondent Number 2119. Interviewed on March 21, 2015 in Foumban, Noun by the author. 
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and hope, perhaps idealistically, that their participation may have some effect on the 
level of democracy. As a 35 year-old respondent in Batibo district (an SDF stronghold 
in the Northwest region) expressed, “I vote to show that the opposition has support; to 
show people outside of this country that the government isn't universally supported. 
But I know it won't really change the results.”64 Such opposition supporters are aware 
that their vote will not significantly alter the balance of power in government, but are 
still committed to voting because they believe that their participation can make a 
larger systemic difference, even if it is only symbolic. 
 
 While the results in this chapter point to a more dynamic understanding of 
voting behavior in electoral autocracies, they do not definitively undermine the 
hypothesis that government spending affects voting behavior in systematic ways. The 
existing literature proposes that the state uses its budgetary powers to affect electoral 
behavior during elections. The following chapter explores these systemic influences 
on voting behavior. It shows that variation in turnout is not well explained by 
government spending patterns, and instead proposes different ways that the state and 
political parties use their power to influence voter behavior.  
                                                
64 Respondent Number 1293. Interviewed on February 13, 2015 in Batibo, Momo East by the author. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TURNOUT 
 
 
Thus far, this dissertation has inverted the existing approach to understanding 
electoral behavior in autocratic regimes by starting from the perspective of the citizen 
instead of the state. The most influential work on electoral autocracies focuses on the 
role of the government in influencing voting behavior, taking for granted that citizens 
respond to state inducements in rational ways (Blaydes 2011; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 
2008; Magaloni 2006; Svolik 2012). Having established a non-economic theory of 
voting behavior, and demonstrating that there is strong micro-level evidence for this 
theory, I now turn to the state: Given this new framework for understanding economic, 
expressive and social reasons for voting, how is the government, in turn, affecting 
electoral behavior?  
 The existing literature proposes two main ways that the state attempts to affect 
voter turnout using budgetary allocations: either spending most in swing districts that 
narrowly support the ruling party or instead rewarding core districts at the expense of 
all other districts. The first hypothesis, originally developed in the context of 
democratic elections (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987), but 
adapted for the autocratic context by Beatriz Magaloni (2006) in Mexico, suggests that 
between elections, the government adjusts its regional spending in order to boost 
turnout and support for the ruling party by focusing most closely in swing districts. 
Magaloni argues that the government does this in two ways: “First, the party will react 
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in an unforgiving fashion toward defectors by withdrawing funds from those 
municipalities that elect opposition representatives. Second, the ruling party will 
disproportionately invest in its supporters who can more credibly threaten to exit, 
rather than its most loyal followers, who are likely to support the party regardless” 
(2006, 124). As a result, government spending should be lowest in opposition districts, 
but highest in swing districts that vote for the ruling party. Swing districts that vote for 
the opposition should be the biggest threat to a ruling party, and therefore see few 
investments. Further, Magaloni proposes that core ruling party districts should not 
receive the highest budgetary allocations. Although they may receive more than 
opposition districts, the government should spend most in districts that narrowly vote 
for the ruling party. 
 The second hypothesis, likewise developed in democratic contexts (Cox and 
McCubbins 1986; Schady 2000; Scheiner 2006), but adapted by Blaydes (2011, see 
Chapter 4) to understand autocratic politics, proposes instead that the government 
should invest the most in its strongholds. The ‘punishment regime’ should be the most 
compelling strategy in allocating government investment spending: elections reveal to 
autocrats where they are least and most popular, and autocrats should respond to this 
information by rewarding supporters and punishing detractors. From the micro-level, 
the logic here is that if ordinary citizens believe that districts that support the regime 
are rewarded, they too should vote to support the regime. In contrast to the first 
hypothesis, the highest levels of government investment should be directed towards 
ruling party strongholds. 
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 Because these theories are derived from the perspective of the state, they are 
focused more on explaining government spending than on the actions of individuals. 
For example, their analysis is centered on explaining the vote totals for the ruling party 
(vote choice), without considering at all voter turnout in the aggregate (why vote at 
all?). Thus when taken to their logical conclusions, their theories may tell us about 
why citizens of swing districts choose to vote, but continue to leave unanswered the 
question of why people vote in opposition or ruling party strongholds, which, by 
definition, constitute the vast majority of districts in electoral autocracies. Citizens 
who live in swing districts may believe that the act of voting can change the fortunes 
of their district vis-à-vis government spending. But if your district has always voted 
heavily for the ruling party or the opposition, what is the point of voting?  
 By flipping the point of theoretical departure, this dissertation has shown that 
ordinary citizens in autocratic regimes do not vote solely for economic reasons. By 
understanding the socioeconomic and political divisions between citizens, we can 
explain why different types of people might vote for expressive and social reasons, 
even if they know their vote will not affect the outcome of the election or result in any 
sort of economic reward. Nonetheless, the idea of electoral patronage is not new to 
Cameroon or Cameroonians. After all, Cameroon is the birthplace of the idiom 
“politics of the belly” (Bayart 1989); a complex notion with multiple levels of 
meaning, but which essentially equates politics with the personal accumulation of 
wealth or favors.  
 Indeed, the micro-level data supports the contention that many citizens are 
familiar with the idea of electoral patronage. As noted earlier, when asked, “do you 
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think that if voter turnout is high in your district, the government will reward the 
district with resources like schools, health clinics or paved roads?”, 36.5 percent of 
respondents completely agreed with the statement and 14.0 percent somewhat agreed. 
From the results of the survey experiment discussed in Chapter Four, it is clear that 
Cameroonians wish that their representatives worked harder to deliver these local 
goods to their communities. However, as this chapter will argue, the weakness of the 
Cameroonian state combined with the unassailable electoral position of the ruling 
party translates into very little local investment for most communities in Cameroon. 
 The primary purpose of this chapter is to more fully investigate the hypotheses 
proposed by the existing literature regarding electoral patronage.  Focusing on the role 
that the state plays in affecting voter turnout, the first part of this chapter investigates 
regional variation in government spending patterns. According to the existing 
literature, the government should allocate budgetary investments based on electoral 
returns—either spending more in swing districts or in strongholds. The first section 
discusses the original budgetary and electoral data collected from the Cameroonian 
ministries and the second section estimates the relationship between government 
spending and electoral behavior using a number of different statistical models, finding 
little evidence of electoral patronage of any kind. The final part of the chapter 
discusses possible explanations for this lack of evidence, using what we have learned 
in previous chapters about the structure of the RDPC and the nature of partisanship in 
Cameroon to help explain why electoral patronage would be a costly and redundant 
strategy for the government. 
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Data and Measurement 
 To better understand the structural effects of patronage and government 
spending on macro-level turnout in Cameroon, the following sections will test the 
hypothesis that government spending is correlated with voting patterns. In order to 
estimate such a relationship, the dissertation presents a new dataset of budgetary 
figures (2008–2015) and electoral returns (1992-2013) collected from the government 
ministries in Cameroon. Though the following analysis is not an exact replication of 
Magaloni or Blaydes’ work, it attempts to imitate their methodological approach as 
closely as possible by measuring the macro-level relationship between government 
spending and election results. Departures from their approaches are noted where 
appropriate. 
 
Investment Data 
 In order to measure electoral patronage, the following analysis uses 
Cameroonian annual public investment budgetary data. The budgetary data was 
collected for 2008-2015 (annually) from the archives of the Ministry for Economy, 
Planning, and Regional Development (MINEPAT) for every government ministry. 
There are 36 ministries in Cameroon, including three ministries of education 
(MINEDUB for basic education, MINESEC for secondary education, and MINESUP 
for higher education), various ministries of public spending (for example, MINTP for 
public works, MINT for transportation, and MINSANTE for public health), as well as 
a series of smaller ministries for various sectors of the population (MINPROFF for 
women’s empowerment, MINADER for agriculture and rural development, and 
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MINJEC for youth and civic education), and, finally, numerous ministries designed to 
implement regular functions of the state (for example, MINFI for finance, 
MINJUSTICE for the courts, DGSN for national security, and MINPOSTEL for posts 
and telecommunications).  
 Annual public investment budgets for each ministry vary widely. For example, 
in 2015, the largest budget allocation was to the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP), 
which received 218.5 billion CFCA (roughly $346 million), contrasted to the budget 
for the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MINTSS), which only received 54.2 
million CFCA (roughly $86,000). It should be noted that President Biya’s 2011 
presidential campaign was heavily focused on the promise of renewed infrastructure 
spending, and so the MINTP budget increased considerably in 2011 (from about $6.65 
million in 2010 to roughly $350 million in 2011); the next closest budget allocation in 
2015 was $135 million for the Ministry of Water Resources, and Energy). 
Nonetheless, excluding MINTP, the average budget allocation across all other 
ministries in 2015 was 8.5 billion CFCA (roughly $13 million). 
 It is important to note that the budgetary data collected in this dataset only 
accounts for the public investment budgets (les budgets d’investissement publique), 
and does not include the operating costs for the ministries (les budgets de 
fonctionnement). Operating budgets are not released to the public, and even retrieving 
the public investment budgets proved politically sensitive (I was unable to obtain 
records predating 2008). Operating budgets include things like salaries for civil 
servants, budgets for office supplies, electricity and water bills, and other incidental 
costs of running each ministry.  
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 Public investment budgets, on the other hand, account for investments in 
permanent infrastructure. This means different things for different ministries, but for 
the most part accounts for building and maintenance budgets of physical facilities. For 
ministries whose functions comprise mostly social activities, such as the Ministry of 
Women’s Empowerment and the Family (MINPROFF), public investment budgets are 
annually quite small (roughly $618,000 in 2015) and usually account for maintenance 
of the actual ministry’s physical building in the capitol city of each region. For 
ministries tasked primarily with building physical infrastructure, the budgets are 
obviously much larger. The Ministry of Public Health’s (MINSANTE) annual 
investment budget is always sizeable (about $31.4 million in 2015) because each year 
they are tasked with building new health clinics and renovating existing hospitals. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Basic Education (MINEDUB), which builds and maintains 
every elementary school in Cameroon, had a public investment budget of roughly 
$16.7 million in 2015. According to the 2015 budgetary planning document, public 
investment budgets represent about 30 percent of all government spending in a given 
year. 
 The budgets are formatted such that each ministry reports their spending by 
region, with a line-item entry for each expenditure. The level of detail for these entries 
varies from ministry to ministry and from year to year, but they all include a brief 
description of the item purchased, the city or village where the money was spent, and 
the amount of money spent on the item. In order to systematize this data, I aggregated 
the spending by electoral district (département). For example, in its 2008 document 
for Adamawa Region, the Ministry of Secondary Education (MINESEC) reported 
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spending 18 million CFCA ($28,515) on two classrooms at the Lycée Bilingue de 
Meiganga in the village of Meiganga in the Mbéré electoral district. Along with the 
other line items reported by MINESEC for the Mbéré region in 2008, total spending 
for the ministry-district-year was 111 million CFCA ($176,319).  
 Occasionally, I was unable to locate the electoral district of a particular village 
reported in a budget, in which case the line item was not included in the dataset. 
Further, I have removed defense and security spending from the totals (the budgets of 
the General Delegation of National Security (DGSN) and the Ministry of Defence 
(MINDEF)). The logic of defense spending is likely different from that of spending on 
general public services, as its strategic political use as a source of patronage is 
curtailed during times of crisis (such as the national security threat of Boko Haram in 
the north of the country, where defense spending should be a priority). In peace times, 
it may be focused disproportionally on opposition areas as a way of suppressing the 
opposition (which undermines the logic of using spending to reward turnout). I also 
excluded “interventions and investments,” which include huge sums set aside for 
specific major infrastructure projects, such as the development of the deep-water port 
at Kribi. Finally, using population totals from the 2005 census, I also created per 
capita figures for each observation (per capita spending for each ministry-district-
year). 
 These public investment budgets offer a reasonable approximation for electoral 
patronage. Unlike existing work, which looks at spending on one public service (i.e. 
Magaloni’s assessment of the poverty reduction program PRONASOL and Blaydes’ 
measure of water and sewage improvement projects), this approach captures a much 
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wider set of ways that government spending may be used to affect voting behavior. 
Further, it includes most of the traditional sources of pork barrel politics considered 
important in Africa: the building of classrooms, health clinics, and roads. While this 
measure may appear excessively broad, its advantage is its ability to capture most 
potential sources of government patronage. Kramon and Posner (2013) have shown 
that measuring only one source of patronage to understand government favoritism can 
be misleading, as governments may use different government programs to target 
different groups. By including all government spending by every ministry of 
government (with the exception of defense), the measure captures most possible 
sources of government favoritism.  
 Nonetheless, there are drawbacks to the measure. As noted earlier, it does not 
include operating costs, such as government salaries. Therefore if electoral patronage 
intended to influence voter turnout is primarily channeled through the regional 
allocation of government jobs and salaries, this data will not measure bias in this sort 
of spending. Further, the official data does not capture any leakages or illicit transfers 
from the central government to local offices. Cameroon is infamous for its corruption, 
and it is extremely likely that extra funds make their way to particular elites in 
different regions of the country. However, it seems unlikely that local elites would 
unilaterally use such illicit funds to invest in public goods, such as elementary school 
classrooms or hospital beds. It is more likely that reported funds get diverted for 
personal use, and do not make it to the reported investment project. Unfortunately, I 
do not have any way to measure for such diversions, though, a priori, I also do not 
have reason to believe that such diversions would vary systemically with levels of 
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voter turnout. Although the data is not perfect, it is a reasonable measure of 
government investments in local public goods, and I argue that it is an improvement 
over existing measures, which have relied on the spending of just one type of 
investment or social program. 
 
Electoral Data 
 In order to measure the relationship between spending and turnout, I include 
two measures of macro-level electoral behavior: registered voter turnout and percent 
vote for the RDPC, both by electoral district. For the 2013 legislative election and the 
2011 presidential election, these figures were collected from the Cameroonian 
Electoral Commission (ELECAM), which was officially created in 2006. For the 
2007, 1997, and 1992 legislative elections and the 2004 and 1992 presidential 
elections, I collected Supreme Court decrees from the Ministry of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralization (MINATD). Historically, the Supreme Court was 
tasked with announcing the official results of all elections in Cameroon, and this was 
the only aggregated source I could find for district-level electoral returns. I personally 
coded all of these returns electronically from the original paper documents. The 
historical records were missing for both the 2002 legislative elections (I was able to 
obtain the names and parties of the winning candidates for each district, but not the 
turnout or vote total figures) as well as the 1997 presidential elections.  
 Between the 1992 and the 2007 elections, the central government significantly 
altered the legislative electoral districts by breaking up opposition districts into smaller 
units (Albaugh 2011). So, for example, Wouri district (département), which 
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encompasses Douala (the largest city in Cameroon), was a unified legislative district 
that elected (by party list) nine seats for the 1992 elections. Seven of the nine seats 
went to the opposition in the 1992 legislative election. Before the 1997 election, 
Wouri was subsequently divided into four separate electoral districts: Wouri Centre et 
Manoka (3 seats), Wouri Est (4 seats), Wouri Ouest (1 seat), and Wouri Sud (1 seat). 
In 1997, the opposition only won four seats across the nine seats total in these four 
new districts (one in Wouri Centre et Manoka, two in Wouri Est, and the seat for 
Wouri Ouest).  
 Although legislative districts across the country were altered significantly after 
1992, all new districts were simply smaller units within the original 1992 district. No 
new districts were created by amalgamation of existing districts. Each original district 
(département) is comprised of multiple subdivisions (arrondissements), and the new 
legislative districts were broken down by the boundaries of these pre-existing 
subdivisions within districts. So for example, in 1992 Wouri was comprised of six 
subdivisions (Douala 1, Douala 2, Douala 3, Douala 4, Douala 5, and Douala 6). In 
breaking Wouri into four new districts, the government redrew the district lines around 
the existing subdivisions. As a result, Wouri Centre et Manoka now comprises Douala 
1 and Douala 6, Wouri Est includes Douala 3 and Douala 5, Wouri Ouest is Douala 4, 
and Wouri Sud is Douala 2. 
 Despite these changes, the government has rarely incorporated the smaller 
electoral districts into their other planning or administrative documents. For example, 
the presidential election results are still reported for the original 1992 districts (i.e., 
total votes for Wouri; not Wouri Est, Wouri Ouest, etc.). Similarly, the budgetary data 
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described in the previous section is aggregated to the standard district level (the 
original 1992 districts). I have therefore similarly aggregated the electoral data for the 
legislative elections, such that all voter turnout and RDPC vote totals are observed at 
the larger (original 1992) electoral unit.  
 Voter turnout is measured as turnout amongst all registered voters. 
Unfortunately, the government does not report voter turnout figures as the percentage 
of the voting-aged population (VAP). Further, it is difficult to calculate these numbers 
myself for two reasons: census data in Cameroon is both difficult to obtain and of 
dubious quality. The most recent census was conducted in 2005, but the results were 
not officially released until 2010, and many believe that this long incubation period 
resulted in various politically calculated manipulations of the data. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to assess the ways in which the figures would have been changed. Relatedly, 
it was difficult to obtain fine-grained data for the purposes of estimating VAP turnout 
figures. Although I have the total population by electoral district, the census data is not 
published by age. The Census Bureau has figures on “youth populations,” including 
numbers of citizens aged 18 years and older by district, but the voting age in 
Cameroon is 20 years, and this data (citizens 20 years or older per electoral district) 
has not been released by the Census Bureau. I must therefore rely on registered voter 
turnout figures. 
 For the 2013 legislative election, registered voter turnout varied from 68.4 
percent (Mfoundi district, which comprises the capital, Yaoundé) to 88.2 percent 
(Bamboutos in the West region). Turnout varies far more drastically at both ends of 
the spectrum for presidential elections. For the 2011 presidential election, Wouri 
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(Douala) had the lowest level of turnout at just 32.6 percent of all registered voters. In 
contrast, registered voter turnout was 96.5 in Mefou et Afamba district in the Centre 
region. In general, and unsurprisingly (Koter 2013; Kuenzi and Lambright 2011), 
voter turnout tends to be much higher in rural areas of Cameroon than in cities and 
towns.  
 Finally, in addition to voter turnout, I also include vote share for the RDPC in 
order to capture electoral support for the regime. If electoral patronage is prevalent, we 
would expect government spending to be fundamentally different if turnout is high 
and for the opposition versus if voter turnout is high and for the ruling the party. 
Unlike the opposition parties, the RDPC has run a candidate in every electoral district 
for every single legislative election. Therefore RDPC vote share is always greater than 
zero and sometimes equals 100 percent. For the most recent 2013 legislative elections, 
the RDPC received its lowest vote share, 37.2 percent, in Mezam district in the 
Northwest (Bamenda). Running uncontested, the RDPC won 100 percent of the vote 
in 13 different electoral districts across the Southwest, South, Centre, and Adamawa 
regions. Unlike the legislative elections, the presidential opposition candidates are on 
the ballot in every electoral district across the country. For the 2011 contest, Biya won 
the lowest share of the vote (26.1 percent) in Mezam district (Bamenda), and the 
highest share of the vote (99.5 percent) in his home district, Dja et Lobo, in the South 
region. 
 Alternatively, in some model specifications, I include a measure of regime 
support that is more historically oriented. Instead of focusing on the results of a 
particular election, certain electoral districts may develop a ‘reputation’ over time that 
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may be less sensitive to movements in actual vote shares during individual elections. 
If an electoral district is ‘known’ as a ruling party district, this may matter more for 
government officials than the actual number of votes the ruling party receives in any 
given election. For example, two districts might elect an MP from the RDPC with 60 
percent of the vote in a particular election, but if historically one district swings back 
and forth between the opposition and the ruling party while the other district has 
always had an RDPC representative, then spending decisions might be qualitatively 
different for these two districts. With this in mind, I include a dichotomous measure of 
whether the electoral district is a core RDPC district, a swing district, or a core 
opposition district. Core RDPC districts have had only RDPC representatives since 
1997 (the first non-boycotted multiparty legislative elections), while opposition 
districts have only had opposition representatives. Swing districts have had 
representatives from both parties at some point between 1997 and the present. Overall, 
there are 26 core RDPC districts, 29 swing districts, and 3 core opposition districts. 
 
Control Variables 
 In order to estimate the relationship between spending and voter behavior, I 
include a number of control variables in the following regression models. First is a 
dichotomous measure of whether or not the district is the capital of its region. Because 
ministries maintain their regional headquarters in the capital districts, public 
investment spending is uniformly higher in regional capitals (16.7 billion CFCA, on 
average for a capital) than in non-capitals (3.1 billion CFCA, on average). Further, as 
mentioned in the previous section, voter turnout is also usually lower in urban areas, 
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such as capitals, than in rural areas. I also control for each district’s distance, in 
kilometers, from Yaoundé, the national capital of Cameroon. All else equal, the farther 
the district is from Yaoundé, the less attention we should expect it to receive from the 
central government. This may have an adverse effect on both government spending as 
well as turnout. Finally, I include the area of each district in kilometers squared. Large 
districts likely require larger public investment budgets, but may depress turnout if 
voters must travel longer distances to reach the ballot box on election day. 
 
The Relationship between Government Spending and Turnout 
 The following analysis cannot prove or disprove a systematic causal 
relationship between government spending and voting behavior. However, if the 
motivation of electoral patronage is the most important factor for understanding 
electoral behavior in Cameroon, we should see some sort of systematic relationship 
between the aggregate spending figures and popular support and turnout for the 
regime. Admittedly, this is a strongly circular and endogenous relationship. On the one 
hand, the existing literature has suggested that spending is specifically used to affect 
turnout rates and vote share for the regime. On the other hand, these spending 
decisions are made based on turnout and vote share figures themselves. Thus in some 
cases spending is affected by electoral behavior, in other cases electoral behavior is 
affected by spending, and presumably in most cases, the two would be endogenously 
related. The literature proposes that the government chooses where to invest resources 
based on past voting behavior in the hope of altering future voting behavior.  
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 Regardless of the direction of causality, however, we should expect at least a 
modest correlational relationship between where the government chooses to allocate 
investments geographically and voter turnout for the regime. According to Magaloni, 
government spending should be highest in swing districts that support the RDPC. For 
Blaydes, there should be a linear positive relationship between investment and support 
for the regime. The following analysis uses ordinary least squares regression in order 
to estimate the relationship between voter turnout, vote share for the ruling party, and 
government budgetary spending, controlling for a modest number of important 
confounding factors, including region fixed effects and using robust standard errors. 
 Because the expected relationship is endogenous, I first estimate the effect of 
electoral returns on future government spending. This has been the approach of the 
existing literature, which has focused most on explaining how the government 
responds to vote shares for the ruing party, rather than on how citizens react to 
spending decisions. I then switch the sides of the equation in order to estimate the 
effect of government spending on future voter turnout. Again, this strategy does not 
give us purchase on the question of the causal direction of the relationship between 
government spending and voting behavior. Nonetheless, if electoral patronage is an 
important reason why people vote in autocratic elections, we should find some sort of 
statistical relationship between government spending and voter behavior: either that 
spending is greatest in core ruling party areas, or in swing districts that vote for the 
ruling party. 
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Government Spending as the Dependent Variable 
 The following models in Table 18 estimate the relationship between voter 
behavior in both the 2013 legislative election as well as the 2011 presidential election 
and government spending the year following each election. If the government spends 
money based on electoral returns, we should expect to see a correlation between voter 
turnout and government spending the year after an election, specifically in areas that 
voted for the ruling party. For all models in Table 18, the dependent variable is per 
capita government spending by district the year after the election (2014 for Models 1-3 
and 2012 for Model 4-6). The primary independent variables of interest are vote share 
for the RDPC and voter turnout per district. Models 1 and 4 present the naïve models 
for these relationships; Models 2 and 5 present the same results with control variables, 
and Models 3 and 6 interact RDPC vote share with voter turnout.  
 The literature suggests that vote share should be positively correlated with 
government spending. Regardless of whether spending is greatest for swing districts 
that vote for the ruling party or ruling party strongholds, spending should always be 
lowest in districts that vote for the opposition. Thinking further about voter turnout 
(and the interaction between voter turnout and vote share for the ruling party), we 
should expect spending levels to be lowest for districts where vote share for the RDPC 
is lowest, and perhaps especially in such districts where turnout is high. Inversely, at 
least according to Blaydes, spending should be highest in areas with high vote totals 
for the RDPC, particularly where voter turnout is also high. Alternatively, it is also 
possible that the government might spend more in areas with middling levels of 
support for the ruling party. 
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Table 18: The Effect of Voter Behavior on Government Spending 
Per Capita 
Government 
Spending by 
District 
2013 Legislative Election 2011 Presidential Election 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Voter Turnout x  
RDPC Vote Share 
-- -- 0.012 
(0.032) 
-- -- 0.004 
(0.024) 
Vote Share for 
RDPC 
0.125 
(0.213) 
0.084 
(0.137) 
-0.829 
(2.544) 
-0.696 
(0.795) 
-0.631 
(0.886) 
-0.855 
(1.733) 
Voter Turnout 0.443 
(1.010) 
-0.109 
(0.644) 
-0.876 
(2.076) 
1.313 
(0989) 
0.742 
(1.051) 
0.410 
(2.223) 
Regional Capital 
 
 
-- -0.555 
(8.039) 
-0.899 
(8.58) 
-- -14.62 
(24.08) 
-15.02 
(25.05) 
Distance from 
Yaoundé  
-- 0.000 
(0.0029) 
0.000 
(0.030) 
-- 0.038 
(0.079) 
0.039 
(0.078) 
District’s Area,  
Kilometers  
Squared 
 
-- 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-- -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Per Capita 
Government 
Spending, lagged 
-- 1.055*** 
(0.092) 
1.051*** 
(0.092) 
-- 0.541 
(0.639) 
0.536 
(0.630) 
Centre Region 1.221 -4.678 -4.756 10.20 21.06 20.82 
East Region 13.01 4.073 4.738 17.33 34.59 34.45 
Far North Region -9.819 -1.589 -1.470 -17.48* -37.72 -38.46 
Littoral Region 28.81 10.65 10.13 16.11 15.36 14.99 
North Region -12.29 -4.693 -4.156 -6.440 -11.10 -11.29 
Northwest Region -11.89 -5.572 -5.091 -19.48 -24.75 -24.26 
South Region 131.6** -0.517 1.412 139.7 144.8 144.1 
Southwest Region 6.603 7.203 6.921 -4.101 -10.55 -10.19 
West Region -8.505 -1.657 -1.625 -15.31 -12.86 -12.13 
Constant -23.23 6.241 66.14 -18.172 2.146 20.67 
N 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-Squared 0.506 0.936 0.936 0.397 0.418 0.418 
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 Overall, as presented in Table 18, there does not appear to be a strong 
statistical relationship between voter behavior and government spending for either 
legislative or presidential elections. Regardless of model specification or election type, 
electoral behavior—vote share or turnout—is never statistically significant. Further, 
although the coefficient is positive for RDPC vote share for the 2013 election, it is 
negative for the 2011 presidential election. If we could distinguish the relationship 
between spending and behavior from zero, it would appear that the government spent 
less in districts with higher vote shares for the President.  
 In order to better understand these results, Figures 14, 15, and 16 plot the 
predicted probabilities of spending for the interactive models in Table 18 (Models 3 
and 6). Figure 14 presents the interactive effect of turnout and RDPC vote share on 
government spending the year after the 2013 legislative election. The x-axis plots 
turnout levels from their minimum (68.4 percent) to their maximum (88.2 percent) 
while the y-axis plots the predicted probability of per capita government spending 
given various levels of turnout and vote share. The red line represents a district with a 
high vote share for the ruling party (90 percent), while the blue line represents a 
district with a low vote share for the ruling party (30 percent). 
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Figure 14: Predicted Probabilities of Spending in Strongholds, 2014 
 
 
 The relationship follows the theoretical prediction. On average, spending is 
about the same for all districts with relatively low levels of voter turnout. In districts 
that vote for the opposition, spending decreases as turnout increases, such that a 
district with high turnout for the opposition is predicted to receive about 10 CFCA 
(roughly two cents) per capita less per year than an opposition district with very low 
turnout. Inversely, an RDPC district with high turnout is predicted to receive about 4 
CFCA (1 cent) more per capita than an RDPC district with relatively low turnout. 
However, these differences are not statistically significant.   
 Figure 15 plots the results of the same model, but this time focuses on the 
marginal effects of vote share at more narrow intervals. Perhaps the contrast is not 
strongest between opposition and ruling party strongholds, but instead between 
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districts that vote very narrowly for the opposition versus just barely for the ruling 
party. Figure 15 presents the predicted probabilities of spending for different levels of 
turnout for districts where the vote share for the ruling party is just below and above 
50 percent. The plot shows that spending is virtually identical in districts that voted 
narrowly for the RDPC (55 percent vote share) versus districts that voted just narrowly 
for the opposition. 
 
Figure 15: Predicted Probabilities of Spending in Swing Districts, 2014 
 
  
 
 Finally, Figure 16 presents the same predicted probabilities as Figure 14, but 
this time looking at the 2011 presidential election. The minimum and maximum 
turnout values have expanded, but variation in vote share remains similar to the 2013 
municipal and legislative elections. Similar to the 2013 election, there is not a 
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significant relationship between voting behavior and government spending. However, 
the marginal effects patterns are different for the presidential election. The data 
suggests that the government spends more in districts with higher turnout, regardless 
of which party the district elects. According to the literature, this pattern makes sense 
for districts that vote for the ruling party, but no theory predicts that the government 
rewards high turnout in districts that vote overwhelmingly for the opposition. 
 
Figure 16: Predicted Probabilities of Spending, 2012 
 
 
 
 It is important to note that one of the reasons we may see little evidence for 
Magaloni’s hypothesis about swing districts is that there are relatively few close 
contests in Cameroon. For the most recent 2013 legislative elections, only six electoral 
districts (of 83 total) changed parties; the vast majority of districts re-elected their 
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deputies from the same party that already represented that district. Table 19 below 
presents the vote totals and budgetary changes for those six electoral districts. Five of 
the six districts (Djerem, Nyong et Kéllé, Mayo Danay Sud, Bui South, and Munchum 
North) switched from the RDPC to an opposition party. Only Mayo Tsanaga Nord 
switched from the opposition to the RDPC (though it went from split representation to 
full ruling party representation). 
 
Table 19: Districts the Elected Different Parties in the 2013 Elections 
District 
2007 RDPC Vote 
Share 
(MP’s Party) 
2013 RDPC Vote 
Share 
(MP’s Party) 
2014 – 2012 
Budgetary Change 
(CFA per capita) 
Djerem 46.0% (RDPC) 
49.0% 
(UNDP) +6.053 
Nyong et Kéllé 55.4% (RDPC) 
49.1% 
(UPC) -0.891 
Mayo Danay Sud 48.9% (RDPC) 
49.8% 
(MDR) -2.708 
Mayo Tsanaga 
Nord 
48.1% 
(2 RDPC; 2 
UNDP) 
52.6 
(RDPC) +1.023 
Bui South 52.1% (RDPC) 
46.9% 
(SDF) +2.004 
Menchum North 59.1% (RDPC) 
46.5% 
(SDF) -1.322 
 
 
 
 For the one district that gained more RDPC representatives, spending did 
indeed increase from the year before the election (2012) to the year after the election 
(2014). However, for the five districts that switched to the opposition, there is no 
discernable trend in the pattern of funding changes. Three districts did in fact receive 
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less per capita investments after the election (Nyong et Kéllé, Mayo Danay Sud, and 
Menchum North), but two actually received more investments (Djerem and Bui 
South). Magaloni argues that these swing districts should be where the government 
focuses its attention on strategic electoral patronage spending. In the Cameroonian 
context, it does not appear that the government is particularly interested in such a 
strategy.  
 
Voting Behavior as the Dependent Variable 
The following analyses flip the equation by estimating the effect of 
government spending on voter turnout in each district the year before the most recent 
election. For the first set of models, presented in Table 20, the dependent variable is 
voter turnout in the 2013 election at the level of the electoral district. For the second 
set of models in Table 21, the dependent variable is voter turnout in the 2011 
presidential election. The primary independent variable of interest is government 
spending at the level of the electoral district the year before the election (2012 for 
Models 7-9; 2010 for Models 10-12). If citizens vote primarily in response to 
economic incentives, then we should expect voter turnout to be highest in districts that 
receive the most government investments.  
 In Model 7 and Model 10, the regression is run on all electoral districts of 
Cameroon. Models 8 and 11 estimate the model only on ruling party districts (districts 
that have elected their MPs solely from the RDPC since 1997), in order to discern if 
there is a special relationship between spending and turnout in core RDPC districts. 
Finally, Models 9 and 12 are run only on swing districts. If citizens primarily vote to 
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obtain electoral patronage, then we should expect higher levels of turnout where per 
capita government spending is greatest. 
 As the results in Table 20 show, controlling for a modest number of 
confounding factors, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
government investment spending the year before the election and voter turnout in the 
ensuing legislative election. The relationship between these two variables appears to 
be small and negative, but never statistically significant, regardless if we look at the 
relationship in all electoral districts, just ruling party districts, or just swing districts. 
Though voter turnout varies considerably amongst different districts, its variation is 
not explained well by government spending the year before the election. If the 
government is hoping to boost turnout through investment spending, the strategy does 
not appear particularly effective.  
 Table 21 estimates the same statistical models as those in Table 20, but using 
electoral data from the 2011 presidential election. The dependent variable in Models 
10–12 is voter turnout in the 2011 presidential election, and the primary independent 
variable is government spending the year before the election (2010). Again, Model 10 
estimates this relationship across all electoral districts in Cameroon, Model 11 
estimates the same regression on just core districts of the RDPC, and Model 12 
estimates the model on just swing districts.  
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Table 20: The Effect Spending on Turnout in the  
2013 Legislative and Municipal Election by District Type 
Voter Turnout by 
District 
Model 7: 
All  
Districts 
Model 8: 
Ruling Party 
Districts Only 
Model 9: 
Swing  
Districts Only 
2012 Government 
Spending, per capita 
 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.062 
(0.076) 
Vote Share for RDPC 
 
0.003 
(0.033) 
0.083 
(0.084) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
Regional Capital 
 
 
-5.933*** 
(0.833) 
-4.598* 
(2.481) 
-5.593*** 
(1.261) 
Distance from Yaoundé  
 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
District’s Area,  
Kilometers Squared 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Centre Region 4.202 6.750 11.06* 
East Region 0.100 2.365 -0.061 
Far North Region 6.999 0.698 2.815 
Littoral Region 5.215* 9.721** 5.545 
North Region 5.510** 3.562 2.568 
Northwest Region 9.694*** -- 9.556** 
South Region 1.908 3.149 -- 
Southwest Region 5.378** 8.658** 2.670 
West Region 9.599*** 13.80*** 8.146 
Constant 73.25*** 61.94*** 69.35*** 
N 58 26 29 
R-Squared 0.699 0.716 0.847 
Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
**p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Similar to the findings for the 2013 election, the relationship between spending 
the year before the election and turnout in the 2011 presidential election is not 
statistically significant. When considering spending and turnout in ruling party 
districts (Model 11), the coefficient continues to be negative. However, unlike the 
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previous models, the coefficient for government spending in 2010 is positive across all 
districts (Model 10) as well as just swing districts (Model 12). However, the 
relationship is not statistically significant. Collectively, voter turnout appears to be 
similar regardless of how much the government spends in a given district the year 
before the election. 
 Although government spending the year before the election is never a 
statistically significant predictor of voter turnout, several of the control variables do 
have a significant relationship with turnout. In the 2013 legislative elections (Models 
7-9), turnout is systematically lower in regional capitals than in non-capitals. 
Interestingly, for the 2011 presidential election, there is a strong positive correlation 
between vote share for the ruling party and voter turnout. This is likely because while 
some local legislative elections remain competitive, citizens in opposition and swing 
districts may see these elections as more important to vote in. Alternatively, the 
presidential election is a foregone conclusion, and turnout in opposition districts is 
uniformly lower for these contests. For example, the most steadfast opposition district, 
Mezam (Bamenda) featured a turnout level of 77.6 percent for the 2013 legislative 
election, compared to a paltry 51.1 for the previous presidential election in 2011. 
Citizens in opposition districts (who support the opposition) likely see voting in 
legislative elections as more productive than voting in presidential elections. 
Nonetheless, the data in Tables 20 and 21 do not provide much evidence that, 
collectively, citizens respond to government spending by voting in elections. 
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Table 21: The Effect Spending on Turnout in the  
2011 Presidential Election by District Type 
Voter Turnout by 
District 
Model 10: 
All  
Districts 
Model 11: 
Ruling Party 
Districts Only 
Model 12: 
Swing  
Districts Only 
2010 Government 
Spending, per capita 
0.075 
(0.237) 
-0.511 
(0.475) 
0.228 
(0.440) 
Vote Share for RDPC 
 
0.574*** 
(0.139) 
0.831* 
(0.444) 
0.715*** 
(0.216) 
Regional Capital 
 
 
-5.762*** 
(1.956) 
-6.076 
(4.322) 
-5.852 
(3.549) 
Distance from Yaoundé  
 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.031) 
0.036 
(0.022) 
District’s Area,  
Kilometers Squared 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Centre Region 8.033 1.436 15.58 
East Region -4.056 -7.045 -3.791 
Far North Region -4.171 8.243 -12.90 
Littoral Region 4.319 17.31 12.52 
North Region -8.246* -0.989 -12.86 
Northwest Region 15.10** -- 21.94** 
South Region 11.93** 8.849 -- 
Southwest Region 7.507 11.63 18.44* 
West Region 12.15*** 14.99 18.28* 
Constant 11.01 2.130 -13.61 
N 58 26 29 
R-Squared 0.757 0.681 0.851 
Coefficients are reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses.  
**p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Government and Party Influence on Electoral Behavior 
 Taken together, the analysis in this chapter has shown that there is not a strong 
relationship between government spending and electoral behavior in Cameroon. On 
the one hand, it does not appear that election results play a large role in the central 
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government’s allocation of investments. On the other hand, citizens also do not appear 
any more or any less likely to vote when their district receives more resources from 
the government (relative to other districts).  Why wouldn’t the government use the 
power of the purse to influence voting behavior during elections? If the state is not 
using budgets to influence voter turnout, what does it do to get people to vote? The 
following section offers answers to these questions. 
 
The Lack of Electoral Patronage 
 Why doesn’t the government invest more in districts that support it and punish 
districts that vote for the opposition? The logic of electoral patronage is weak in 
Cameroon for two inter-related reasons. First and foremost, the regime has built its 
hegemony over politics through institutional and systemic means; the government 
knows it will not lose power through elections. The opposition is so thoroughly 
defeated that the need to demonstrate its weakness further is generally redundant, 
especially given the expense (both fiscally and politically) of electoral patronage. 
Second, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, the regime is not overwhelmingly popular, 
has not created an inclusive, popular ruling party, and therefore likely does not seek to 
maximize voter turnout during elections if it does not need to. 
 First, existing theories implicitly assume that the national budget is a fixed 
amount, and the central government has full authority to direct funds wherever it sees 
fit. While of course it is in theory possible for a government to spend however it wants 
to, allocation decisions are always costly for the government in terms of reserving its 
own political capital. Spending a dollar in District A means not spending that dollar in 
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District B. If the government truly fears losing an election or feels that cowing the 
opposition is a major priority, then it may be politically efficient to allocate budgetary 
investments according to the logic of electoral patronage. But if this is not a major 
priority, then it will be politically costly for the government to reward ruling party 
strongholds when it has more pressing priorities, such as development goals or other 
reasons for distributing economic rewards.  
 As discussed in Chapter Three, since independence, the primary goal of the 
RDPC  (and the UNC and UC before it) has not been to build mass popularity and 
legitimacy, but instead to coopt political elites. As van de Walle wrote nearly 25 years 
ago in regards to economic policy in Cameroon: “Reform and economic austerity can 
be imposed on the general population; it is the state elite that will not tolerate the end 
of a system of prerogatives and privilege that is the glue that keeps it together” (1993, 
359). In this sense, little has changed in Cameroon; the regime is fundamentally an 
elite-centered operation with little regard for mass public opinion or voter turnout. 
 If the ruling party is an elite-coopting party and not a mass legitimacy party, 
then basing spending decisions on electoral returns is not highly efficient. For 
example, the literature has unambiguously argued that the government should 
consistently spend less in opposition districts in order to punish the opposition and its 
supporters. But if the party is trying to coopt opposition elites, then it may make more 
sense to send larger investments to opposition districts in an effort to make them a 
loyal opposition. An opposition MP who gets more than his fair share of investment 
money for his constituency may be less inclined to fiercely attack the ruling party. 
Further, an elite’s loyalty to the regime may not be adequately measured by his 
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constituency’s support for the ruling party. A highly loyal and valuable MP may not 
necessarily come from a highly loyal or valuable constituency. Thus the regime may 
reward an MP with constituency-level budgetary investments, even if turnout for the 
regime in that district is not high or overwhelmingly pro-regime. 
 Although the government does not allocate investments according to the logic 
of electoral patronage, we might still expect to see citizens responding to these 
investments with their decision to vote. However, as demonstrated with survey data in 
Chapter Four, citizens who believe in the logic of electoral patronage do not appear 
any more or less likely to vote than citizens who do not believe in electoral patronage. 
Further, as the statistical analysis in this chapter has shown, constituencies that receive 
more government investments do not feature higher levels of voter turnout than 
constituencies that receive fewer investments. If citizens are aware of the logic of 
electoral patronage, why don’t they respond to such inducements by voting? 
 As I have argued elsewhere in this dissertation, most citizens have seen so few 
investments in their constituencies that the promise of economic patronage is no 
longer credible. For example, the largest group of citizens who “completely agree” 
that “if voter turnout is high in your district, the government will reward the district” 
come from opposition districts—precisely where this logic should be least convincing. 
Citizens in opposition districts who express a belief in the logic of electoral patronage 
are expressing a belief that the system is rigged against them, not a belief that if they 
vote they will receive a reward.  
 These citizens believe that electoral patronage exists in Cameroon, but that it 
benefits other areas of the country, and not their own. An astounding 76 percent of all 
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Cameroonians surveyed said that their Deputy has made no difference in their lives, 
indicating that a general belief in the systemic existence of electoral patronage may 
not translate into any personal experience with the practice. Interestingly, when 
compared to citizens in RDPC districts or swing districts, a larger proportion of 
citizens in opposition regions believe that their MP has made a difference in their life. 
On the whole, citizens in opposition regions are happier with their MPs than citizens 
of RDPC strongholds or swing strongholds. In opposition strongholds, 14.6 percent of 
citizens reported “very positive” feelings toward their MP, compared to 9.3 percent of 
citizens in RDPC strongholds and just 5.9 percent of citizens in swing districts. 
Inversely, citizens in opposition strongholds are less happy with the National 
Assembly as a whole: only 23.4 percent of opposition residents trust the National 
Assembly “somewhat” or “a lot,” as compared to 38.9 percent of RDPC district 
residents and 33 percent of swing district residents. 
 Overall, people are generally unsatisfied with the government and the economy 
in Cameroon—only 2.2 percent of Cameroonians say that present economic condition 
in Cameroon is “very good,” compared to 34.8 percent who say it is “very bad”—and 
while many citizens may believe that the government allocates budgetary investments 
according to electoral returns, few believe that they are (or could be) the beneficiaries 
of such a practice. This chapter has tried to show that not only does the government 
not invest money primarily based on voter turnout patterns, but also that citizens do 
not systematically respond to economic investments by voting. Given the many 
diverse priorities of the central government, including the cooptation of elite political 
actors, rewarding loyal constituencies with budgetary investments is but one reason to 
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allocate funding. Given the evidence presented in this chapter, I argue that it is not a 
top priority for the Cameroonian government. Further, given the meager number of 
investments doled out to each constituency every year, few citizens believe that their 
constituency is being rewarded relative to other constituencies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPLICATIONS, SIGNIFICANCE, AND EXTERNAL VALIDITY 
  
 
This dissertation has made two broad arguments. First, even in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where party systems are notoriously weak, partisanship matters for 
understanding the basic beliefs and political behavior of ordinary citizens. The theory 
presented in Chapter Two proposed that, as an analytical framework, partisanship can 
help us better understand why everyday people participate in politics. Citizens are not 
randomly distributed into categories of partisanship. Instead, citizens with higher 
levels of socioeconomic status are better positioned—both socially and 
instrumentally—to engage in politics, and thus are more likely to identify as partisans. 
Further, electoral autocracies feature unique political cleavages that are critical to 
understanding different types of partisans. Citizens who identify with the ruling party 
tend to support the status quo and see the state as legitimate and relatively democratic. 
Inversely, opposition partisans tend to see the regime as illegitimate and autocratic. 
Nonpartisans, who possess lower levels of socioeconomic status, are less politically or 
ideologically committed to beliefs about the legitimacy of the state. Chapter Three 
showed that even in a case like Cameroon, where political parties are historically 
hierarchical and elite-centered, there is systematic variation in the types of citizens 
who support parties. 
 Second, I have also argued that it is critical to understand the non-economic 
motivations that citizens have for participating in politics. Though the literature on 
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autocratic elections has focused on patronage and vote-buying to explain political 
behavior, and existing work on political participation in Africa has centered on 
ethnicity, this dissertation has instead argued that citizens also have expressive and 
social reasons for participating in elections. As I proposed in Chapter Two, not only 
do citizens in general possess non-economic motivations, but also different types of 
citizens vote for different types of expressive and social reasons. Using a framework 
of partisanship can help us better understand why different people participate for 
different reasons. Chapter Four presented data to support these claims, showing that 
ruling party partisans are most likely to vote when they feel that voting is a civic duty, 
while opposition partisans are more likely to vote when they believe that voting can 
improve democracy. Nonpartisans participate in elections when they feel social 
pressure from their families and communities to vote. Using macro-level data, Chapter 
Five showed that there is little evidence to support the argument that Cameroonians 
vote primarily because they receive investments from the state.  
 Taken together, this dissertation poses a conspicuous challenge to the way that 
we think about politics in electoral autocracies. Therefore, a number of concerns are 
raised by these theoretical departures.  First and foremost we must ask: So what? Thus 
far, the dissertation has worked on the assumption that understanding political 
behavior in electoral autocracies is inherently important. But how do the differences in 
the theory presented here reflect on the implications of existing theories? What can a 
theory of partisanship or expressive political behavior tell us about authoritarianism 
more broadly? Second, to what degree is the theory presented in this dissertation 
driven by its case selection? To the extent that Cameroon is a unique case of 
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autocracy, how can we extend these findings to other cases? Finally, given the 
theoretical departures of this dissertation from the existing literature, it is critical to 
outline the contrasting research agenda proposed by its findings. If non-economic 
political behavior is important to understanding authoritarian politics, I propose that 
future work on electoral authoritarianism must take seriously the role not only of non-
economic participation, but also partisan identification and political cleavages between 
ordinary citizens. The following sections discuss these issues. 
 
Implications of the Theory 
 If citizens of electoral autocracies vote primarily for non-economic reasons, 
how do the implications of their behavior differ from a world in which citizens 
primarily have economic motivations for voting? If partisanship can give us analytical 
leverage on political behavior, how can we use a framework of partisanship to 
understand other aspects of autocratic politics? The theory in this dissertation implies 
three important differences in our broader expectations about autocratic politics.  
First, from a more micro-level perspective, expressive and social reasons for 
voting can shed light on the campaign strategies of parties, candidates, and elites, 
which provide us with a whole range of possibilities that we are blinded to if we focus 
solely on strategies of vote-buying and patronage. Second, the significance of voter 
turnout takes on a different meaning and has different consequences if citizens vote 
primarily for expressive and social reasons. Third, and relatedly, many of our theories 
of autocratic regime stability rely on arguments about economic growth and 
inequality, which are predicated on the argument that citizens only support or tolerate 
 184 
the regime when they receive economic incentives to do so. But if most citizens do not 
receive or expect to receive economic benefits from the state, then economic growth 
and redistribution may not always be the cornerstone to explaining regime stability. 
 First and foremost, one of the clearest implications of the theory in this 
dissertation is that political parties in electoral autocracies use different political 
messages to mobilize different types of voters during elections. Only a few studies 
have looked closely at political campaigns in autocratic regimes. Lust-Okar (2006, 
2008), analyzing legislative campaigns in Jordan, and Shehata (2008), who conducts 
an ethnography of a legislative campaign in Cairo, Egypt, both highlight the singular 
centrality of issues of clientelism, patronage, and constituency service within these 
campaigns. However, while several authors touch on the differences between 
candidates who run for the opposition versus the ruling party (Blaydes 2011, Chapter 
8; Magaloni 2006, 22; Reuter and Gandhi 2011),65 Greene (2007) offers the strongest 
and most comprehensive theoretical claim over this question of campaign strategies in 
electoral autocracies. He argues that because of their enormous advantages vis-à-vis 
control over the state, ruling parties campaign almost exclusively on economic issues. 
However, opposition parties, who are not so advantageously positioned, tend to focus 
more heavily on political issues. He emphasizes that these ideologically-oriented 
opposition parties are condemned to being niche organizations because their messages 
only appeal to a small subset of citizens. 
  While this is a critical departure from the overwhelming emphasis of the 
literature on issues of economic patronage and vote-buying, it does not go far enough 
                                                
65 Which thus implies differences in campaign techniques and political messages. 
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in exploring the nuance and importance of non-economic political campaigning for the 
ruling party. By focusing on the economic dominance of the ruling party, we may be 
missing the political and social foundations for its rule (as opposed to the economic 
foundations). While economic issues are seriously important for understanding the 
campaign rhetoric of ruling parties, they are most certainly not the only messages that 
these parties use to attract voters. Further, by dismissing the political messages of 
opposition parties as niche, or only appealing to tiny constituencies of voters, the 
theory also overlooks a critical aspect of political communication in electoral 
autocracies. While opposition voters may constitute a minority of citizens in electoral 
autocracies, they are a critically important minority. Ruling parties tend to be obsessed 
with countering the claims made by the opposition, which is more than just ‘empty 
rhetoric’ when it impacts the beliefs and actions of voters. By reorienting our focus on 
political campaigns to ideological, expressive, and social messaging, we open up the 
possibility of understanding a whole host of legitimizing techniques used by both 
ruling parties and oppositions.   
 Relatedly, if citizens are voting for expressive and social reasons, where and 
how do they develop these motivations? Citizens are not born with an innate sense of 
civic duty or desire for democracy. Instead, these expressions of identity are likely 
learned from political messages from the state and from the political parties 
themselves. Thus, not only does a focus on the political communications of parties tell 
us about their campaign tactics, but it also has the potential to tell us about the political 
socialization of ordinary citizens (Letsa 2017). By refocusing our attention away from 
vote-buying and patronage, we can better understand how citizens in autocratic 
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countries learn about politics, how they develop diverse political stances toward the 
state, and how these beliefs feed back into the tactics, failures, and successes of 
parties.  
 In addition to shifting our attention to the significance of autocratic electoral 
campaigns, the theory presented in this dissertation also introduces nuance into the 
way that we interpret the meaning of voter turnout in autocratic elections. By and 
large, the literature has assumed that the regime seeks to produce high levels of voter 
turnout because high turnout signals to the opposition and the international community 
that the regime and ruling party are strong and legitimate (Blaydes 2011, 17; Magaloni 
2006). As Magaloni writes, “The pillar of a hegemonic-party regime is its monopoly 
of mass support…Hegemonic parties are oversized governing coalitions that are 
largely sustained through the distribution of government spoils and patronage. These 
autocracies strive to sustain oversized governing coalitions rather than minimally 
winning ones because…they want to generate an image of invincibility” (15). 
 While this may be the case in some electoral autocracies, this is not what we 
observe in places like Cameroon, where turnout is usually quite low.66 In part, turnout 
may be explained by levels of partisanship: whereas the PRI in Mexico actively sought 
to create partisans out of ordinary citizens, and then enthusiastically mobilized them to 
vote in elections, the RDPC in Cameroon, as explained in Chapter Three, is an elite-
oriented party that takes as a secondary concern the partisanship of ordinary citizens. 
While the PRI has created partisans who are mobilized to vote during elections, the 
                                                
66 While certainly the ruling party would not highlight these low levels of participation with pride, 
showcasing high levels of turnout does not appear to be a primary concern of the regime. 
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RDPC has not invested in its citizens and does not go above and beyond to mobilize 
them to vote.  
 One of the implications of this dissertation’s theory is that partisanship and 
turnout are likely interactive. Where partisanship is high, and ordinary citizens are 
politically committed to the status quo, high levels of voter turnout are, as the 
literature has emphasized, a sign of regime strength and stability. Where partisanship 
is high, low turnout may be viewed as red flag of regime weakness or illegitimacy. 
Inversely, where partisanship is low—such as in Cameroon, Togo, or Algeria67--high 
levels of voter turnout may not be a sign of regime legitimacy or stability. In electoral 
autocracies that feature low levels of partisanship, high turnout indicates that a large 
number of ideologically uncommitted nonpartisans are participating in politics. This 
may or may not signal danger for the regime, depending on how and why these 
nonpartisans are being mobilized.  
 Given the assumptions of the literature, one of the implications of these 
theories is that electoral autocracies always seek to mobilize citizens in order to 
produce high levels of voter turnout. Why else would the state invest in costly vote-
buying campaigns? But if levels of partisanship vary across autocracies, and vote-
buying is not common, then the meaning of voter turnout is not always so obvious. 
We must seek to better understand why levels of partisanship vary across autocracies, 
and why only some autocratic parties are invested in producing high levels of 
partisanship and voter turnout. Further, given this new set of assumptions, we are 
                                                
67 See Figure 1. 
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primed to investigate the differential role that turnout has in explaining regime 
legitimization in electoral autocracies that feature varying levels of partisanship. 
 Finally, and relatedly, this study questions the principle approach to 
understanding the regime stability of electoral autocracies. By and large, most of the 
literature on autocracy and democratization focuses on providing a political economy 
explanation for when and why regime transitions occur. For example, in two of our 
most foundational theories of regime transition, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) argue that democratization is precipitated by a crisis of economic 
inequality, with issues of economic redistribution at the heart of regime transition. 
Similarly, Magaloni (2006, Chapter 7) argues that economic decline is an underlying 
condition for the de-stability of hegemonic party regimes. Greene (2007) puts 
economic decline squarely at the heart of Mexico’s regime transition:  
The economic crisis beginning in 1982 angered voters and increasingly 
turned them against the PRI. Yet the incumbent continued to win national 
elections until 1997…in large part because the PRI still had access to the 
resources of massive state-owned enterprises, dominated the airwaves in 
campaigns, and outspent competitors by a factor of about ten. By the late 
1990s, in contrast, state control over the economy had decreased 
dramatically and a leaner federal public bureaucracy yielded fewer 
patronage jobs. As a result, the PRI’s national patronage system ran dry 
(8). 
 
 
Because these theories of political participation in electoral regimes rely heavily on 
the importance of patronage and vote-buying, their natural implication is that electoral 
autocracies are in trouble when they can no longer deliver patronage. 
 One of the central claims of this dissertation is that not every electoral 
autocracy has the resources or capabilities to provide mass-based patronage. The 
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implication of this claim is that economic decline may not necessarily precipitate 
regime transition or democratization. Mexico’s story of economic decline is not 
dissimilar to the economic context in Africa. By the 1980s, many African economies 
featured negative growth rates, bloated public sectors, and huge external debts (van de 
Walle 2001). Similar to Mexico, structural adjustment plans in the 1990s liberalized 
the public sector, forcing states to abandon failing parastatals, cut government 
budgets, and decrease the number of state employees. Yet unlike Mexico, electoral 
autocracies such as Cameroon, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe weathered the 
storm. Despite decreased access to resources and a declining standard of living, the 
hegemonic parties in these regimes trudged on, even through the crisis of political 
liberalization, during which many of these countries allowed opposition parties for the 
first time. The theory presented in this dissertation suggests that if electoral patronage 
and vote-buying are not at the center of mass political behavior, then autocratic 
regimes may be better positioned to survive economic decline.  
 
External Validity 
Thus, not only can the theory in this dissertation better describe politics in the 
modal electoral autocracy, but I will also argue that the insights derived from 
autocracy in Africa, with some modifications, can also be applied to middle-income 
countries. Given the unique under-development of the electoral autocracies of sub-
Saharan Africa, can the theory developed in this dissertation be applied outside of 
Africa? If we need a new theory to understand political behavior in sub-Saharan 
Africa’s electoral autocracies, can we expect it to travel outside of Africa? In part, this 
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is an unanswered question. But the response for now must be that citizens of all 
electoral autocracies vote for expressive and social reasons, but the proportion of 
citizens who do so depends on how many vote primarily for economic reasons. 
Although a weak state is not a scope condition of the theory presented in this article, 
the importance of non-economic voting is likely inversely related to economic 
development: As economic rewards for voting become less credible, the proportion of 
citizens voting for non-economic reasons should increase. 
This dissertation has demonstrated that in Cameroon, the proportion of citizens 
who vote for economic reasons is small. And while the existing literature has argued 
that in places like Mexico under the PRI and Egypt under the Mubarak regime, the 
vast majority of citizens vote for economic reasons, these studies have not taken into 
account the possibility of non-economic reasons for voting. Even where economic 
incentives for voting are credible for larger proportions of the population, many 
citizens presumably vote for expressive and social reasons. Given these arguments and 
implications, the following section discusses new research agendas for future work. 
 
 
New Research Agendas 
 With these considerations in mind, the first task for future research is to 
expand the theoretical framework we have for understanding autocratic political 
behavior to include both economic and non-economic motivations for voting. The 
theory of autocratic partisanship developed in Chapters Two and Three can help to 
bridge this divide. I have argued that the experience of partisanship is unique in 
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electoral autocracies, and different types of citizens—based on their socioeconomic 
and political proclivities—vote for different reasons. Thus, based on this framework of 
partisanship, it is possible to incorporate economic reasons for voting in cases where 
these motivations are more credible.  
 If Blaydes (2011) is correct that vote-buying is most common amongst citizens 
with low levels of socioeconomic status, then in more economically developed 
countries, we might expect vote-buying to be most prevalent amongst nonpartisans. 
Miguel, et al. (2015) find that in the Middle East and North Africa, citizens with 
higher socioeconomic status are more likely to vote because they have access to the 
benefits of electoral patronage. Similarly, Frye, et al. (2014) argue that citizens with 
salaried jobs vote when they feel pressure from their employers. Thus we might find 
that ruling party partisans, who tend to possess higher levels of socioeconomic status, 
are more likely to vote because they expect electoral patronage or because they are 
victims of electoral coercion. In more repressive electoral autocracies, such as 
Ethiopia or Zimbabwe, we might find that the decision of opposition partisans to vote 
is strongly related to their fear of retaliation or repression. 
 In sum, a framework of partisanship in electoral autocracies can be expanded 
to incorporate both economic and non-economic motivations for voting, and thus 
better explain outcomes in autocracies with varying levels of economic development. 
While not all electoral autocracies feature the same levels of development or 
repression, I argue that the socioeconomic and ideological foundations of partisanship 
should look similar across all cases of electoral autocracy. Thus, while the economic, 
expressive, and social reasons why these groups participate may not be identical 
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across cases, these three groups of citizens—ruling party partisans, opposition 
partisans, and nonpartisans—should still possess different reasons for voting, and 
these reasons can be tied to their differences in socioeconomic status and political 
attachments to the regime.  
 In addition, there is important work to be done on the implications articulated 
earlier in this chapter. First, future work must take seriously the role that parties and 
candidates play in shaping the political beliefs of ordinary citizens, both in electoral 
autocracies, as well as in Africa more generally. On the one hand, how do parties use 
messages to attract different types of voters? Presumably, parties use a mix of 
economic, ideological, and social campaign messages and tactics to attract supporters. 
Future work should investigate the different messages used by different types of 
parties, and how parties target different types of voters with different types of tactics 
and messages. Do ruling parties use economic messaging to mobilize their base, but 
use socially-based tactics, such as rallies and door-to-door canvassing to mobilize 
nonpartisans or ‘swing’ voters? To what extent are opposition parties forced to rely on 
anti-regime political appeals, and how and when do they expand their messaging? 
Studies that take seriously non-economic campaign appeals have the potential to shed 
light on a host of micro-level dynamics of autocratic elections. 
 On the other hand, how do these political messages reciprocally affect the 
ways that citizens think about voting, elections, and politics more broadly? More than 
two thirds of Cameroonians believe that voting is a civic duty—a fact that the existing 
literature would likely find surprising. Where did these citizens learn that voting is a 
civic duty, and if the regime is viewed as autocratic and elections as an exercise in 
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extracting patronage, why did they internalize this belief? Further, if opposition parties 
appeal to their supporters through messages about democracy, did these parties 
cultivate their supporters to adopt these values, or did they find citizens who already 
held beliefs about the importance of democratization? The answers to these questions 
hold important implications for our theories of democratization. If democratic values 
and a commitment to democratization are instilled in citizens by opposition parties, 
then opposition parties may play a critical role in developing a democratic culture in 
autocratic regimes, even if they fail to win elections or play a major structural role in 
regime transition. 
 In general, this dissertation also proposes that we take partisanship in 
autocracies more seriously. Why do some autocratic ruling parties mobilize voters 
during elections, while others do not? Why do some, but not all, ruling parties create 
partisans out of their citizens? Clearly, partisans are a special group of citizens in 
autocracies, who hold strong political beliefs about the legitimacy of the regime, its 
level of democracy, and its ability to manage and control national issues. If ruling 
party partisans are good for the autocratic regime, why doesn’t every autocratic party 
invest in creating partisans? Or, if every autocratic party does attempt to create mass 
partisanship, then why do some fail where others succeed? On the one hand, we have 
the PRI in Mexico, the CCM in Tanzania, and the BN in Malaysia, which have all 
created high levels of partisanship and go to great lengths to mobilize citizens to vote 
during elections. On the other hand, the RDPC in Cameroon, the MPLA of Angola 
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the party. Providing answers to these foundational questions can give us better 
leverage on understanding the dynamic of politics in otherwise similar regimes. 
 On the whole, this dissertation has made two main arguments: that partisanship 
matters, and that citizens have non-economic reasons for voting. These two simple 
propositions open the door to a host of new research agendas in the field of 
authoritarian politics. If different groups of partisans have different socioeconomic 
characteristics and political beliefs, there are a number of ways they might think or act 
alike. This framework of partisanship has the potential to shed light on everything 
from protest, to social movements to revolution. And if people have non-economic 
motives for participating in politics, we must strive to understand what these are, 
where they come from, and when and why they motivate different people into action. 
 
Understandings of Citizenship Outside of the Western Context 
 In part, the existing literature on political behavior in electoral autocracies has 
relied on assumptions of economic motivations because these types of motivations are 
easier to measure. But they also support a larger normative narrative that autocracies 
are exotic and illegitimate. The broader western public tends to view authoritarianism 
as outside of ordinary politics—that autocratic politics are fundamentally apart; 
extraordinary. In the popular imagination, the Kim Jong-Ils, Talibanis, and Saudi 
princes of the world have helped to make authoritarianism both evil and mysterious. 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine that ordinary citizens in autocratic regimes could share 
the same political experiences and beliefs as citizens in consolidated democracies. 
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How could someone living in a dictatorship believe that voting is a civic duty? How 
could they believe that their elections are free and fair? 
 Political scientists have inadvertently supported this storyline by constructing a 
fundamentally different approach to understanding political behavior in autocratic 
regimes. While it is uncontested that citizens in democracies vote for expressive and 
social reasons, it is harder to imagine that ordinary citizens in autocracies vote for 
similar reasons. Instead, we must rationalize political participation in autocratic 
contexts by insisting that it is economically motivated: Citizens don’t want to 
legitimize the regime by voting, but they do so anyways because they are 
economically incentivized. No doubt, vote-buying occurs in autocracies around the 
world. But for every erstwhile defector who sells her vote, there is a citizen happy to 
participate in elections in order to express their civic duty as a proud citizen.  
 Unfortunately, these tendencies to exotify autocratic politics are multiplied 
when we turn to our understandings of African politics. Political scientists have made 
monumental efforts to normalize African politics in the public imagination. 
Nonetheless, our theories of African political behavior rely overwhelmingly on the 
tropical concepts of ethnic identity and patronage. Again, this dissertation does not 
argue that ethnicity or patronage play no part in explaining political behavior in 
African autocracies. However, I do argue that other (less exotic) reasons for 
participating in politics may have been overlooked because of our singular focus on 
ethnicity, vote-buying and patronage.  
 Politics in electoral autocracies is unique. But, as Bayart (1989) has argued (for 
African politics), it is also banal. In the course of searching for exotic and exciting 
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explanations for politics in extraordinary places, we risk missing a whole host of 
mundane processes that, in fact, may explain more about outcomes than we would 
expect. African citizens, who are increasingly embedded in a highly globalized world, 
are not immune from or ignorant to Western narratives about democracy, elections, 
and citizenship. Although Africans of all nationalities possess unique understandings 
of the world that are different from Western beliefs and practices, they also share with 
Westerners a common normative language about politics and democracy. 
Citizenship—even in Africa’s electoral autocracies—in many ways is shockingly 
mundane. Citizens participate in politics to express identities that are not dissimilar 
from the identities of citizens living in economically developed consolidated 
democracies. Nationalism, patriotism, and support for democracy (Letsa and Wilfahrt 
2017) are increasingly globally-held values. 
 With this in mind, this dissertation implores future work to de-exotify the 
African and the autocratic experiences of ordinary citizens. Public opinion surveys are 
beginning to do much of the legwork in this endeavor. For the first time, surveys are 
reaching countries that were otherwise shut off from the world—particularly the 
electoral autocracies in Africa. By asking ordinary people what they think about 
politics, we are finally permitted to hear voices that have largely been silent in the 
study of comparative politics. Increasingly, a new field of study is developing to 
analyze, contextualize and understand these new voices. While our existing work has 
focused on the extraordinary differences of citizens in these autocratic regimes, we 
might now be surprised to find that these voices sound quite similar to our own. 
 
197 
APPENDIX 1 
REPLICABILITY OF SURVEY RESULTS  
(COMPARISON TO AFROBAROMETER) 
 
 The following Appendix presents the questions and (weighted) responses of 
the 17 Afrobarometer questions that were replicated by the original survey conducted 
for this dissertation, not including the demographic questions. The tables report 
questions that were asked by both the original survey as well as either (or both) Round 
5 and/or Round 6 of the Afrobarometer. Several other questions were originally 
borrowed from the Afrobarometer, but the question wordings were changed after pre-
testing, and therefore these modified questions are not included below. Note that the 
question ordering is not the same across instruments and that other questions unique to 
the author’s survey or to the Afrobarometer are not presented below (question 
numbers for each instrument are included). Such discrepancies in question ordering, 
along with differences in sampling design (the original survey was not conducted in 
the three northern regions of the country) and timing of implementation 
(Afrobarometer Round 5 was conducted in 2013, the author’s survey was conducted in 
2014/2015; and Round 6 was conducted in 2015) may account for differences in the 
findings. 
In this country how free are you to say what you think? 
 Not at all Free 
Not very 
Free 
Somewhat 
Free 
Completely 
Free 
Don’t 
Know/ 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q54) 16.00% 14.87 23.24 45.04 0.84 
Afrobarometer  
Round 5 (Q17A) 10.03% 20.15 33.09 33.03 3.70 
Afrobarometer  
Round 6 (Q15A) 7.28% 17.91 31.09 41.73 1.99 
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In this country how free are you to join any political organization you want? 
 Not at all Free 
Not very 
Free 
Somewhat 
Free 
Completely 
Free 
Don’t 
Know/ 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q55) 4.56% 4.84 20.20 69.01 1.32 
Afrobarometer  
Round 5 (Q17B) 5.67% 8.40 27.16 52.68 6.09 
Afrobarometer  
Round 6 (Q15B) 4.53% 6.91 24.97 59.99 3.60 
 
In this country how free are you to choose whom to vote for without feeling 
pressured? 
 Not at all Free 
Not very 
Free 
Somewhat 
Free 
Completely 
Free 
Don’t 
Know/ 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q56) 3.60% 3.81 15.74 75.73 1.09 
Afrobarometer  
Round 5 (Q17C) 3.21% 5.71 19.76 65.64 5.68 
Afrobarometer  
Round 6 (Q15C) 2.73% 5.37 20.87 68.34 2.70 
 
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
 Yes No Don’t Know/ Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q19) 37.80% 61.99 00.15 
Afrobarometer Round 5 (Q89A) 41.49% 53.29 5.22 
Afrobarometer Round 6 (Q90A) 45.05% 47.18 7.77 
[If respondent replied yes to the previous question]  Which political party do you 
feel close to? 
  RDPC 
 
SDF 
 
Other 
Author’s Survey (Q19A) 74.54% 14.36 10.08 
Afrobarometer Round 5 (Q89B) 69.98% 9.35 12.86 
Afrobarometer Round 6 (Q90B) 71.98% 12.31 11.03 
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In general, would you describe the present economic condition of Cameroon as 
good, bad, or neither good nor bad? 
 Very Good 
Fairly 
Good 
Neither 
Good nor 
Bad 
Fairly 
Bad Very Bad 
Don’t 
Know/ 
Refused 
Author’s Survey 
(Q57) 2.01% 14.06 25.69 21.09 34.29 2.86 
Afrobarometer 
Round 5 (Q3A) 3.09% 27.73 20.21 27.36 17.34 4.27 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q4A) 4.34% 32.19 17.01 29.75 14.71 2.01 
 
How much do you trust the President of the Republic? 
 Not at all 
Just a 
little Somewhat A lot 
Don’t 
know / 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q43) 22.59% 22.23 23.50 27.71 3.97 
Afrobarometer Round 5 
(Q59A) 15.93% 20.62 25.28 30.70 7.48 
Afrobarometer Round 6 
(Q52A) 10.73% 18.5 27.33 39.43 4.01 
 
How much do you trust the National Assembly? 
 Not at all 
Just a 
little Somewhat A lot 
Don’t 
know / 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q39) 32.85% 28.39 22.34 10.49 5.93 
Afrobarometer Round 5 
(Q59B) 25.41% 23.24 25.79 16.03 9.54 
Afrobarometer Round 6 
(Q52B) 23.73% 27.38 25.96 17.59 5.34 
 
How much do you trust ELECAM (the electoral commission of Cameroon)? 
 Not at all 
Just a 
little Somewhat A lot 
Don’t 
know / 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q40) 34.83% 26.33 20.75 13.32 4.77 
Afrobarometer Round 5 
(Q59C) 25.32% 25.79 21.41 16.37 11.10 
Afrobarometer Round 6 
(Q52C) 26.16% 27.38 25.12 15.98 5.36 
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How much do you trust the Ruling Party?  
 Not at all 
Just a 
little Somewhat A lot 
Don’t 
know / 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q41) 35.96% 21.89 22.42 16.21 3.52 
Afrobarometer Round 5 (Q59F) 36.58% 24.21 14.11 13.93 11.18 
Afrobarometer Round 6 (Q52F) 29.53% 25.32 26.77 12.41 5.96 
 
How much do you trust the Opposition Political Parties? 
 Not at all 
Just a 
little Somewhat A lot 
Don’t 
know / 
Refused 
Author’s Survey (Q42) 52.07% 23.58 11.61 7.45 5.29 
Afrobarometer Round 5 
(Q59G) 44.64% 26.34 12.44 6.15 10.42 
Afrobarometer Round 6 
(Q52G) 39.75% 27.03 19.83 7.52 5.87 
 
 
 
On a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 means completely undemocratic and 10 
means completely democratic, where would you place our country today?  
 Sample Average 
Author’s Survey (Q30) 4.88 
Afrobarometer Round 5  (Q46A) 4.84 
Afrobarometer Round 6 (N/A) -- 
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In your opinion, what are the three most important problems facing this country 
that the government should address? 
 Author’s Survey (Q18) 
Afrobarometer  
Round 5 (Q63) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q60) 
Unemployment 23.38% 30.00% 24.53% 
Poverty 11.42 9.49 6.15 
Infrastructure / Roads 10.38 6.34 6.43 
Corruption 9.67 10.02 10.03 
Security / Crime / Boko 
Haram / Political 
Violence / Civil War 
5.34 1.45 6.86 
Education 4.96 4.04 4.39 
Hospitals / Health 4.38 3.81 8.45 
Management of the 
Economy 3.25 5.18 6.63 
Water Supply 2.71 4.84 3.06 
Electricity Supply 2.63 4.05 3.36 
Agriculture 2.54 2.17 4.06 
Wages and Salaries 2.33 8.32 3.44 
Taxes 2.17 1.23 1.40 
Economic Inequality / 
Discrimination / 
Tribalism 
3.38 0.33 0.22 
Democracy / Political 
Rights 1.38 0.88 0.13 
Food Shortage 1.25 2.01 2.12 
Transportation 1.00 0.77 1.02 
Don’t Know 0.83 0.74 0.93 
 
How often do you get news from the radio? 
 Author’s Survey (Q10) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 5 (Q13A) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q12A) 
Everyday 33.74% 40.66% 45.52% 
A few times a week  29.59 26.65 25.31 
A few times a month  13.86 6.64 8.32 
Less than once a month  6.31 4.97 4.74 
Never 16.50 20.94 15.93 
Don’t Know // Refused 00.00 0.15 0.18 
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How often do you get news from the television? 
 Author’s Survey (Q11) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 5 (Q13B) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q12B) 
Everyday 50.84% 55.92% 56.40% 
A few times a week  23.71 20.81 21.48 
A few times a month  9.75 5.59 6.91 
Less than once a month  4.01 1.64 2.73 
Never 11.69 15.75 12.27 
Don’t Know // Refused 00.00 0.30 0.21 
 
How often do you get news from the newspaper? 
 Author’s Survey (Q12) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 5 (Q13C) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q12C) 
Everyday 7.30% 6.2% 5.67% 
A few times a week  13.19 10.78 12.99 
A few times a month  14.61 14.01 19.83 
Less than once a month  11.69 14.90 14.36 
Never 53.13 53.27 46.49 
Don’t Know // Refused 00.00 0.84 0.67 
 
How often do you get news from the internet? 
 Author’s Survey (Q13) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 5 (Q13D) 
Afrobarometer 
Round 6 (Q12D) 
Everyday 9.42% 5.52% 9.64% 
A few times a week  10.09 11.13 10.12 
A few times a month  9.15 7.77 11.90 
Less than once a month  4.43 7.56 8.39 
Never 66.82 67.05 59.38 
Don’t Know // Refused 00.00 0.99 0.57 
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APPENDIX 2 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CAMEROON 
 
*The map depicts the larger administrative electoral districts, but some of these departments 
have been redistricted since 1992 into smaller electoral districts (for example, Benoué in the 
North became Benoué East and Benoué West after 1992). Districts highlighted in red were 
sampled in the survey. 
Ruling Party Stronghold 
Opposition Stronghold 
Swing Area 
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APPENDIX 3 
VOTE BUYING AND LIST EXPERIMENTS 
In recent years list experiments have become a common way for researchers to 
generate responses to sensitive questions in survey research. The structure of the list 
experiment (also known as the item-count technique) is designed to allow survey 
respondents to report their socially sensitive actions and opinions without having to 
reveal outright these thoughts and behaviors to the survey enumerator (Ahart and 
Sackett 2004; Corstange 2009; Droitcour et al. 1991; Imai 2011; Tsuchiya, et al. 
2007). For example, in the American context, they have been used to reveal prejudice 
against African-Americans and other minority groups (Kane, et al. 2004; Kuklinski, et 
al. 1997; Redlawsk, et al. 2010; Streb et al. 2008) as well as socially sensitive personal 
behaviors (Braithwaite and Walsh 2008; Dalton, Wimbush, and Daily 1994; LaBrie 
and Earleywine 2000). More recently, researchers have also begun to apply the list 
experiment technique to vote-buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012).  
In order to avoid social sensitivity bias, respondents are randomly split into a 
control group and one or more treatment groups. Each group is read a list of beliefs or 
activities and asked with how many items they agree. The list is identical for each 
group, except that the treatment group receives an additional belief or activity that is 
socially sensitive. For example, in Cameroon I implemented the following list 
experiment (derived from Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012) in order to reveal the number 
of respondents who received money or a favor in return for their vote in the most 
recent election: 
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I am now going to read a list of activities concerning the legislative and 
municipal elections that took place on September 30, 2013. I do not want 
to know WHICH ones happened during the election, but only the total 
NUMBER of activities that took place. So when I list each activity, you 
should count the ones that you saw happen. When I ask at the end how 
many took place, you should give me a number. Do NOT tell me which 
ones in particular occurred. 
 
1. They put up campaign posters or signs in your community. 
2. They visited your home. 
3. They placed campaign advertisements on the television or radio. 
4. They sent you an email. 
Treatment: They gave you money or did you a favor. 
 
When the researcher compares the two groups’ total averages, the difference in the 
mean number of choices between treatment and control groups is an estimate of the 
percentage of respondents in the treatment group that counted the socially sensitive 
item in their list. Thus, if the average response for the control group if 2.45 while the 
average for the treatment group is 2.75, then 30 percent of respondents in the 
treatment group have “reported” that they received a gift or a favor in the previous 
election. 
 
Criticism and Concerns with the List Experiment 
 
Having conducted this list experiment myself with a total of 1,542 respondents 
in which I personally surveyed over 340 individuals, I have identified a number of 
issues with the list experiment technique. Overall, while the list experiment is 
designed to decrease social sensitivity bias, its cognitive complexity introduces other 
forms of bias that may be difficult to control for. In a meta-analysis of list experiments 
in psychology, Tourangeau and Yan (2007) have already voiced some concern about 
this technique. They find that, taken together, these studies produce a positive 
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treatment effect, but that this overall effect is not significant. However the authors do 
not discuss the potential reasons for these results.  
I identify several potential sources of bias in the list experiment technique, and 
argue that the direction of bias cannot always be accounted for. First and foremost, in 
a face-to-face interviewing context, a large number of respondents simply do not 
follow the instructions, revealing to the survey enumerator the specific list items that 
they are counting. This biases the treatment effect downward by undermining the point 
of the list experiment, and is also potentially correlated with level of education, 
possibly introducing additional bias depending on the treatment being measured.  
In addition, I echo Kramon and Weghorst’s (2012) concerns about the problem 
of satisficing and agree that a potentially large proportion of a sample may not be 
providing accurate responses. I argue further that if people are satisficing, then being 
in the treatment group itself will bias the treatment effect towards 0.50. Because the 
treatment group by definition has more options than the control group, its average will 
be higher when people report random numbers. If the true mean is less than 0.50, then 
there will be upward between-group bias, and if it is less than 0.50, then there will be 
downward bias. 
Other researchers have noted that there is potential bias in list experiment 
reporting, but have argued that this bias is predictable. For example, Zigerell (2011) 
shows that even given the anonymous list format, respondents will still deflate their 
responses to disassociate themselves from the socially sensitive item. However he 
argues that the direction of this bias can be accounted for and that it can be partially 
remedied by careful design for ceiling and floor effects. Similarly, Tsuchiya and Hirai 
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(2010) indicate why respondents may underreport their responses within the context of 
the list experiment, but propose that modifying the response options will remedy the 
issue. Finally, Blair and Imai (2012) discuss the importance of the “no-liar 
assumption,” which requires that respondents always provide truthful responses. 
However, the authors argue that violations of this assumption will only create bias 
through the interaction of the sensitive item with the control items, which can be 
remedied by controlling for floor and ceiling effects.  
I argue instead that satisficing—not lying—produces unpredictable forms of 
bias. Thus, problems with the implementation of the list experiment can introduce 
different forms of bias in the measure of the sensitive item. If these issues are not fully 
accounted for, then it is difficult for the researcher to ascertain the true treatment effect 
of the list experiment.  
 
The Example Survey and List Experiment 
In order to illustrate these points, I draw on my experience implementing my 
survey in Cameroon. Within the total sample, 775 respondents were randomly 
assigned to the control group, while 767 received the treatment list item (“They gave 
you money or did you a favor”).  I was fortunate enough to be able to implement the 
survey personally in every sampled region of the country, interviewing over 340 of the 
list experiment respondents myself. In-depth debriefings with my five research 
assistants confirmed my personal observations about the list experiment detailed 
below.  
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The Difficulty of Following Directions 
The most obvious issue that arose during the implementation of the list 
experiment was the inability of a sizable number of respondents to correctly follow 
directions. After discovering this issue, survey enumerators were asked to record 
whether or not each respondent gave a number in response, or instead listed which 
items they were counting. Fully 31 percent of respondents failed to correctly give a 
numerical option for their response.  
Oftentimes respondents would say “yes” or “no” after each item. Other times 
they would list the items they agreed with after the list was finished. When 
respondents began to do this, I instructed the enumerators to stop the respondent and 
re-read the instructions, allowing the respondent to try to answer the question correctly 
without revealing all of their list items. However, this option was not foolproof, as 
respondents would frequently reveal all of their choices before it was possible to stop 
them, sometimes reacting quickly to the sensitive item which they found surprising. 
Even when it was possible to stop the respondent, many of them failed to follow the 
directions multiple times, never being able to figure out what was being asked of 
them. 
For the first few enumeration sites, my assistants and I simply recorded all 
responses equally—whether or not the directions were correctly followed. This 
approach is clearly problematic, as respondents who reveal their list items are 
violating the purpose of the list experiment. By including both types of respondents 
(those who follow directions and those who do not) in the same category, the 
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researcher biases their treatment effect downward if people who list their items are 
less likely to include the sensitive item.  
 This is especially problematic when the ability to follow instructions is 
correlated with particular demographic characteristics. As seen below in Table 1, in a 
region-level mixed effects logistic regression, where the dependent variable is the 
respondent’s ability to follow directions (recorded by the survey enumerator), level of 
education is significantly related to who could properly follow directions. People with 
less education are less likely to follow directions.  
Thus if a researcher includes the responses of both direction-followers and 
direction-breakers in the same group, the treatment effect will be further biased if the 
sensitive item is correlated with the ability to follow directions. For example, it has 
been argued that in developing countries, less educated citizens are more likely to sell 
their votes (Blaydes 2011). Therefore in this particular list experiment, if the responses 
of direction-breakers had not been separated from those of direction-followers, the 
treatment effect would be doubly diminished for the overall population because less 
educated citizens, who are more likely to sell their votes, are also less likely to follow 
directions.   
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Table A3.1: Explaining the Ability to Follow Directions 
 
 
Respondent Correctly  
Followed Directions 
Rural 
 
 
0.380 
(0.253) 
Female 
 
 
-0.074 
(0.162) 
Age 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
Education 
 
 
0.254*** 
(0.049) 
Socioeconomic Status 
 
 
0.068 
(0.046) 
Interest in Politics 
 
 
0.162** 
(0.073) 
French Speakers 
(baseline = English) 
 
-0.697* 
(0.383) 
Pidgin Speakers 
(baseline = English) 
 
-0.332 
(0.216) 
Constant -0.048 (0.493) 
***p <0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
n = 887 
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Satisficing and Bias from the Treatment Effect 
 
Satisficing can also be a serious issue with list experiments, which require 
significantly more cognitive effort than straightforward yes/no or multiple-choice 
questions (Armstrong, et al. 1975). Satisficing occurs when respondents find the task 
at hand too difficult or taxing, and thus skip one or more steps in the cognitive process 
required to accurately respond to the question (Krosnick 1991; Tourangeau 2000). If a 
respondent finds the instructions confusing or the list items too complex, he may not 
actually count the items on the list that apply to him, but instead report a more-or-less 
random number that seems to be a reasonable response.  
Satisficing is different from not following directions. When someone does not 
follow the directions, they fail to provide a numerical response to the question. When 
someone satisfices, they give a numerical response that is not a true reflection of the 
number of activities or beliefs they agree with. Thus although it is possible to count 
the number of people who do not follow directions, it is not possible to detect the 
number of satisficers in a sample. Kramon and Weghorst (2012) have already 
highlighted some issues with satisficing in the list experiment approach. After 
implementing a non-sensitive list experiment in Kenya, and then asking respondents 
outright about these non-sensitive items, they find that more than 40 percent of 
responses did not match between the two question formats.  
Unfortunately this satisficing doesn’t just create noise around the estimate. I 
argue that it also creates bias. The more satisficing there is in a sample, the more the 
treatment effect is biased towards 0.50 because the control and treatment groups do 
not have the same number of list items. If everyone reports random numbers, but one 
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group can choose between n options, while the second group can choose n +1 options, 
then the difference in means between these two groups, by definition, will be 0.50. For 
example, if the control group has four list items (average of 4.0 = 2.0) while the 
treatment list has five items (average of 5.0 = 2.5), then the average “treatment” effect 
will necessarily be 50 percent. Thus, the more common satisficing is, the closer the 
treatment effect will be to 0.50. If the “true” treatment effect is 0.50, then no bias is 
introduced. But if we do not know what the true treatment effect should be—and if the 
researcher is using a list experiment, then it is likely that the true treatment effect is 
not known—it is impossible to know if this bias exists, or if it is artificially pushing 
the treatment effect upwards or downwards.  
 Researchers have assumed that if satisficing occurs, it will be randomly 
distributed across the control and treatment groups, and therefore will not create any 
bias in the treatment effect. This is not always a safe assumption, as the numerical 
average for the treatment group will be higher than the control group simply because 
there are more options to choose from in the treatment than in the control. Further, it is 
unclear what effect this bias will have unless the true treatment effect is already 
known, or it is possible to somehow identify satisficers. Researchers have tended to 
assume that the higher their treatment effect is, the better their list experiment must be 
working (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010), but it is entirely possible that a large 
treatment effect may instead be the result of extensive satisficing. 
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Conclusions 
 
 Given these issues with list experiments, I caution researchers against their use, 
at least in face-to-face interviews. First, if they are used in such a context, it is critical 
that survey enumerators record the ability of each respondent to follow the directions 
of the list experiment. Grouping the responses of direction-followers with the 
responses of direction-breakers will bias the treatment effect downward, if the 
treatment item is indeed socially sensitive. Second, satisficing is prevalent and can 
create not just noise around the true estimate, but also bias. It is much more difficult to 
correct for this bias because it is impossible to identify satisficers.  
 Nonetheless, a number of partial remedies can be used to improve the clarity of 
the question and reduce satisficing. First and foremost, extensive pre-testing is an 
important step in working out misunderstandings. In particular, each list item (not just 
the treatment) should be asked explicitly in order to get a sense of how people 
understand each one. Additionally, a ‘practice’ list experiment might fix problems 
involved with following the directions of the actual list experiment. I implemented this 
technique during the second half of survey implementation and found it to be only 
partially successful.  In total, 552 respondents received a ‘practice’ list experiment 
before the actual list experiment and 732 received no practice. Roughly 60 percent of 
respondents who did not get a practice list were able to correctly follow the directions 
of the ‘real’ list experiment. Sixty-eight percent of respondents who did get practice 
correctly followed the directions. Thus there was some improvement, but the method 
was not perfect. In addition, 6.52 percent of respondents who followed directions on 
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the practice list experiment failed to correctly respond in the real experiment! 
Unfortunately this cannot tell us how practice affects satisficing. 
 In addition, Kramon and Weghorst (2012) recommend using a “tick” or 
tabulation system whereby a respondent is given an erasable list of the question items, 
so that they may check with a pen the items they agree with, and erase their responses 
at the conclusion of the question. In order to help illiterate respondents, they also 
recommend the inclusion of pictures or cartoons to help respondents visualize and 
understand the list options. They find that these techniques have the potential to 
decrease the number of satisficers and improve the quality of responses.  
 With all of these recommendations in place, the list experiment is still a risky 
option for researchers with sensitive survey questions. While asking a sensitive 
question outright produces response bias, it is clear that this bias will be downward. 
The list experiment, on the other hand, produces several forms of bias that can be 
conflicting in direction and difficult to know the direction of. Therefore caution is 
needed in interpreting the results of any list experiment. Researchers tend to argue that 
the larger their treatment effect the better the list experiment must be working, but it 
critical to keep in mind that upward inflation of the treatment effect may be an artifact 
of satisficing more than anything else. 
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